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In the 1950s and 1960s, after gaining independence from their colonial powers, most developing 
countries adopted ―market substitution‖ as their policy for economic development and growth. In 
essence, this was an industrialisation strategy followed by these developing economies to 
concentrate on home-grown products and nurture their expertise in order to reach the status of 
industrialised nations. However, by the end of 1970s, many developing countries began to realize 
the failures of their inward-looking approach to industrialization when their economies were 
mired with high unemployment, inflation and chronic external debt. By the middle of 1980s, 
many of these countries began to change their policies and reorient themselves into market 
economies. However, with financial crises and economic recessions that resulted from pursuing 
market driven liberalization policies, these economies began to realize the flaws of the market 
driven approach to industrialization.  Nevertheless, they continued with the liberalised policies 
incorporating market as well as non-market (institutional) reforms, aimed at strengthening 
regulation, improving corporate governance and curbing corruption to avoid the destabilising 
consequences of financial liberalization. 
The evolving economic policies that influenced financial development and growth in developing 
economies came about with the objective of enhancing household and private sector‘s savings. 
These policies have been designed to influence financial development and economic growth 
(which can impact upon private savings) in two different ways: (i) by increasing saving due to 
households taking precautionary motives, or (ii) negatively by spending more due to increase in 
xvii 
 
overall expenditures. Theoretically, the combined effect on private saving is therefore ambiguous.  
The purpose of this thesis is to assess empirically the importance of various economic factors 
influencing private sector savings in emerging market economies. In addition, the influence of 
non-market institutional factors on savings is explored from the incorporation of newly 
institutional measures into these countries economic policies. 
Several econometric methodologies are employed with empirical analysis conducted on data for 
twenty emerging economies across three primary regions in the world, i.e. Asia Pacific, Middle 
East and North African (MENA), and South America. The twenty countries also include other 
emerging economies that are proximate to MENA regions such as South Africa, Turkey and 
Israel. In general, the findings based on SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) methodology 
show that per capita growth, financial development, government savings, and trade openness have 
a positive impact on private savings; while youth and old dependency-age groups, real interest 
rate, and urban growth have a negative effect on private savings. In general, most of these results 
are consistent with previous studies for other countries. 
Additionally, causality tests are conducted using Vector Autoregressive (VAR) methodology as 
well as Pedroni and Johansen cointegration methods within the Vector Error Correction (VEC) 
model to determine both short-term and long-term causality effects between financial 
development and economic growth.  The results indicate that in the long run financial 
development has a causal effect on growth; however, in the short run the results are quite mixed. 
For example, the short run result using the VAR method shows that income growth has Granger 
causality effect on financial development, but the F-test result for the VEC method shows 
evidence of bivariate causality. The long-term causality results also confirm the finding of 
xviii 
 
previous research about the importance of developing financial sector in order to spur the 
country‘s economic growth.  
The final empirical investigation is to conduct panel data regression to test the impact of non-
market institutions on private savings. The main result here is that sound institutional factors 
based on respect for property rights (e.g. bureaucracy, accountability and regulation quality) have 
a positive effect on aggregate private savings. Furthermore, political stability is found to have a 
negative impact on savings while efficient bureaucracy has a positive impact on savings. It can be 
construed that with an uncertain political environment, i.e. diminishing political stability, the 
public in general would save more than spend. On the other hand, efficient bureaucracy would 
boost public confidence about the country‘s governance, which can lead to increased overall 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 In the 1950s and 1960s after gaining independence from their colonial powers, most of developing 
countries found that their economies were impoverished. The only way to play catch up to the high 
living standard enjoyed by the developed nations was to develop their own industries by exploiting 
their own rich natural resources. By early 1960s until most of 1970s, majority of the economic policies 
employed by these developing countries were based on market substitution policies, which promoted 
development of local industry rather than relying on imported goods to satisfy their consumers‘ market. 
The countries tend to impose selective tariffs and established restrictive trade policies to prevent 
imported goods to compete directly with domestically produced products. High import tariffs, 
industrial licensing, and price control became the prevailing economic mantra. State owned enterprises 
or cooperatives were set up by the government to spearhead development in key industrial areas since 
the private sectors were reluctant to undertake due to riskiness and sheer size of the projects. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, most of the economists were of view that the problem holding back the 
development of these countries was not only due to capital shortages, but due to inefficient use of the 
resources (Meier and Baldwin, 1957). Most of the needed capital was from foreign aid, taxation and 
deficit finance. But the majority of financing was derived from the increased in domestic savings 
(Little, 1982; Lewis, 1984). 
The idea of how to improve the domestic savings was originally based on the Keynesian model that 
income is the main driver for savings. Keynes argument was that the effect of real interest rates on 
savings is difficult to ascertain, i.e. which is more dominant, either substitution or income effect should 
the interest rate be increased (Keynes, 1936). Keynesian assumption was that since the effect of interest 
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rate on savings is secondary and difficult to predict, interest rate can be set low enough by banks to 
encourage loans for investment but yet profitable enough that could increase overall domestic income.  
Hence, during the early stage of implementation of import-substitution policy, these countries 
experienced increased growth and income. However, as times passed by, the manufacturing sectors 
began to suffer from high cost, less productivity growth and eventually had to succumb to extensive 
losses. In addition, the quality of the domestically produced products were as not as reliable as the 
imported ones. The manufacturers had become complacent in protecting the quality of their products 
knowing they would be cheaper than the imports due to high tariffs. Eventually, the notion of catching 
up with the rest of developed countries was never materialized.  By the middle of 1970s, there were 
several studies probing the success and failures of import-substitution industries. The seminal work by 
Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) which was based on the works of Gurley and Shaw (1955) rejected 
the monetary models of Keynes, and Keynesians economist, which advocated for low controlled 
interest rates and financial repression.  The newer literatures promoted financial liberalisation and 
pointed to the weakness of growth retarding effect of financial repression.  
In developing economies, financial markets were poor and underdeveloped, hence bank loans and self-
financing became the major source for financing. The choice to store the money are quite limited, 
therefore the economy tends to be highly money intensive. Due to concentration of holding money, low 
deposit rates tend to encourage the population to consume now rather than later, which resulted lower 
overall aggregate savings and investment levels.  
In essence, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argued that financial repression caused disequilibrium, 
which distorted the market from clearing and serving the allocative function in the most efficient way. 
The government tended to impose ceiling on interest rates for deposits and loans. As a result, it created 
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shortages of funds as those with surplus funds would rather invest elsewhere rather than keeping their 
money in low return deposit account. It also contributed to misallocation of funds as the government 
tended to distribute available funds to preferred sectors rather than to those that can best utilise the 
funds. The result is inefficient usage of funds, which then contributed to slow economic growth.  
Shaw‘s (1973) exposition of the adverse impact of low interest rates on investment is rooted in the 
debt-intermediation process.  According to his view, shortages of funds resulted from low interest rate 
that discouraged the population from depositing their savings, which then reduced loanable funds 
available in the banking system. Shaw argued that by liberalizing the financial system and deepening 
the financial sectors, increased financial transactions between savers and borrowers would result.  
These two factors have the effect of increasing the returns to the depositors as well as lessening the 
investor‘s real cost via risk reduction through greater financial diversification and increased operational 
efficiency in the financial system.  
The Mc Kinnon-Shaw doctrine calling for ending financial repression together with exhortation for 
outward oriented trade and industrial policy soon became the new mantra for developing countries. The 
new paradigm shift towards liberalizing the economy together with strong encouragement by IMF-
World Bank had resulted in increasing number of developing countries shifting from import-
substitution and financial repression policies to a more open orientated policies favouring trade and 
financial liberalisation.  
These governments realised the need to increase domestic savings and the only way to reform their 
economy was by liberalizing their financial market. According to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), 
financial liberalisation can affect growth via: i) expanding and improving the financial system 
efficiency ii) provide opportunities for the local companies to access fund from international financial 
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market iii) improve transparency and governance in the domestic financial sector. Initiatives to 
liberalise the financial market began globally with the resolution from Washington Consensus urging 
developing countries, especially Latin American countries to reform and liberalise their financial 
markets and institutions. Originally, the Washington Consensus was the result from John Williamson‘s 
proposition in 1989 for a desirable policy framework for economic growth based on good governance 
reform. The initial form of Washington consensus was simple policy changes based on ten main 
principles: i) liberalisation of trade, ii) elimination of currency overvaluation, iii) reduction on fiscal 
deficit, iv) tax reformation, v)  interest rate liberalisation, vi) liberalisation on foreign direct investment,  
vii) privatisation of government assets, viii) deregulation of the financial markets, ix) reorientation of 
the public expenditure towards offering better returns and x) improved income distributions and finally 
xi) security of property rights.  
By the end of 1990s the original Washington Consensus was improved to be heavily based on 
institutional reform.  The main reason for the improvement was the recognition that the market-
oriented policies are not sufficient without institutional restructuring. In addition, there was concern 
that trade liberalisation may not able to reallocate the economy resources equitably and that financial 
liberalisation may lead to excessive volatility (Rodrik, 2006).  
The newly augmented Washington Consensus mainly emphasized on governance with the following 
aims: i) reduction in corruption,  ii) improving regulatory structure,  iii) ensuring the independence of 
the monetary and fiscal institution from political meddling, iv) strengthening corporate governance, v) 
improving the judiciary system, vii) providing social safety net, reducing poverty, viii) non-interference 
exchange rate regime, compliance to WTO rules, ix) adherence to financial codes and standards and x) 
prudent capital account opening. The new Washington Consensus was referred by the world 
community as the principle of economic reform until its demise in 2008 as a result of the recent global 
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financial crisis. The governments around the world soon realised that the augmented Washington 
Consensus policies were not the panacea to prevent the economic turmoil from recurring. 
Even when most Asian developing economies began to amass sizeable savings in the 1990s, they could 
not prevent the Asian financial crisis experienced in 1997. Most of the domestic savings together with 
foreign capital were mostly used for investments that were channelled to build the countries‘ extensive 
infrastructure and provide growing social services. Due to the excessive borrowing to meet the catch up 
mentality of achieving ―developed nation status‖, it has caused most of the economies exposed to 
negative shock from capital market volatility.  
After  the financial crisis shock, most developing nations have begun establishing varying types of 
institutional frameworks based on the Augmented Washington Consensus to recover to their pre-
financial crisis growth level. As a result, several developing nations, especially Asian economies, have 
grown leaps and bounds in terms of economic growth. The financial crisis of Latin American countries, 
e.g. Argentina and Mexico, however is taking longer, i.e. from 1999 to 2002, before recovering. Their 
growth has been quite modest since most of them have to address the dire economic and financial  
problems in order to boost savings and investment back into their economy.  
1.2 EMERGING ECONOMIES 
The term emerging market economies was first coined in 1980‘s by the World 
Bank economist Antoine van Agtmael.  Carl Olsson (2002, p147) defined emerging markets as ―those 
countries which have started to grow but have yet to reach a mature stage of development and where 
there is significant exposure for economic or political instabilities‖. However, the term ―emerging 
economies‖ or ―emerging market‖ is still loosely used and subjected to various interpretations. Many of 
the definitions are based on GDP per capita of a country which defines whether a country is able to be 
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classified as an emerging economy. However, that definition failed to consider the potentiality for the 
country to grow further in the near future. According to Xin Huang (2007), emerging economies are 
those countries that were not only experiencing problems with their economies, but have great potential 
for further development. Hence, there are those considered lesser developed, but yet being classified as 
‗emerging economies‘ due to the growth potentialities of these countries.  There is general 
understanding that the scope of emerging economy includes the following geographic areas, i.e.: 
i. Latin America ( Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, etc) 
ii. Africa and Middle East (South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco) 
iii. Subcontinents ( Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka etc) 
iv. Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, etc) 
v. Greater China  ( mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, etc)  
According to Kose and Prasad (2010), between 1965 until 1985, the developed economies on average 
accounted for nearly three quarter of the world GDP adjusted in purchasing power parity. By 2008 and 
2009, their contribution share had declined to 57 percent. In contrast, the share of emerging economies 
has risen from 17 percent in 1960‘s to 31 percent by mid 1980‘s and 40 percent by 2008-2009. 
According to the Economist (2006), the exports of the emerging economies have grown from 20 
percent in 1970 to 42 percent in 2005 and produced half of the world output measured at purchasing-
power parity.  They also hold about two thirds of the world foreign exchange reserves and consume 
47% of the world oil.   
Between 1973 and 1985, the developed economies accounted for 60 percent of the 3.4 percent annual 
world growth, whereas the emerging economies contributed only about 30 percent. However, from 
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1987 until 2007, the average growth of the world GDP was 3.7 percent and the emerging economies 
contributed 47 percent, in contrast the developed economies shares fell to 49 percent.  
The Economist (2011) reported that 40 percent of global consumption was from the emerging market 
and therefore a slowdown in these economies would pose substantial risk not only to the growth of the 
developed economies but also to the world.  
This shows that through progressive liberalisation policies, these emerging economies have been able 
to transform into one of the most dynamic and vibrant world economic groupings. As their economy 
expanded and become more globally integrated, the economic policies that they pursued have greater 
impact toward the rest of the world economies (Anand, 2009). Furthermore, Kose and Prasad (2010) 
argue that emerging economies as a group create a decoupling impact from the rest of the world when 
they enter into multilateral financial and trade agreements as well as engaged in trading amongst them 
(Kose and Prasad, 2010).  Eventually, they may not need to rely heavily on other developed nations as 
trading partners to generate growth. This was exemplified by the recent 2007 and 2008 financial 
meltdown experienced mostly by developed countries, in which most emerging economies, especially 
Asia Pacific economies did not experience the contagion effect (Kose and Prasad, 2010). Even those 
that experienced it, e.g. the Latin America countries, their economies managed to rebound quite 
rapidly. Hence, it is indispensible to study the dynamics of the emerging economies as they will 
become the future major contributor for world economic growth.  
1.3 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
The main aim of this thesis is to understand the role of non-market institutional factors in affecting 
aggregate private savings in emerging economies. Several emerging economies have been selected 
from three different regions, i.e. Asia Pacific, Latin America and MENA (Middle East and North 
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African). There have been numerous hypotheses and models discussed in the literature on savings 
behaviour, such as Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH), Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH), Consumer 
Optimization Model and Solow-Swan Model.  These hypotheses are discussed mainly with respect to 
how the changes in savings are affected by demographic, financial and macroeconomic factors.  
On the other side, there are other studies that discuss the origins of law and historical background that 
lead to the establishment of the non-market institutions that exist currently. The study by La Porta 
(1997) on Law and Finance Hypothesis, and Acemoglu et al (2001, 2004) based on two hypotheses, i.e. 
endowment and political process, led to understanding the evolution of institutions and their impact on 
economic growth. In addition, leading economies, such as North (1990), Dixit (2004, and 2009) and 
Rodrik (2000, 2006 and 2008), advocated the importance of institutions to spur and sustain economic 
growth. Based on these two disciplines of study, there is a gap that none of the studies examined the 
impact of institutional factors towards aggregate savings. This is our main focus as we will examine the 
impact of several non-market institutions towards aggregate savings. As such we have developed our 
hypothesis in section 2.7 of Chapter 2. In our case, we have focused primarily on emerging economies 
as these economies are the future driver for the world economic growth.  
1.4 RESEARCH AIMS AND HYPOTHESIS  
The aim of the thesis is to examine the determinants of private savings in emerging market 
economies with regard to the importance of financial development, economic growth and 
institutional quality.  The specific research objectives and hypotheses are  
1.4.1 Research Objectives: 
I. Review relevant theories and empirical evidence on economic growth and savings, analyzing 
the importance of the role of financial development and institutions. 
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II. Conduct country-level econometric analysis to test the causality between economic growth and 
financial development using both Vector Autoregressive (VAR) and Vector Error Correction 
(VEC) models for selected emerging economies  
III. Estimate savings behaviour for emerging economies using Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR) and panel data regression methods to analyse the impact of traditional determinants, i.e. 
demographic and macroeconomic variables, as well as of non-market variables, e.g. 
institutional quality.   
1.4.2 Hypothesis 
Three hypotheses that have been formulated and examined: 
I. Sound institutional factors based on property rights have positive effect in increasing aggregate 
private savings in the emerging economies. 
II. Financial development has a short term Granger causality effect on economic growth of the 
emerging economies. 
III. Financial development has a long term causality effect on economic growth of the emerging 
economies. 
Detailed explanation of the above hypotheses is given in Chapter 2: section 2.9. The evaluation 
(reaffirmation or repudiation) of the hypotheses is discussed in Chapter 7: section 7.5. 
1.5  OUTLINE STRUCTURE OF EACH CHAPTER 
I. Chapter 1:  Introduction 
II. Chapter 2: Review of theories and empirical evidence on : 
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i) Savings and Growth: Solow-Swan, Life Cycle Hypothesis, Permanent 
Income Hypothesis, Consumer Optimization Model. 
ii) Financial Development and Growth: Endogenous Growth and McKinnon-
Shaw Hypothesis. 
iii)  Institutions and Growth: Legal Origin and Endowment Hypothesis. 
III. Chapter 3: i) Synopsis on the economic growth of the 20 emerging economies: Major 
economic and political events are highlighted that have a significant impact 
on the growth of these countries.  
ii) Analysis by region: Trends on savings, growth and other macroeconomic 
variables from 1970 until 2003.  
IV. Chapter 4:   Examines the effect of aggregate private savings using Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) estimation methodology in 20 emerging economies. Using 
LCH framework to examine their effects of demographic and macroeconomic 
variables on private savings. 
V. Chapter 5: Examines short-term and long-term causality effect between financial 
development and growth using Vector Autoregressive (VAR) and Vector Error 
Correction (VEC) models for the 20 emerging economies. Endogenous growth 
theory and McKinnon and Shaw financial liberalization approach have improved 
our understanding of the importance of financial development on economic 
growth.  However, the key question is:  Is it vital to develop the financial sector 
first before expecting growth, or, can it be growth first before developing financial 
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sectors? This chapter attempts to determine the causality effect in order to identify 
which variable drives the other to spur aggregate private savings. 
 
VI.Chapter 6:   Examines the effects of institutional quality on aggregate private savings in the 20 
emerging economies using fixed effect panel data estimation method.  The legal 
origin (La Porta, 1999), endowment (Acemoglu, 2001) and political process 
(Acemoglu, 2004) hypotheses have attempted to explain the importance of non-
market institutions and their link with the current state of economic growth. 
Utilizing institutional variables obtained from International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) and Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007), we have used them to find 
the impact of institutional factors on private savings. 
 





CHAPTER 2  
THEORIES ON SAVINGS AND GROWTH 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Previous studies on private savings were mostly focused on examining the effect the economic and 
demographic variables on savings. Similarly, studies and empirical evidence relating to institutions 
have concentrated on their impact towards the country‘s growth and financial development. Hence, 
there is no previous model or hypothesis that draws on the direct relationship between the 
institutional impacts on savings, although the impact can be indirect through economic growth and 
other factors.  Therefore, in order to formulate our hypotheses regarding the effects of institutions on 
savings, there needs to be a discussion of previous theories regarding savings and growth. This 
chapter provides an overview of several theories and empirical evidence on savings and growth.  
The chapter is divided into two major parts. The first part reviews theories and evidence on savings. 
The second part reviews theories and evidence on growth. 
The discussion on savings is divided further into three sections. The first section dealt with micro 
theory on savings, i.e. Consumer Optimization Model by Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and Koopmans 
(1986), which discusses intertemporal choice between savings and consumption. The second section 
is on macro theory on savings, which provides overview on Permanent Income Hypothesis and Life 
Cycle Hypothesis. The third section discusses previous empirical evidence on savings. 
The discussion on growth is also subdivided into three sections. The first section reviews the 




The second section explores the relationship between growth and financial development as both have 
significant affect on savings.  Studies on the relationship between growth and financial development 
have branched out into two schools. The first set of models view financial institutions as the 
entrepreneurial driving force behind ensuring the efficiency of the financial transactions. Essentially, 
the models discuss about the role of financial institutions in pooling financial resources effectively. 
The hypotheses are based on models developed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Diamond (1984), 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Becievenga and Smith (1991), and Pagano (1993). The other set 
of models look into the role of financial liberalization in promoting financial deepening. McKinnon 
and Shaw argue that financial repression has adverse effects on savings, investments and growth. By 
eliminating the artificially set interest rates ceiling, it allows the individuals to invest their funds to 
earn the expected returns and for financial institutions to allocate resources to economic sectors that 
are able to generate the highest return.   
The discussion linking growth and financial development theories is also followed by a review of 
previous empirical evidence on the inter-relationship between financial development and growth 
variables, i.e. on finding the causality effect.  It is crucial especially for the policy makers to find the 
causality effect to identify which factors to deal first as both factors could affect aggregate savings:  - 
Is it vital to develop or deepen the financial system first in order to spur economic growth; or 
alternatively, focus on stimulating the economic growth first as it would drive the deepening of 
financial system? 
Finally, the third section on growth explores several hypotheses that discuss the evolution of formal 
institutions and how they affect the current economic development of a country.  Recent hypotheses 
by La Porta (1997, 2000) on legal origin and by Acemoglu et al (2001, 2004) on endowment and 
political disposition are based on historical records that are used as evidence that lead to the current 
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legal and economic development of most countries. Following the discussion on La Porta (1997, 
2000) and Acemoglu et al (2001, 2004) are empirical evidence discussing on the effects of 
institutions on growth. 
In section 2.4, we will relate the importance of reviewing previous theories and provide the rationale 
for relating them with the empirical analysis undertaken in later chapters. 
Lastly, we formulate our own hypothesis by exploring the dynamics on the effects and importance of 
institutional factors, such as property rights and rule of law have on aggregate savings. Based on our 
hypothesis on the effect of institutions on savings together with the previous discussed hypothesis on 
growth and savings theories, we test empirically the relationship between savings, growth, financial 
development and non-market institutional factors in chapters 4, 5 and 6 for the 20 emerging 
economies.  
2.2 SAVINGS THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
2.2.1 Micro Oriented theory of Savings - Consumer Optimization Model 
Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1986) work and model the economy as a single and 
infinitely lived representative consumer. Essentially, Ramsay‘s approach of ―Consumer Optimization 
model‘ is that an individual‘s objective is to maximize a utility function over a certain period. The 
individual is motivated not to consume all within the current period, but to extend it over time 
homogenously as possible. In this intertemporal setting, a rational agent will compare the marginal rate 
of substitution between current versus future consumption by postponing the consumption. By forgoing 
the current consumption, the individual can save to earn a higher return. The optimal savings is based on 
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Ramsey‘s theory, in which saving is optimal if marginal utility growth rate is equal to the difference 
between the utility discount rate and the real rate of return on savings.  
The model starts with households that provide labour services in exchange of receiving salaries, wages, 
and saved them by accumulating asset. The basic assumption is that households are identical, i.e. having 
the same salary and asset per person.  
Assuming that H stood for identical households with each household at time t represent as L (t)/H. Each 
household grows at rate n.  Since L (t) is the number of members in the household, and c(t) ≡C(t)/L(t) is 
the consumption of each member, the household‘s utility function  is the aggregation of utilities of all the 
household members, both present and future (L = ent ) . Assuming each household wishes to maximise 
overall utility, U, as expressed by: 
 u c(t) 
∞
0
∙ ent ∙ e−pt dt          Equation 2.1 
The assumption is that the household‘s utility at time 0 is a weighted sum of all future flows of utility, 
u(c). The function u(c) or the felicity function represents household utility consumption (c) at any point 
in time. ρ stood for the constant discount rate or required rate on capital. 
We assume that u(c) is increasing in c and concave— u‘ (c)> 0, u‘‘ (c)< 0. The concavity characterise the  
smoothing of  consumption over time, in which households prefer a relatively constant trend as 
compared to uneven consumption period, in which at certain time, c is low and other times, c is high. 
This desire to smooth consumption drives the household‘s savings behaviour because they will tend to 
borrow when income is relatively low and save when income is relatively high. We also assume that u(c) 
satisfies Inada conditions: 𝑢′ 𝑐 → ∞ 𝑎𝑠 𝑐 → 0  and 𝑢′ 𝑐 → 0 𝑎𝑠 𝑐 → ∞. Inada condition stipulated that 
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the marginal consumption approaches infinity as consumption goes to zero and approaches zero as 
consumption goes to infinity. 
The other multiplier, 𝑒−𝑝𝑡 , involves the rate of time preference, ρ> 0. A positive or greater ρ means the 
net worth are valued less the later they are received. The hypothesis also assumes that the discount rate 
within a person‘s lifetime is the same across generations. 
The following Euler equation stipulated that households choose consumption so that the rate of return (r) 
is equivalent to the rate of time preference (ρ) plus the rate of decrease of the marginal utility of 
consumption, u‘ , multiply with per capita consumption growth.  




 = 𝜌 −  
𝑢 ′′ (𝑐)∙𝑐
𝑢 ′ (𝑐)
 ∙ (𝑐 𝑐 
 
                           Equation 2.2 
r is the rate of return to saving on the left side of equation while on the right side of equation is 
associated with the rate of return to consumption. 
Household would be willing to sacrifice some consumption today for more consumption tomorrow, i.e. 
𝑐 /c  > 0, if they were to commensurate with interest rate (r) that is greater than the discount rate (ρ). 
Therefore, the elasticity of marginal utility , i. e.      −𝑢′′ (𝑐) ∙ 𝑐 / 𝑢′(𝑐)    or the elasticity of u‘(c) with 
respect to c, can be considered the premium for the household to forfeit current consumption in lieu of 
the future.  . This elasticity or the measurement for the concavity of u(c), determines the disparity of rate 
of return (r) over rate of preference (ρ). 
 If the magnitude of elasticity is significant, the required premium of r over ρ is greater for a given value 
of c /c. The equation can also be transformed into its common form, i.e. 𝑢 𝑐 =
𝑐 (1−𝜃 )−1
(1−𝜃)
  where θ>0, so 
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that the elasticity of marginal utility equals the constant  -θ. The extent of elasticity of marginal utility 
  −𝑢′′ (𝑐) ∙ 𝑐 / 𝑢′(𝑐)    can also be expressed as the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution.  
On the other hand, the elasticity of substitution for this utility function is the constant 𝜍 = 1/𝜃 or 
recognised as ‗Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution’.  The higher is θ, signified by the pace of decline 
of u‘ (c) with regards with increase in c, the lesser willingness to substitute consumption intertemporally, 
or to defer consumption for future date. The optimality condition from equation (2. 2) can then be 
expressed as:𝑐 𝑐 =  
1
𝜃
 ∙ (𝑟 − 𝜌). A lower willingness to substitute intertemporally, which indicated by 
greater θ, denotes a smaller responsiveness of c c  to the gap between r and ρ or smaller is the elasticity of 
the marginal utility of consumption. Household would be more indifferent to postpone consumption for 
the future, and would rather consume currently, which would negatively affect the rate for saving.  On 
the other hand, households are willing to sacrifice some consumption today for future consumption, i.e. 
they are willing to save if c /c  > 0, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is large. This is also 
indicated by larger magnitude of elasticity of marginal utility of consumption that fills the gap between 
the rate of return and rate of time preference of the household. 
In the Ramsey‘s model in reference to the neoclassical growth theory, s can fluctuate substantially as the 
economy develops and approaches the steady state. As capital per capita (𝑘  ) rises, the decline in 
marginal product of capital, 𝑓 ′( 𝑘 ) , lessen the rate of return from savings (r). The reduced motivation 
from saving— a negative intertemporal substitution effect— tends to lower the saving rate as the 
economy grows. Simultaneously, as  𝑘    increase, the consumption tends to fall in relation to current 
income, eventually the saving rate tends to rise. This force — an income effect— as it tends to raise the 
saving rate as the economy develops. In crux, the saving rate is depended on which effect is dominant, 
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i.e.  the substitutions or the income effect. The net effect is ambiguous in general, and the path of the 
saving rate during the transition can be complicated. 
In summary, there are two effects resulting from the increase in the rates of savings, i.e. income effect 
against substitution effect. Income effect contributes to more household to deposit their earnings into 
savings. Intertemporal elasticity of substitution effect resulted in the postponement of the current 
consumption to the future. When intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than one, income affect 
will dominate the substitution affect. The result will be negative effect on the net savings as the 
household would spend more than the realized returns. However, when the inter-temporal elasticity of 
substitution is greater than one, household would tend to postpone their consumption and would instead 
invest the residual income into savings. The net impact would be overall increase in the overall savings. 
When the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is 1, the income and the substitution effect is the same, 
thus no net effect on the overall savings.  
2.2.2 Macro Oriented Theory of Savings 
2.2.2.1 Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) 
According to (Deaton and Paxson, 1997), PIH is studied for its macroeconomic fluctuations and short-
run dynamic relationship between consumption, savings and income. Friedman (1957) claims that both 
income and consumption be divided into two parts: a permanent and a transitory part.  Permanent income 
is when one receives income over certain length of period and transitory income is considered all other 
factors, which are considered by the individuals as ‗accidental or chance‘ occurrence, which can have 
positive or negative impact. Permanent income is a reflection of the individual‘s wealth or the capital 




Essentially, Friedman perceives the consumer in terms of ―human wealth‖ rather than income earner. 
The examples Friedman considers as transitory income are sickness or bad selection in buying or selling 
capital assets as these factors do not change fundamentally the amount consumed. He postulates that at 
aggregate level this transitory element in income will cancel out each other. Friedman believes that if 
there is permanent income, there should be permanent consumption, i.e. comprising permanent and 
transitory consumption.  Transitory consumption is considered the residuals of consumption, for e.g., 
sickness and unplanned purchases. He argues that at the aggregate level, transitory consumption will 
cancel out each other.  
Permanent and transitory variables are considered uncorrelated. Permanent income cannot be observed 
directly. The income that can be observed argued by Friedman is the measured income. The measured 
income, Ym can be defined as the sum of permanent income (Yp) and transitory income, Yt, as indicated in 
equation 1. Likewise, in equation 2.8, measured consumption can be defined as the sum of permanent 
consumption, Cp, and transitory consumption, Ct. The two equations are as follows: 
 𝑌𝑚 = 𝑌𝑝+𝑌𝑡         Equation 2.3 
𝐶𝑚 = 𝐶𝑝+𝐶𝑡         Equation 2.4 
Equation 2.5 sums up the relations between consumption and income. Permanent consumption is the 
planned consumption out of permanent income and is assumed to be proportional to permanent income. 
The factor of proportionality k, need not be seen as constant. It is influenced by factors such as the rate of 
interest, wages and individual consumption preference. 
   𝐶𝑝 = 𝑘 𝑖, 𝑤, 𝑢 𝑌𝑝 ;      Equation 2.5 
 in which   i= rate of interest 
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 w= regular wages or revenue from capital investment 
 u= consumers preference for immediate consumption rather than defer to late period. 
PIH assumes that household has limitless life and consumes based on discounted wealth, laboured 
income and on the level of interest rates.  Household will try to maximise the utility of consumption over 
lifetime period. He postulates that the timing of consumption is not determined by the timing of current 
income but rather by the marginal rate of substitution between this year‘s consumption and next year‘s 
consumption or the rate of interest rate. Interest rate is assumed to be exogenously given and not derived 
from any general equilibrium.  
Savings can be shown as the summation between marginal propensity of saving of the permanent income 
and marginal propensity of saving from transitory income since saving is considered the residual 
between observed income and consumption: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑌𝑡
𝑝 + 𝛾 𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡
𝑝 + 𝑡  Equation 2.6 
β is the marginal propensity to save (MPS) from the permanent income and γ is the MPS from the 
transitory income. The main basic assumption of PIH is that household will try to maintain the 
consumption level in its current form and any changes are reflected on the magnitude of the savings rate. 
In another words, Friedman (1957) postulates that household consumption will only respond to changes 
in permanent but not transitory income. Therefore, any fluctuation in consumption on top of the 
permanent consumption level is only temporary. Only if there is any increase in income perceived by the 
individual as permanent, the individual would then raise his or her consumption level permanently. 
However, Carroll and Summers (1991) criticise the applicability of the model during the early 1970s 
economic slowdown. It is expected that before the slowdown, the consumers would have expected that 
21 
 
they will start saving earlier to smooth out their consumption due to lesser earning in the future.  
However, it turns out that all of the aggregate saving in the developed countries before and during the 
1970s oil crisis recorded a decline. This phenomenon contradicts the PIH, which stipulates  that 
individuals would start saving in anticipation of less earning in the future in order to smoothen out their 
overall future consumption expenditure. 
2.2.2.2 Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) 
LCH by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) contend that individuals and household maximise lifetime 
utility by allocating lifetime discounted income to consumption in various periods of the life cycle to 
equalize with the discounted marginal utility of consumption in each period. The life-cycle model 
predicts that individuals should smooth consumption by holding marginal utility constant, across stages 
of life.  
The amount of lifetime consumption is equal to the wealth plus the labour income throughout the 
remaining life of the household. In contrast to Keynesian model, the consumption is depended only on 
expectation of the lifetime income.  
Consumption and income tend to fluctuate over the individual and household life cycle so it does not 
mean that the current income matches in proportion with the current consumption (Browning and 
Crossley, 2001; Tobin, 1967). The model predicts household will borrow before the young dependents 
enter working environment. Once these individuals start to work, they will begin accumulating wealth 
until upon reaching retirement age, when most their saving accumulated will be spent away. During the 
period where individuals earn more than they spend, they will save. In contrast when they earned lesser, 
they will support their consumption by saving less or borrowed elsewhere. The classical type of LCH is 
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that income will rise until the time of retirement. LCH also postulates that the main motive for saving is 
for retirement, as the individual became less productive and depended on accumulated savings. 
The shape of the age profile of saving determines how the aggregate saving rate responds to changes in 
economic growth and demographic structure. In what Modigliani (1970) calls the ―stripped-down‖ 
model, income is increasing until retirement and decreasing thereafter, while consumption is constant 
throughout life, so that there is positive saving until retirement, and negative saving (dissaving) from 
retirement until death. This negative association between age and the rate of saving implies that 
aggregate saving rate will be greater the higher is the rate of per capita economic growth. If income 
grows as a result of increased productivity, even if population remained stationary, saving will show 
positive because younger working population will generate more income and more savings from higher 
per capita income growth, than do the old generation who dissave but at a lesser rate.  
Modigliani (1986) on ‗balanced population growth‘ postulates that the major determinants of the saving 
rate (over time in a given country or across countries) are the rate of growth of per capita income and the 
age structure of the population.  It is assumed that countries with greater rate of population growth with 
balanced age structure will experience greater number of people entering the working life, hence greater 
potential savers. Thus even if all the individual households in two given economies have the same saving 
profile over their life cycles, one economy may show a higher aggregate saving rate because it has faster 
population growth and /or faster economic growth from generation to generation.  In another words, 
growth in income is assumed to occur across cohorts or generations rather than within cohorts. If 
earnings growth increased, the current generation would not experience increased in lifetime earnings. 
Only their successors will enjoy the shift towards higher lifetime earnings.  
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According to Modigliani (1986), when the growth is attributable to productivity, this phenomenon is 
termed as Bentzel effect. Similarly, an increase in per worker income from one period to the next implies 
that the working-cum-saving generation is wealthier that the preceding one. Even if the saving and 
dissaving individuals have the same saving propensities, the new generation will be saving out of a 
higher income than the dissaving one, which renders aggregate savings positive.  
In the short term the aggregate savings will be influenced by transitory income earned on top of the 
average permanent income of the individual or household. Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) argue that 
the higher fraction of people on a temporary basis with high transitory income, the higher is the saving 
ratio. Hence, it explained why the farmers and small business enterprises tend to save more as their 
incomes are considered more unpredictable.  
Demographers added to LCH by postulating that life cycle stage of dependency could adversely affect 
public and private savings.  According to Mason (1988), if a decrease in the children caused increased in 
the overall life time earning, the aggregate saving will increase similarly. If a decrease in the number of 
children affects life cycle savings by transferring the childrearing period to the post childrearing period, 
aggregate saving will increase as long as the aggregate income is growing. Therefore changes in 
dependency ratio will affect aggregate saving in so much as depending on the rate of growth income.  
Specifically, the link between working and non-working populations is significant as the nonworking 
population tend to reduce the national household saving, since they consume without generating 
sufficient earnings (Modigliani and Cao, 2004). If the population is growing and has reached its 
equilibrium, the proportion of working household will become significantly large, which leads to current 
life cycle savings to overtake current life cycle dissaving, thus aggregate savings will be positive. 
Likewise, if the rate of growth of total income, i.e. the sum of rate of population growth and the rate of 
24 
 
per capita growth is zero, the aggregated savings will be offset by aggregated dissaving, hence the 
overall life cycle aggregated savings will then be zero. Modigliani (1986) did not expect interest rate to 
play a significant role in affecting savings. However, interest rate will have positive effect on savings if 
substitution effect is dominant, in which household would defer consumption to later period and save 
now. On the other hand, if most households are net depositors, an increased in interest rate will produce 
greater income. This phenomenon is called the income effect. Realizing that they can earn extra income, 
they would be encouraged  to spend more. As a result their total expenditure will be more than their 
income and this would cause negative effect on their overall savings. They will become dissavers rather 
than savers. Modigliani (1986) postulates that there will be net overall savings with increase in the 
interest rate if the substitution effect is more dominant than income effect. He also argued that inflation is 
expected to cause certain amount of uncertainties in the economy. He expected the population would 
take the precautionary measures by increasing their savings to protect against the risk of losing their 
future purchasing power. Therefore, the higher is the expected inflation, the higher will be the savings 
rate. 
Private savings is also affected by deficit. In a rational society where the individual consume service and 
goods, they would realize that the current deficit increases the countries debt which eventually would 
increase future interest rates and taxes. The household would start to save if they expect that the 
government will impose tax in the future to finance the deficit due to the current expenditure. The current 
saving would supplement the future income in order to maintain smooth consumption in the event the 
government initiate increase in taxes. The overall national savings won‘t be affected by the government 
dissavings (deficit) as it is offset by the private savings. Therefore, it is postulate that the future service 
of the debt is equal to the present value for the future taxes that will be levied by the current households 
and individuals.  
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2.2.3 Review of Evidence on Savings  
Together with examining the savings and growth models, we review previous literature that empirically 
examined some variables used by these models to depict relationship with savings. The variables to be 
reviewed are demography, growth, government savings, interest rates, inflation, financial development 
and terms of trade. Furthermore, we would also use the same variables to empirically test savings 
behaviours on selected emerging economies.    Finally, we would re-use the same variables as our control 
variables when we test empirically the relationship between institutional factors and savings in chapter 6. 
2.2.3.1 Demography Effect 
James Tobin‘s (1967) published a study that national saving rate would increase with faster population 
growth. His reasoning was based on the premise that with faster population growth, there will be a 
greater increase in productive population group rather than the older population group, which resulted 
increased in income growth.  Leff (1969) conducts extensive regression  study on aggregate savings on 
74 countries to determine the effect of demographic factors based on specific ages by controlling for log 
GDP per capita. He finds that aggregate savings were negatively related with the increase in youth 
dependency, i.e. below 15 years and old age dependency , i.e. ages 64 and above. However, Goldberger 
(1973) and Ram (1982) question the reliability of empirical work and cast doubt over the negative 
relationship between dependency periods against aggregate savings.  
According to Fry and Mason (1982) on LCH, age structure is expected to interact with income growth in 
affecting the level of national savings. An increase in the number of young dependence will reduce the 
saving rate, ceteris paribus . At a greater rate of income growth, young families will have greater lifetime 
resources than middle-aged families, therefore the percentages of dissaving will be larger, and the 
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negative effects of additional children on the saving rate will become greater. He termed it as the 
interaction effect. 
Mason (1988) postulates that that there are three major factors that young dependency population can 
affect aggregate savings. First is the distribution effect as a result of the increase or decrease in the 
number of household occupants. The changes in the occupants will force redistribution of the 
consumable among the household members. He postulates that neither consumption nor rate of 
consumption is being affected. Second is on the level effect in which the increase in the household 
members will have direct effect on the overall current household consumption. Third is the timing effect 
in which the increased in the number of members will have intertemporal substitution, in which they 
would tend to increase current consumption in lieu of future consumption. These three factors would 
most likely have significant negative impact on savings. 
Kelly and Schmidt (1996) improvise Leff‘s (1969) work and by expanding it into 89 countries divided 
into three distinct periods: 1960‘s, 1970s and 1980‘s.  In the 1960‘s and 1970‘s the young and older 
dependency population did not show significant affect against aggregate savings, however, in 1980‘s 
both groups of population show significant negative relationship with savings. When the model is 
augmented by including the interaction between dependency and growth together, the result indicate a 
significant negative relationship against aggregate savings in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. However, 
when they expand to include only low income countries, only the income growth and young dependency 
population ratio shows any significant relationship with aggregate savings.  
Higgins and Williamson (1996) conduct studies on 16 Asian countries from 1950 to 1992 by regressing 
demographic data against savings. They conclude that the economic prosperity experienced by these 
countries was reflected by the decline in the fertility rate, which helped to transform the age composition 
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of the population. It caused the population to generate greater working age population, which increased 
the aggregate savings and the economic growth rate.  
Weill (1994) conducts microeconomic studies and his result indicates significant relationship between 
savings and demographic studies, however, he finds that old age people did not dissave when they retire. 
Carroll and Summer (1991) and Haque et al (1999) argue that elderly people may not dissave to the 
extent that the lifecycle model predicts due to bequest and unpredictable expenses by the elderly, in 
contrast to the assumption of life cycle model predicting that there will be major dissaving by the older 
population.   
Shultz (2004) concludes that if the quantity and quality of children can be interchangeable, it could 
explain the negative relationship between fertility and savings. With the introduction of new technology 
on birth control, it would reduce the cost of birth control, which would lead to reduction in birth fertility. 
Hence, private savings would increase as youth dependent population shrank from lower birth rate. 
Hondroyiannis (2005) uses GMM estimator on 69 countries comprised of 20 industrial and 49 
developing countries. His result indicates that urbanization ratio and the young and old dependency ratio 
have significantly negative impact on the savings rate.  
Schrooten and Stephan (2005) examine the dependency impact on savings on the newly EU-accession 
countries. The result indicates a significant negative correlation between these variables, which concurs 
with LCH.  In contrast with the result derived from EU member countries, they show insignificant 
relations between these variable, which leads to the conclusion on the state of public pension fund 
enjoyed by the Western European blocks.  They attribute the insignificance relationship to the fact that 
the public pension fund inherent in the Western European counterpart provides a reasonable standard of 
income to support a comfortable standard of living. 
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Cook (2005) conducts studies on 120 countries to investigate the effect in increase of the population 
growth on savings. He finds that there is positive relationship between savings and the labor force, 
however, negatively related with young dependency population. The conclusion derived is that by 
curbing the birth rate growth it would eventually increase savings in the long run. 
Li et al (2007) investigates the impact of life expectancy, population growth and population demography 
on savings, investment and per capita output growth across two hundred countries from 1960 to 2004. 
The studies discover that increase in life expectancy contributes positively towards the growth on 
savings, investments and income growth, and in contrast the aging population adversely affecting the 
savings, investments and income growth rate. Contrary, to study conducted previously by Modigliani and 
Cao (2004), the age group structure or specifically the dependency group didn‘t have any significant 
impact on savings 
Utilizing a panel dynamic model for G7 countries from 1979 to 2001, Soyoung and Jong (2008) find that 
the demography affect, i.e. the change in population age structure have significant affect on private 
savings and government savings.  The higher is the dependency rate the more negative affect it has on 
government savings than private savings.  
2.2.3.2 Growth Effect 
Modigliani and Ando (1963) argue that higher income growth would increase aggregate saving, ceteris 
paribus, by virtue that the increase in income by those in productive stage would outweigh those in the 
old dependency. As a result from household aggregation, when the economy continuously grows, it is 
expected that the workers' savings will increase more in relation to the retirees' dissavings. 
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Carroll and Weil (1994) examine savings on 38 countries indicate that there is close relationship between 
growth and savings using Granger causality test. They find that high savings experienced by East Asian 
countries was caused by increased in income growth rates.   In 2000, both also conducted studies on Asia 
region in examining the impact of savings through habit formation.  They find that in the short run 
savings tend to increase but in the long term savings tend to decrease as the economy was growing. 
However, the result indicates that during the transition period to the steady state, long term savings tend 
to be on the rising trend. They also find out that there is an increased in intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution as interest rate increase as the consumer willing to postpone consumption as the rates 
increased. 
Paxson (1996) using micro data on life-cycle models for each country indicates that the increase in 
economic growth will have a marginal effect on aggregate saving rate.  Specifically, the results show that 
an increase in economic growth of 10 percentage points would increase the aggregate saving rate by no 
more than 2.5 percentage points (for the US and Taiwan), and would have virtually no effect on the 
saving rate in Britain or Thailand.  She postulates that even though the saving rates resemble hump-
shaped pattern, the reason the effect on savings were quite marginal due to income and consumption 
move together over the life cycle.  
Masson et al (1998) examination on 21 developing and 40 developed countries find positive correlation 
between GDP growth and savings. However, they find negative correlation when the per capita incomes 
in the developing countries were being squared. This seemed to suggest that after a certain threshold of 
income, a further increase in aggregate income growth would have diminishing effect on savings.  
Deaton and Paxson (1997) investigate the consequences of savings and inequality of population and 
economic growth on Unites States, United Kingdom, Taiwan and Thailand. The empirical results shows 
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that the increase in growth and population only contributed a small fraction of increase in the saving 
rates, therefore the life cycle effect of growth and population on saving is not large enough to justify a 
cross country effect 
Deaton (2000) using the household samplings in Thailand and Taiwan finds that the greater is the income 
growth, the more negative impact it has on the overall household savings.  The growth rate will 
contribute towards higher aggregate income, however, the extra income gained would instead be used for 
increase spending on household expenditure rather than savings. 
Park and Rhee (2005) utilise micro study on Korea finds that aggregate saving can neither be explained 
by the increased in the relative size of population nor by the increased in the income of certain age 
groups. In contrast, the overall growth in aggregate saving was attributed to the universal rise in the 
saving rates across all age cohorts. 
Modigliani and Cao (2004) show that by controlling the population growth rate in China, the government 
has changed the demographic structure of the population. It has caused increased in percentage working 
age group, therefore lowering the dependency age group, which eventually contributes to the increase in 
the savings. 
According to Aghion et al (2006), savings are positively related to those countries classified far away 
from the technological frontier. In contrast, those countries that are considered closer to the technology 
frontier, their growth rates are not affected at all. The reason is that those countries that are far from 
technology frontier, the local banks would use domestic savings to finance foreign investor to spearhead 
new projects. The foreign investors would then introduce new technologies to the local entrepreneurs, 
who would then contribute to the growth of the economy. Hence, the greater the savings rate, the higher 
the growth of these countries. As compared to the countries that are closer to the technology frontier, 
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they would rather use local investors to spearhead projects rather than using foreign investors. There was 
no transfer of technology involved to spur the economy, which explains the indifference results between 
private savings and growth in developed economies.   
The study on EU-accession economies also shows that per capita income is correlated positively with 
private savings, which meant that countries with high per capita income tend to have higher saving than 
those with lower per capita income. Further analysis shows that those countries in Eastern Europe and 
Baltic state have higher savings than those former Soviet Union (Chowdry, 2004). 
Based on Schrooten and Stephan (2005) study on EU-accession and EU member countries, their result 
indicates that both regions show that per capita income is positively related to private savings. While the 
short run affect is similar for both groups of countries, but the long-run affect shows that per capita 
income in EU-accessions countries has larger impact on private savings than EU-member countries.  
2.2.3.3 Government Savings Effect 
Ricardian hypothesis hinges on the premise that in anticipation of future taxation by the government as 
result of substantial current spending, private sectors would increase their savings rate for fear of 
diminishing purchasing power in the future from higher taxation. As a result, the intertemporal 
substitution between government spending and private spending would negate any fluctuation in the 
overall national savings.  The increase in the government deficit as a result of lower taxes or higher 
government spending can boost private consumption and thus, a coefficient between 0 and −1 is 
expected when government savings are regressed against private saving.   
Barro (1974) rejects the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis by claiming that government surpluses or 
deficits would not have any impact on the general savings.  
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Haque and Montiel (1989) reject Ricardian equivalence after sampling 16 developing economies and 
attributed the non-equivalence to the effect of liquidity constraint experienced by household savings. 
Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991) studies on 13 developing countries find that for one percent increase 
in government savings resulted in minus 0.47 to minus 0.50 percent decline against private savings. It 
indicates that the government savings crowds out private savings. 
 Dalamagas (1992) presents empirical evidence from 52 countries and finds that in countries with low-
debt ratio there is a positive relationship between consumption and government deficit which indicates 
that when deficit increases, savings also declines.  
Edwards (1996) in the panel study on 36 developing economies finds that there is substitution between 
household and government saving, even though the substitubility is not one-to-one basis. Seater (1993) 
postulates that different government spending behaviour would yield different results against private 
spending.  Increase in government spending may cause a decline in the availability of resources for 
private sector which causes negative effect on private savings. According to Seater (1993), public 
investment that is productive but does not require further taxes would not generate private savings 
response. However, increased in the government expenditure that causes increased in future taxes would 
result increased in private savings.  
Based on the analysis on 150 countries from 1965-1994 , Loayza (2000) finds a negative relationship 
between private and public saving rates in India, however the relationship is not a full Ricardian 
equivalent since the coefficient on the public saving ratio is statistically less than minus one. An increase 
in public savings by one percent lead to short term decrease by 0.29 percent and long term decrease by 
0.69 percent of private savings. Schrooten and Stephan (2006) find that public sector savings have a 
Ricardian effect on private savings for EU-accession economies and EU members. The short run affect 
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was the same for both groups of countries, i.e. minus one percent, however, there were differences in the 
long run. The long-run effect on EU-accession economies was minus 0.5 and EU members was minus 
0.9 percent 
Chowdry (2004) using GMM estimation on transition economies reveals that the short-term and 
permanent coefficient is less than minus one when regressed against public savings, which indicates that 
the substitution affect is not unitary. 
The study by Cohn and Kolluri (2003) supports Ricardian equivalence hypothesis that government 
saving partially substitute household savings. Real per capita government savings have shown 
statistically negative effect on all of the G-7 countries, except Canada. 
2.2.3.4 Real Interest Rate Effect 
According to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), an increase in real interest rates in developing 
countries would encourage savings and increase the supply of credit available to domestic investors, 
which would help the economy to grow rapidly.  Fry (1978, 1980) also finds a positive correlation 
between gross national savings and interest rates at five percent significant level if the deposit rate of 
interest is used as proxy and 10 percent significant level if the government bond is used instead. Studies 
by McDonald (1983) on Latin American regions find a positive significant relationship between savings 
and interest rates with the coefficient of 0.2.  
 Gupta (1984) studies on 12 Asian countries find that financial savings increase positively with the 
increase in interest rates. The positive correlation between interest rates and savings is due to the 
substitution affect. With the increase in interest rates, it will induce decrease in future consumption. 
Individuals would prefer to spend more on future consumption rather than the current consumption.   
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Rossi (1989) also finds that the increased in the real rate of return is not likely to elicit substantial 
increase in savings, especially in low-income developing countries. Balassa (1989) finds positive 
correlation between the interest rates and savings in developing economies but find it reduced when 
compared to developed countries.  
Ogaki et al (1996) claim that interest rates affect on private savings was depended on the per capita 
income of a country. The interest rate would only significantly affect on those countries that reached 
certain per capita income threshold.  They attribute the insignificant impact of interest rates on private 
savings on poor countries due to liquidity constraint.  
Masson et al. (1998) reports positive correlation but finds it insignificant when subjected to a more 
robust test. It became clearer that when tested on the developing countries the effect be attributed to the 
choice of interest rate used as proxy and due to other affected variables such as financial liberalisation. 
However, Bandiera et al (2000) indicates that there was an ambiguity on the effect of interest rates on 
savings.  Only when the countries were being pooled together, the results indicate a long-term positive 
effect on the correlation.  Even then the affect is quite limited.  
Loayza et al (2000), performing cross-country estimation on 69 countries, reveal that real interest rate 
has negative impact on private savings, with one percentage increase in real interest rate caused 0.25 
percent increase in private savings in the short run. However, due to the negative correlation between 
interest rates and inflation, the negative correlation between savings and interest rate would be more 
attributed to controlling inflation rather than the income affect.   
Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (2005) examination on 13 European economies using panel 
cointergration reveal significant positive relationship between interest rates and savings. By using VECM 
and VAR model on seven Asian developing countries, Agrawal (2001) analysis finds that the high 
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savings rates were mainly contributed by the high growth per capita income and population age structure 
rather than interest rates. In Malaysia and Singapore, he finds that government institutionalized 
retirement scheme played a major role in contributing towards the high growth in savings. 
2.2.3.5 Inflation Effect 
Masson et al (1998) postulate that the effects of inflation rate on savings can be double sided, i.e. it can 
positively and negatively affects savings. Positively as inflation can act as precautionary motive and tax 
on saving, while negatively it can cause increases in resources to be allocated for consumption. They 
conducted cross sectional regression on a sample of 40 developing countries and find either insignificant 
or negative relationship with savings. 
 Hussein and Thirlwall (1999) panel result between savings and inflation on 55 countries shows positive 
but nonlinear relationship. Inflation is perceived as tax on money as savers would increase the level of 
savings in anticipation of its increase as they would like to maintain their real level of wealth. When the 
inflation is subjected to robust test, the result shows that the inflation is still positively related to savings.  
Loayza et al (2000) find that by increasing the inflation rate by 10 percent, it will increase the private 
saving by one percent. He attributes the phenomenon to the precautionary effect. As people become more 
uncertain about their future, they will allocate more of their income into savings.  
Inflation, which is a proxy for macroeconomic uncertainty shows significant positive effect on private 
saving, which  suggest, individuals prefer to save a larger fraction of their income for precautionary 
motives during period of uncertainty.  (Loayza et al, 2000; and Hondroyiannis et al, 2005). 
The generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimation result on EU-transition economies shows that 
the inflation has a positive effect on savings (Chowdry, 2004). With an increase of inflation by 10 
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percent, it would raise savings by 0.8 percent. The result indicates that with the increase in uncertainty, it 
would induce the people to less consume, hence increased in savings.  
2.2.3.6 Terms of Trade Effect 
According to Svenson and Razin (1983), Harberger–Laursen–Metzler model in 1950 postulate that there 
is a significant impact from terms-of-trade shock on saving due to the consumption smoothing affect.  A 
negative transitory shock will lead to decline in transitory income which is larger than decline in 
permanent income. Consumption smoothing behaviour would then lead to a decline in domestic savings. 
On the other hand, a permanent decrease in terms of trade, which would have simultaneous decrease in 
current and permanent income, would not have any impact on savings.   
Masson et al (1998) study on 61 countries reveals that terms of trade have positive impact on industrial 
countries, but negative affect for developing countries. 
Matsubayashi (2002) empirical result using GMM method indicates that the intertemporal substitution 
between terms of trade and private savings is more than one for Japan and United States. This indicates 
that the improvement in the country terms of trades causes decline in private savings.  
Cashin and Dermont (2003) extend the impact of the transitory term-of-trade shock on private saving on 
five industrial countries using an intertemporal model of consumption. The model hinges on the 
assumption that substitution effect will influence private savings decision. This substitution effect relates 
to the country‘s economic elasticity in response to the term-of trade shocks: i) either to choose to 
consume importables or non-tradables (intratemporal substitution), and ii) either to choose to consume 
now or in the future (intertemporal substitutions). The empirical indicates that the transitory 
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intratemporal substitution and intertemporal substitution have a significant negative effect on private 
savings.  
Agenor and Aizenman (2004) examine the terms of trade in non-oil commodity exporters of sub-Saharan 
Africa for the period 1980–1996. They conclude if there were permanent increase in terms of trade, it 
would have a favourable positive impact on savings, however, if there were permanent decrease, it won‘t 
have any impact at all savings.  
The study by Cohn and Kolluri (2003) supports Ricardian equivalence hypothesis that government 
saving partially substitute household savings. Real per capita government savings have shown 
statistically negative effect on all of the G-7 countries except Canada. 
Chowdry (2004) investigates 21 transition economies using GMM method and finds that both permanent 
as well as transitory terms of trade have significant positive impact on private savings. However, the 
transitory component has a greater positive impact on the permanent ones, which shows lack of access to 
borrow externally by these countries.  
2.2.3.7 Financial Development Effect 
The growth of financial development can not only help for the individuals to access funding but also 
enable them to easily deposit or invest their money.  The integrity and credibility of the financial 
institutions and system would help to gain the customers confidence to engage in the financial 
transaction. The risk of financial meltdown or increase in negative news concerning the financial system 
could cause them to withdraw their money or not borrowing from the institutions.  
Beck et al (2000) examine 63 countries from 1960 to 1995 using panel cross section and Generalized 
Method of Moment (GMM) to find the relationship between financial development and savings. They 
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use several ratios as proxy for financial development and the result was considered mix. Different 
econometric techniques yield different results and the conclusion is there was no robust or consistent 
relationship able to link between financial development and private savings across the 63 countries.  
Loayza and Shakar (2000) find that credit to the private sector over GDP in India has a negative effect on 
private savings. The underlying reason was the deepening of financial sector enable individuals to 
finance higher ticket items at the current level of income by borrowing. The individuals need not have to 
save considerably in order to buy expansive products, which explain the negative relationship between 
savings and financial development. 
Cook (2003) tests using different variables as proxies for financial development based on the levels of 
liquidity. By testing on 122 countries and utilizing oil exporting countries as dummy variables, the 
results indicate that all of the proxy variables have positive effect on savings at different levels of 
significance. Athukorala and Sen (2004) results show that the greater is the level of financial 
development in India with the increase in the number of bank branches, the greater are the savings. 
Kelly and Mavrota (2003) conducts panel integration and cointegration test on 17 African countries by 
using several measures of financial development against private savings. Their results indicate the 
significant positive relationship between financial development and private savings are only apparent in a 
few countries. The inconclusive results meant that the recent financial reforms are not able to achieve the 
expected results to increase savings. 
Menzie and Ito (2007) find that the deeper is the financial development, the less impact it has on national 
savings for countries with well developed legal system and open financial market.  Vice-versa, the 
deeper is the financial development, the greater the impact it has on national savings for countries with 
lesser developed legal system and closed financial market.  They postulate that there will be considerable 
39 
 
increase in investment in emerging economies with improved financial development as well as better 
legal system and greater open market. Bernanke (2005) postulate that the more financially developed is 
the emerging markets, the lesser will be the accumulated savings.  
2.3 GROWTH THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 
2.3.1 Neo Classical Growth - Solow-Swan Model 
Policies that encourage savings are deemed important as higher savings will contribute to higher 
economic growth.  We would like to revisit neoclassical growth model by Solow (1956) and Swan 
(1956) to establish the theoretical link between savings and growth.  The Solow-Swan model is based on 
simplification that the savings rate is constant and determined exogenously.  
The Solow-Swan production function model of long-run economic growth describes how the input and 
output are related in the economy as well as how capital is accumulated. In particular, the Solow-Swan 
model shows that an increase in the stock of capital leads to a higher level of output and faster growth at 
least in the short to medium term. 
This function model expresses how much output can be produced, given the aggregate capital stock (K), 
knowledge, technology, and a given array of different capital, intermediate and consumption goods. It is 
assumed that all capital and labour are fully and efficiently employed, so f (K) is not only what can be 
produced but also what will be produced. 
The model is based on the assumption that the capital is homogenous and certain fraction of the stocks 
depreciate and unuseable for production purposes. The production function assumed Cobb-Douglas 
model with constant returns to scale in capital (Kt) and labour (Lt); that is doubling the inputs, Kt and Lt, 





1−∝    Equation 2.7 
where At is an exogenous productivity variable and 0 < ∞ < 1 is the income share of capital. The 
production function has diminishing returns in capital (labour); that by doubling capital (or labour), it 
increases output by less than double. Because domestic savings must equal domestic investment in a 
closed economy, capital accumulation is given by 
𝐾𝑡+1 − 𝐾𝑡 = 𝑠𝑌𝑡 − 𝛿𝐾𝑡      Equation 2.8 
where sYt denotes private savings (i.e. savings is a fixed fraction s of current income Yt ) and 𝛅 is the rate 
of depreciation. 
The model also assumes that aggregate savings finance the accumulation of the capital. Economies 
starting with low capital-labour ratio will have high marginal product of capital f‘(k). When capital is 
low, income to capital ratio will be large, which motivates people to save; this in turn compensate the 
depreciation from the existing capital.  
The growth drivers in this model are exogenous technological change and labour force expansion. 
Productivity is assumed to grow at a constant rate g 
A t+1 (1g)At      Equation 2.9 
and the labour force, which equals population, grows at rate n; Lt+1= 1 + n Lt   
The amount of increase in capital stock in any point of time can be determine from the differences in the 
gross investment in new capital generated from the fractions of earnings saved by the individuals against 
the depreciation of the capital stock and increase in population. The rate of which savings contribute to K 
can be denoted as the rate of savings per person s(∙) shown in equation 2.11. 
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Because productivity and the labour force are growing, the steady states will not be stationary and output 
will grow. Equation 2.8 is normalised by dividing it by AtLt, in order to express it in stationary steady 












                                                                                Equation 2.10 
or  
𝑘 = 𝑠 ∙ 𝑓 𝑘 −  𝑛 + 𝛿 ∙ 𝑘     ,                                         Equation 2.11 
Equation 2.11 is the basic differential equation of the Solow-Swan model. This nonlinear equation 
depended on k. The term n+𝛿 can be treated as the effective depreciation rate for the capital-labour ratio, 
𝑘 ≡ 𝐾/𝐿 . If the savings rate reduced to zero, the capital per person would decline due to depreciation of 
capital at the rate δ and also due to increase in the population at rate (n). Increase in the rate of population 
growth tend to lessen capital per capita by diluting the capital resulting from increase population sharing 
limited sum of capital.   
Based on figure 2.1, the rate of increase in capital stock can be depicted by the vertical line between the 
saving line and depreciation line, 𝑑𝑘 𝑑𝑡 . As long as the saving line position above the depreciation line, 
it indicates that the capital stock will be increasing monotically and would converge at K*, which is 





The differential equation, i.e. equation 2.11, indicates how the change of capital stock is determined by 
the existence capital, which leads to the determination of the entire path of capital. As a result of  k  or 
marginal product of capital is increasing with diminishing return, the saving schedule also indicate 
positive but with diminishing slope also.   
Thus the capital stock will rise, and hence national income F(K) will rise. But because of diminishing 
returns, national income will not grow as fast as the capital stock, which meant that savings will not grow 
as fast as depreciation. Eventually depreciation will catch up with savings, and at that juncture the capital 
stock will stop rising. The savings generated by the income gained from the new capital will also 
declined, and will eventually be only enough to replace worn-out machines and equipped new workers. 
At this point the economy enters a stationary state with unchanging standard of living. The diminishing 
return can be depicted with the following equation. F‘ (K) >0 and F‖ (K) <0 for all K, and imposing the 
Inada condition 
lim𝑡→0 𝐹
′ 𝐾 = ∞,   𝑎𝑛𝑑  lim𝑡→∞ 𝐹
′ 𝐾 = 0     
The convergence point of the steady state can be depicted as follows: s∙k= (n+δ) k. But if the marginal 
product continues to fall, the savings generated by the income accruing to new capital also will fall, and 
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will eventually be only just sufficient to replace worn-out machines and equip new workers. At this 
point, the economy enters a stationary state with unchanging standard of living.  
The link between saving, capital and output can be illustrated clearly in Figure 2.2. Figure 2.2 plots the 
production function, y , the saving function, sy , and savings needed to maintain any given level of 
capital,    1 + n  1 + g + δ k,   all as a function of capital per efficiency worker, k . The savings 
function and savings needed to maintain a given level of capital intersect at the long-run equilibrium, 
steady state, where capital accumulation is zero, point (k*, y*). 
 
    FIGURE 2.2 
The Figure 2.2 can be used depict how savings influence the economy. The increase of savings from s to 
s‘ caused increased in capital per efficiency worker from k* to k** as well as gross income per efficiency 
from y* to y**. However, once the economy reached to its new capital level, income per efficiency then 






In essence, prior to increase in savings, the income growth rate is equal to the labour efficiency rate and 
the ratio of income over efficiency labour is constant. The rise in saving would lead the rise in capital 
stock, k* to k** and income, y* to y**. In order to move to higher equilibrium stock k*, the capital must 
grow faster for quite some time than efficiency labour. Due to greater increase in capital stock, the 
income will grow temporarily faster than efficiency labour.  
The rise in savings would temporarily increase the capital stock, however, would not have any long-run 
effect on growth rate. A rise in the depreciation rate would cause decline in the capital by moving the 
depreciation schedule upward. However, once the new steady state (k**, y**) is reached, capital and 
income will grow again at the same rate as efficiency labour, i.e. y** is constant. This implies that a 
country willing to invest more of its output (and consume less) can enjoy a temporary growth spurt; 
however, increased savings will not raise growth indefinitely.  In this steady state equilibrium, output and 
the capital stock will both continue to grow but only at the rate of population growth. Growth as 
measured by the rate of increase in output per person will cease in the long run. 
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Without population growth and increase in technology, the economy will eventually reach a stationary 
level its growth rate experience diminishing return. As capital stock reaches the stationary level k*, gross 
income will reach its stationary level, y*=f (k*) and the growth rate of national output will fall to zero. 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) agrees with a standard Solow model on international difference in 
levels of per capita income and rates of growth after they factored in to include human capital and to 
allow for cross-country differences in savings rates to reflect differences in tastes or culture. The 
assumption was based on that every country has its own Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function 
and its own exogenous rates of savings and population growth. In the Solow growth model, this would 
imply convergence to different steady-state path for per capita income, as represented in equation 2.12: 






ln⁡(ni + gi + δi)     Equation 2.12 
Here, yi(t) is per capita income in a country i at time t (when the country has already  entered a steady 
state with constant growth rate gi , Ai represents a multiplicative factor in the aggregate production 
function that augments the productivity of labour at time 0, ∝i denote the exponent on capital in this same 
production function  ( and also capitals‘s share of income), si is the country‘s saving rate and ni, gi and δi 
are the rates of population growth, labour-augmenting technological progress, and capital depreciation, 
respectively.  
The equation states that a country per capita income in the steady state is positively related to the initial 
workers productivity, technology progress, and interest rates. However, it is inversely related to the rates 
of depreciation and population growth. A high savings rate indicates that most are used to replace 
depreciated capital, while low depreciation and population growth rates mean that little of the new 
capital must be used to replace old machine or to equip new workers. Hence, savings will only affect the 
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growth rate temporarily according to Solow-Swan. In another words, increased in savings would increase 
capital-output ratio, raises output and capital per head, but unable to change the steady state of growth. 
2.3.2 Growth and Financial Development 
Two major factors are significant when discussing theories about savings. One is financial development 
and the other is growth.  The study into financial development-growth nexus can be classified into two 
perspectives. One can be viewed as an important agent to ensure that the financial transaction could be 
done efficiently and effectively. The other one views the role of financial liberalisation in terms of 
growth and financial deepening.  
2.3.2.1 Financial Development Model 
The first school of thought is based on Diamond (1984) model, i.e. financial institutions help to share and 
diversify risk in financial market. The study focuses on delegated monitoring by financial intermediaries. 
Depositor delegates the role of monitoring to the financial intermediaries in overseeing the lending to the 
entrepreneurs. Diversification occurs when N bankers working for intermediaries monitor ex-ante 
information of N entrepreneurs. The bankers are assumed not to face any moral hazard since all bankers 
observe each other information. Due to the risk sharing, each bankers signalling decision  is equivalent to 







/Ν (where α= constant). As a result, diversification by subdividing risks, the intermediary's 
signalling costs are lower than an entrepreneur's and the intermediary's costs are equivalent to the 
signalling costs of an entrepreneur with a smaller variance of specific risk. 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) focus on the financial institution‘s ability to pool and mitigate risk and 
invest in projects that are considered long-term in nature. These projects are deemed too illiquid, that is 
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beyond the capability for the individuals to handle, but yet able to generate handsome return. This makes 
the role of financial institutions unique as they improve investment efficiency and eventually enhances 
economic growth (Becievenga and Smith, 1991). Becievenga and Smith (1997) continue further work by 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) by formulating models that illustrates financial development create 
specialisation in financial markets. According to the model, there are costs incurred in establishing the 
market. These costs are more affordable for societies on high levels of per capita income than those at the 
lower levels. Increased revenue from transactions taking place in the financial market would be able to 
lessen the average cost of transactions. Hence, based on the model there would be specialisations in the 
marketplace as more transactions occur and increased productivity.  
Based on the model developed by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), financial institutions are expected 
to increase the percentage of investments and hence the economic growth. In its early development, the 
economy is simple and poorly organised. Information regarding the range of productive activities is 
expected to be dismal. The role of financial information becomes vital to act as monitoring agents, 
pooling all the important information regarding information activities, and giving professional advice on 
any potential productive venture. Hence, financial intermediaries act as vital role in transferring funds 
from unproductive investment to productive ones. 
Financial institutions also increased the amount of savings transformed into investment based on 
endogenous growth theory (Pagano, 1993). It enabled pooling of individual funds and invested them in 
viable projects. The premise of Pagano‘s assertion is that as financial transactions increase, it would 
increase competition among financial institutions. Inevitably, that would help reduce leakages in 
investment caused by previous high transaction fees imposed by financial institutions. In addition, with 
increased activities of financial institutions, it will be able to stimulate the countries growth.  
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Pagano‘s assumption on the importance of financial development effect on growth was based on the AK 
model. The production function is assumed to be a function of capital and increasing function of the 
degree of financial development of the economy. Financial development affects the aggregate output by 
increasing the marginal product of capital.   
tt AKY     Equation 2.13 
A  = the marginal productivity of capital 
   K= measure of physical capital stock 
 Y= the output 
Assume that the population is stationary that that there is only a single good is produced and consumed at 
it depreciates at the rate of  δ  per period. Therefore, gross investment can be represented as follows: 
  
ttt KKI )1(1         Equation 2.14 
In a closed economy in a steady state, gross savings tS  equals to gross Investment tI . However, 
according to Pagano (1993), a proportion of  1 − 𝜃  is lost in the process of financial intermediation, in 
which a dollars saved by households generates less than one dollar worth of investment. 
   𝜃𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡 𝑆𝑡        Equation 2.15 
The leakages goes to the banks as the spread between lending and borrowing rates and to securities 
brokers and dealers as commissions. 
Using the equation 2.13, the growth rate at time 1t can be defined as  
  ttttttt KKKYYYg )()( 111      Equation 2.16 
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     Equation 2.17 
Equation 2.13 is then rearranged into: 
A
Y
K tt   and then inserted into equation 2.17 and obtain:  
 )/(1 ttt YIAg       Equation 2.18 
By combining equation 2.15 into equation 2.18, the growth rate can be written as a follows: 




s  , equation 2.19 can be summed up as:  
   sAgt 1        Equation 2.20 
 Equation 2.20 is in a steady state where growth rate is a factor of marginal productivity of capital, ratio 
of savings turn into investment and savings rates minus rates of depreciation.  
g can then be rewritten into log form as follows: 
Log SAg lnln         Equation 2.21 
In this equation, endogenous economic growth is affected by the three elements which  is   which is the 
proportion of savings that transformed  into investments or capital absorption rate, A which is the 
increase in capital productivity, which according to Lucas (1988) capital comprised of human and 
physical capital, and  s the rate of savings. 
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From this context, financial development affects growth via increasing θ or the capital absorption rate, or 
it may increase the social productivity of capital (A); or it may influence the savings rate.     
2.3.2.2 McKinnon-Shaw Financial Liberalisation Model 
Mc Kinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) show that financial repression exerts a negative effect on savings 
and economic growth. This condition occurs when the governments impose interest rates ceiling the 
deposits and loans. Financial repression causes disequilibrium, which distorts the market from clearing 
and serving the allocative function in the most efficient way. Both postulate that removing interest rate 
ceiling would allow the interest rate to be determined by the market forces and would in turn spur 
investment and growth. Figure 2.4 shows the impact of interest rates ceilings on savings and investment. 
The premise of the model is:  
i. Investment (I) is negatively influenced by real rate of interest (r) 
ii. Savings(s) is positively influenced by r with  
iii. Rate of growth (g) is positively influenced by r 
Where S(g)= rate of savings;  g= economic growth

















If g1 increase to g2, it would caused increased from S(g1) to S(g2). In a non-interference control market 
where the interest rate is free to fluctuate, the equilibrium would be at Ie when re= I=S(g2).  
In a closed and financial repressive economy, the government would imposed interest rate ceilings by 
fixing real interest rate r2 lower than re , which is the equilibrium rate. At r1, which is equivalent to the 
amount of interest that could earn from depositing money, the amount of money in the economy is 
equivalent to I1. In this situation, the amount of money demanded (I3) is greater the fund available (I1), 
hence there will be shortages of funds available for investments. Depositors are not keen to save in low 
yielding interest rate and they would invest elsewhere to realise their expected returns. There will be 
credit rationing since there is excess demand for credit (I3-I1).There will be several potential profitable 
projects that will fail to obtain the necessary funds for investments. Several scenarios exist in this 
circumstance. Firstly, there is tendency for the population to consume now rather than deferring to later. 
Secondly, there will be lesser transactions as depositors would shy away from putting their money into 
low yielding deposits. Thirdly, investors would invest more on capital intensive projects rather than 
labour intensive projects as they could acquire funds for capital at a lower interest rate. Fourthly, 
investors could afford to venture into low yielding projects, which would be otherwise impossible in the 
market determined interest rate. Fifth, it also contributed misallocation of funds as the government tends 
to distribute available funds to preferred sectors rather than to those that can best utilise the funds. The 
result is inefficient usage of funds, which then contributed to slow economic growth.  
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) postulate that by liberalising (or removing the ceiling on) the   
interest rates, it would remove inefficiency in allocation of funds and will increase the aggregate savings, 
investment and economic growth. 
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Assume that the government decides to allow interest to determine its course, and evidently the interest 
rate increases to (r2) (Figure 2.4). Savings/Investment would rise to I2 and growth would be at g2. Projects 
that yield returns that are higher than r1 but lower than r2 would no longer be acceptable to receive the 
fund. In this circumstance by relaxing the interest rates, it would encourage savings, increased efficiency 
in investment and reduce credit rationing. Eventually the interest rate would then move to the 
equilibrium point, Ie, and the economy would grow from g2 to g3. Finally, there will be no more credit 
rationing or shortages of funds. Only potential projects with yields greater than re are acceptable for the 
needed funding.  
2.3.2.3 Empirical evidence on Financial Development and Growth 
Demetriades and Hussein (1996) conduct studies on 16 selected countries with each having 27 
continuous observations using a time-series error correction estimation technique. Their study produces 
mixed result as some countries show significant relationship while others failed. Even the results from 
their error correction model are mixed, as some countries indicate positive causation running from 
financial development to economic growth, while the rest either indicates reversed or bidirectional 
causation. 
Neusser and Kugler (1997)‘s finance-growth study is based on time-series perspective on thirty sectors in 
fourteen OECD economies from 1960s to 1990s.  The primary focus is to discover any causality between 
manufacturing sector GDP and financial sector GDP as well as between total factor productivity (TFP) 
and financial sector GDP. Most countries reveal long term relationship between manufacturing GDP as 
well as TFP with financial sector GDP. In terms of causality, it is unidirectional as the result indicates 
that financial sector GDP drives both TFP and manufacturing GDP in most countries.  In certain 
countries, the causality is reversed. 
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Levine and Zervos (1998) use GMM dynamic panel estimation technique to deal with biasness caused by 
simultaneity bias, omitted variable and unobserved country specific effects to examine whether 
component of financial intermediary development influences economic growth. The study also uses 
cross-sectional method for comparison.  Legal origin dummy variables introduced by La Porta et al 
(1998) were used as instrumental variables to control for simultaneity bias.  The study involves 74 
countries from 1960-1995. The result from both estimators indicates that financial development leads 
and influences the economic growth. The importance of this study is that it is able to allay any doubts 
regarding any biasness due to simultaneity or lacks of conditioning variables that have plagued previous 
studies. 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) postulate that financial development is a leading indicator to anticipate faster 
economic growth. They use United States as a benchmark for frictionless financial market and assumed 
every sector of the industry requires external financing. Then they compare the industrial sectors across 
various countries and examine if these sectors that depended on external financing grew faster in those 
countries with well developed financial sectors. Their result indicates that external financing contribute 
more growth to the sectors with well developed financial sector than those that are less developed. In the 
nutshell, they conclude deepening of financial sector helps to alleviate the external cost of financing and 
therefore foster economic growth. Their end result confirms that causality runs from financial 
development to economic growth. 
Levine and Zervos (1998) evaluate whether banking and stock market indicators are both robustly 
correlated with current and future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity 
growth on 47 countries from 1976 to 1993. The study used cross-sectional analysis to find the 
relationship. The results indicate that that stock market liquidity is positively and significantly correlated 
with current and future economic growth, capital accumulation and productivity growth. Furthermore, 
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the level of banking development, as measured by bank loans to private enterprises divided by GDP, also 
shows similar significant result. Stock market size, volatility and integration with world capital markets, 
however, were not significantly correlated with economic growth and productivity increase. 
Luintel and Khan (1999) use multivariate time series causality testing to examine the association 
between financial development and economic growth for 10 selected countries. Results show that there 
was bi-directional causality between financial development and economic growth in all the sample 
countries analysed, unlike the previous studies using bivariate testing, i.e. (Demetriades and Hussain 
1996), which reported mixed results for different countries. Their results also shows that in the long-run, 
financial depth is positively and significantly affected by the levels of per capita, real income and the real 
interest rate.   
Beck et al (2000) conduct a study of 63 countries examining the correlation between financial 
intermediary development and sources of growth, identified as (1) private savings rate (ii) capital 
accumulation (iii) total factor productivity. The studies apply the same two econometric procedures used 
by Levin et al (1998), namely GMM dynamic panel estimator to deal with simultaneity bias and country 
specific effect and cross-sectional estimation method. The results do not show any significant link 
between private savings rate and capital accumulation and financial intermediary development. However, 
it indicates a robust link between total factor productivity and financial development, in which can be 
construed that financial intermediaries affects economic development, mainly via influencing total factor 
productivity growth. 
Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) use two models by regressing using GMM estimator to examine the 
financial development variables used by Levine (1998) against growth variables, i.e. total factor 
productivity, physical capital and human capital variables. One of the models used was neoclassical 
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model, based on Solow growth model with human capital added as factor production and the other, the 
endogenous growth model developed by Benhabib and Spiegel (2000). Each model was run with and 
without fixed effect. Overall, the financial development positively influences total factor productivity 
and investment variables, however, different financial development variables correlate significantly with 
different growth variables. 
Thangavelu and Ang (2000) conduct using time-series VAR model and Granger test examining the 
causal relationship between financial development and economic growth in Australia, in terms of bank 
based versus market based system. The result indicates that economic growth spurs the growth of 
financial intermediaries, while in contrast, stock market growth leads the economic growth. It assumes 
that better functioning stock market, results better informed investment decisions and thus improved 
economic growth.  
Wachtel (2001) using panel VAR on 47 countries for two eight-year average finds significant causality 
from financial development to real GDP but no reverse causality. He finds that by increasing money 
supply M3 by 10 percent, it would increase output per capita growth by 0.8 percent.  
Time series method using Eagle-Granger causality test used by Mazur and Alexander (2001) in 
examining financial development relationship, i.e. stock market and bank sectors, shows negative 
correlation with economic growth in New Zealand.  
Schich and Pelgrin (2002) use dynamic panel error correction approach to examine the correlation 
between financial development and the levels of investment in 19 OECD countries from 1970 to 1997. 
All the estimators show significant relationship between the financial development indicator, i.e. 
financial intermediary and stock market capitalization, against the levels of investment. 
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Guiso et al (2002) examine the individual regions of Italy. Using an extraordinary dataset on households 
and financial services across Italy, they examine the effects of differences in local financial development 
on economic activity across the regions of Italy. They find that local financial development (i) enhances 
the probability that an individual starts a business, (ii) increases industrial competition, and (iii) promotes 
the growth of firms. These results are weaker for larger firms as they can raise funds easier from outside 
rather than dependant from the local area.  
Beck (2003) examines whether a higher level of financial development translates into a comparative 
advantage in industries that relies heavily on external finance as a source of financing. The study was 
conducted on 56 countries and 36 industries. It uses the same methodology as Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
by regressing export and trades shares with financial development across countries and by controlling 
simultaneity bias. The result indicates that countries, in which the industries  rely more on  external 
finance as a source of capital, with a higher level of financial development leads to  higher export shares 
and trade balances. 
Jeong and et al (2003) investigate to find relationship between banking health and economic 
performance. Their study was based on the US banking data stretching from 1942 until 1996. Variables 
used are bank capital (BC), investment oriented bank loans (IOBL) and GDP. Their cointegration test 
shows cointegration between BC, IOBL and GDP. However, that causality test shows bidirectional effect 
between BC and IOBL and weak exogeneity between IOBL and GDP. 
Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) examine the relationship between financial deepening and economic 
growth using Johansen and panel cointegration analysis on 10 less developed countries from 1970 until 
2000. Vector error correction model (VECM) is used to determine the causality between the variables 
and ancillary variables (investment share and inflation). The result indicates that there is long run 
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relationship running from financial developed towards economic growth. There is no indication of 
bidirectional causality or short run relationship. 
Rioja and Valev (2004) examine the effect of levels of financial development on economic growth by 
segregating 74 countries into 3 different levels of financial deepening, i.e. low region, middle region and 
high region. They employ GMM dynamic panel estimator, instrument variables and dummy variables to 
deal with serial correlation, country and time specific affects. Results indicate that in lower region the 
positive effect of finance and growth cannot be established. However, for middle and upper region, the 
finance-growth relationship is robust in which the authors suggest that it is imperative that to bolster 
economic growth it is essential for countries to develop to a certain threshold of financial development. 
Levine and Beck (2004) study on stocks market, banks and growth is an extension of the study done by 
Levin and Zervos (1998). The methodology they use is a two-step GMM dynamic estimator applied on 
40 countries. The data is averaged over five 5-year periods between 1976 and 1998 to normalise the 
business cycle influences. The result indicates that stock market liquidity and bank development 
significantly affect economic growth. 
Hondroyiannis et al (2005) assess the relationship between the development of banking systems and 
stock market against economic performance for Greece from 1986 to 1999. The result is less robust 
suggesting that the stock market capitalization and bank credit only partially determine the size of 
economic activity. Furthermore, the contribution of stock market to the growth process is substantially 
smaller than the banking sector, meaning that the stock market plays a lesser important role than the 
banking sector in contributing towards the growth of Greek economy. 
Ghirmay (2005) investigates the linkage between financial development and economic growth on 13 sub-
Saharan African countries using Johansen cointegration methodology and error correction model. The 
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result from the cointegration finds that there is long run relationship between financial development with 
economic growth in all the 13 countries. Eight of the countries show a causal relationship from financial 
development to growth, while nine countries show causal relationship from growth to financial 
development. Six countries show bidirectional causal relationship which results are similar to Luintel and 
Khan (1999).  
Loayza and Ranciere (2005) study used Pooled Mean Group  (PMG) estimator  developed by Pesaran et 
al (1999) to analyse the long run and short run impact of financial development against growth on 75 
countries from1960 to 2000. Their result shows a positive long-run relationship between financial 
intermediaries and output, however, it indicates a negative relationship in the short run term. 
Apergis et al (2007) investigate the long run relationship between financial development and economic 
growth using panel cointegration technique developed by Pedroni (1999) and PMG developed by 
Pesaran et al (1999) on 15 OECD and 50 non OECD countries from 1975 to 2000. The results indicate 
that there is long run equilibrium relationship between financial deepening and economic growth. They 
also find that there is bidirectional causality effect between financial deepening and growth for all the 
OECD and non OECD countries.  
2.3.3  Growth and Institutions  
There is a widespread belief among the economist that the quality of institutions in a country is very 
important to the development of growth and macroeconomic stability of the countries, i.e. investment, 
savings and growth. Countries with investors feeling secured about the property rights and the rule of law 
would be able to establish a better and stronger basis for economic prosperity. 
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According to North (1990, pp 147): Institutions can both formal and informal which stretches from 
taboos and unwritten traditions in one end to the laws and constitutions governing the countries. In 
North‘s own words (1990, pp110) - ―Third World countries are poor because the institutional constraints 
define a set of payoffs to political economic activities that do not encourage productive activity‖. 
North and Thomas (1973, pp91-93) argue that the secured and stable property rights are the main reasons 
behind the rapid rise of Western civilization and modern economic growth. The rationale was that 
businessman would not be motivated enough to accumulate wealth and become productive unless they 
are in control of their earnings. 
Collier (1998) terms institutions factors, such as enforceability of law and rule of law, as government 
institutions that influences people ability to cooperate to reach towards mutual objective. 
According to Dixit (2009), economic governance can be perceived as structure and functioning of the 
legal and social institutions that support economic activity and economic transactions by protecting 
property rights, enforcing contracts and taking collective actions to provide physical and organizational 
infrastructure. 
Property rights are deemed essential as without the security or guaranteed of the wealth accumulated, 
there is no incentive for a party to invest its resources or capital in the first place.    Enforcing the 
contract is important as multiparty may enter into contracts and during the term of contracts, one or more 
parties would felt that the terms have been violated.  There need to be recourse for proper punishment so 
that fairness and justice could be restored.  
Collective action refers to the common provision conceived by a society or community for the well-being 
of the general public, e.g. social safety nets, and for controlling the wrong doers, i.e. prosecutions and 
punishments on the transgressors.   
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The following are three important hypotheses explaining from the historical perspective on the 
developments that led to the establishments of institutions in a country and the impact on growth. 
2.3.3.1 Law and Finance Hypothesis 
La Porta et al (1997, 1998, and 2000) suggest that legal origin is an important determinant of traits of the 
legal framework such as rule of law and property rights.  Their hypothesis is important as they re-
examine historically from legal perspective the role of legal origin on economic and financial framework 
across the countries. Their studies primarily attempt to rationalise why certain countries are able to 
institute effective legal, financial as well as political institutions that becomes the basis for strong 
economic growth, while other countries seems to bog down and becomes rather ineffective. 
Their studies focus on enforceability of property rights that become the countries benchmark in enforcing 
the country‘s rule of law.  Countries that have well written and enforcement of the property rights are 
deemed to have clear framework and modus operandi to perform transactions and protecting the rights of 
investors and creditors.  The origins of the law, according to La Porta et al,, can be traced back to 
colonial times when most nations were ruled by major superpowers, i.e. British, France, Germany and 
Scandinavian. Based on extensive research, La Porta et al. conclude that countries that were ruled by the 
British (common law) have laws that were more accommodating and able to provide greater latitude for 
interpretation by judges.  It is deemed that the countries that were being colonised by the British are able 
to absorb, implement and localised the law according to their own unique circumstances.   
They are less rigid on the requirements of presenting formal evidence. The judges tend to make judgment 
based on facts and evidence rather than based solely on the principles of codified law. They argue that 
laws were shaped more from the judge‘s decision and interpretation based on the judges‘ perception of 
the new developments. According to La Porta et al (2003), the common law is most likely to use the 
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judicial decision as a reference point to solve new cases. As opposed to Napoleonic doctrine, the law 
requires the reliance on judicial formalism. As a result, the inflexibility of the legal system in French 
colonised countries eventually affected the future development of the country‘s financial system. 
In comparison, the French Civil law, which could be traced to the Napoleonic doctrine tend to be strict in 
interpretation and rigidly retained its historical roots of jurisprudence. The Napoleonic doctrine based on 
the notion that everything has been written and it left little room for the judges‘ interpretation. The 
judges were only considered the purveyor of law, whose purpose to execute law that has been explicitly 
stated in the doctrine. Moreover, the French law inhibit open discussion among the judges regarding 
laws, statutes, and past court decision that are in conflict between each other, that which impede the 
development of efficient legal system around the world. 
 As a result of the rigidness, most of the countries that are under French ruling have difficulty in applying 
the French legal law into solving the local problems. According to La Porta et al (2003), the common law 
countries are more open towards protecting private property rights that are foundations for development 
of sound financial system. In contrast, the French civil law are more supportive on the rights of the state 
rather than rights of protecting the private properties. Hence, the law and finance theory concludes that 
the British Common law supports financial development to a greater degree than the French Civil law 
systems. 
Several legal scholars conclude that the German law are closer to the Common law than the Napoleonic 
doctrine. The scholars argued that countries with the common law have more comprehensive, discipline 





2.3.3.2 Endowment Hypothesis 
Acemoglu et al (2001) posits that the current legal and financial development of a country can be 
explained by the endowment hypothesis. The endowment hypothesis argues that the level of country‘s 
legal and social development is dependent on how historically the European colonisers treat the 
territories that they occupied. Primarily, the hypothesis postulates the role of mortality rate linking to the 
fatal disease in determining the colonisers‘ length of stay.  
The authors documented in detail which territories colonisers found to be hospitable and which are not. 
Those countries that the European colonisers deem hospitable and decided to stay permanently, they 
would establish adequate legal and regulatory structures, so that those countries are able to govern 
effectively and manage their own affairs. Those occupied countries that deemed inhospitable by the 
colonisers would be considered as purely strategic centre to extract natural resources. The European 
colonisers would institute limited financial and legal institutions that the local government unable to 
effectively govern the country. Eventually, the economic growth of these countries faltered with growing 
unresolved social and political problems.  
After gaining the country‘s independence, the local government would inherit the previous colonial 
master‘s mentality of stripping away the country‘s natural resources in order to remain in power for a 
longer period. In this circumstance, rule of law was only used to serve their vested interest rather than to 
govern their society. Examples of these countries are mostly the third world countries, which are 
characterised by lack of formal institutions such high corruption, ineffective bureaucracy, limited 
transparency, lack of accountability, economic instability and lawlessness. 
The second factor in determining European colonising strategy is the indigenous population density. 
According to Acemoglu et al (2004), when the population density is high, the colonisers tend to capture 
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the native and put them into force work. But if the density of the population is lesser, the colonisers tend 
to settle permanently and less likely to treat the new territory as extractive institution. 
2.3.3.3 Political Process Hypothesis 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) stipulates in his growth hypothesis built from his endowment hypothesis 
that differences in the political institution caused differences in economic development. Their hypothesis 
hinges on premise that the evolvement of the political process, either based on de jure or de facto 
reasoning, is essential in determining the type of political system that emerged, which thereafter 
determines the type of economic development 
De jure refers to the power of political institutions that existed during that period. In absolute monarchy, 
the political institutions provide unlimited constraint of power to the monarchy and the monarchy has 
unconditional power to rule the country. There can be gradual change in the distributions of property 
rights to his subjects. Power is more concentrated in the monarchy and there is less constraint and check 
and balance by other governing bodies.  In contrast to the constitutional monarchy, the political power 
provides limited power to the monarchy and greater power to the parliament. 
The other source of political power is the de facto political power. This power originates from grassroots 
levels where certain groups of people are able to gain enough support to demand drastic changes from 
the ruling political party, either amicably or forcefully.  Typically, if they succeed to realise their 
objectives, they would then restrict the de facto power and request for more distributive power for the 
grassroots. A restricted political power with its own check and balance would be able to produce better 
institutional environment, e.g. better enforcements of property rights and private contract, which is vital 
for transformation into better economic performance of the country. Economic institutions are also 
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important as they assist in allocating the resources to the best usage. Without property rights, they will be 
no incentive to invest in physical or human capital or adopting the latest technology. 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) define property rights as rules and regulations protecting citizens against 
the power of government and bureaucracy. Property rights encompass not only the extent of non-
interference by the ruling parties in expropriating the property of the private citizens but also include the 
extent of not showing any favouritism against one party or another in awarding private contracts. A 
private contract is defined as fulfilling ones obligation to another as stipulated in the agreement.  The 
inability to enforce the appropriate penalty if one party broke the contract,  signifies the weakness of the 
country‘s economic system.  However, according to Acemoglu et al (2004), the failure to fulfil the 
contract obligation can be remedied easily by modifying the terms of the contract by requiring more risk 
premiums or converting the equities into debt instrument. However, lesser enforcement in property rights 
would pose more problems to rectify as it normally involves requesting the ruling party to change its 
practice, which is difficult to accomplish.  
Examples of the political system that arrived via de facto process, is the American Revolution which 
fights for their independence from the British colonisation. Once the dissidents overthrew their British 
occupiers, they managed to put together a political framework based on the executive power of the 
President, with senate and congress as the other legislative bodies that serves to check and balance the 
power wield by the U.S. President. One of the organisations evolved from this political process, which is 
free to exercise its independence without outside interferences from other government bodies, is the 
Federal Reserve Bank of United States.  
 According to Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), de facto power has tremendous power to influence the 
political institution during that period, since the de facto power largely controlled the distribution of 
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resources and wealth. Their success in overtaking the political system has enormously influenced how 
the economic institutions evolved and the country‘s economic growth. He posits since this group of 
power previously control the distribution of resource, their success in overthrowing the government has 
great bearing in making the economic institution more align to the market needs rather than the vested 
interest of political institutions. 
2.3.3.4 Empirical evidence on Institutions and Growth 
According to Rodrik (2003), the types of institutions that are currently adopted by different countries 
were influenced by its historical origins, which are linked to the country‘s geography, political and other 
initial conditions factors. He pointed that those successful nations, especially the developed and the 
newly emerging economies, are able to blend between the unorthodox elements with orthodox policies to 
achieve success in protecting property rights and enforcing law. He also finds not only institutional 
structures can vary between countries but they also can vary within a country across time as illustrated by 
Korean model of subsidising major conglomerate. During the early stages of economic development, the 
policy works well to boost the country‘s economy growth, however, during the 1990‘s the policy 
backfired and one of the reasons contributing to the country‘s financial crisis.  
Rodrik (2008) finds that emerging economies in Latin America, except Chile, that has instituted 
economic reform as advised by the Washington Consensus has witnessed their economic growth faltered, 
unlike East Asia emerging economies, e.g. China, India and South Korea, that have adopted unorthodox 
ways of reforming their economy. These East Asian countries found to perform better to ensure property 
rights and maintain macroeconomic stability than those countries opting to follow strictly by Washington 
Consensus economic prescription. 
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According to Li (2003) and Dixit (2004), such institutions that can protect property rights and ensure rule 
of law can be both informal , e.g. moral codes and self-enforcing agreements, or formal which involved 
enforced legal rules by a third party. Institutions that are able to induce socially desirable outcome from 
the actions by the economic agents are considered exceptional. 
According to Dixit (2009), in most countries there exist formal institutions, in which the government 
would administer the rule of law and protect the private property rights. The failure of the 
government to provide the necessary formal institutions could impede the progress of its economy.  
Less developed economies are characterized by weak formal governance as they have not developed 
and accrue sufficient knowledge and experience in managing large number of transactions and 
properties. Similarly, there are certain developed countries that are in similar circumstances that have 
not developed adequate formal institutions.  
According to Cleassen and Laeven (2003), both formal and informal form of institutions is important 
in governing the transactions between private parties and government sectors in the economy. It 
allows the enforcement of property rights among different parties and sectors that provides incentives 
for investment and risk taking as well as encourages market-based commercial and financial 
transactions.  
The above discussion leads to the next question: i.e. ―Can informal or private governance able to 
assume the role of protecting property rights and enforcing the contracts in lieu of formal 
governance?‖ Dixit (2009) adds that in developed economies, there exist informal social and market 
institutions that are already functional that are able to assume the role of dysfunction formal 
institutions. He postulates that for the private institutions to assume the role of formal institutions, 
three methods have to be in place, i.e. first-party, second-party and third-party systems.  
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The first party system operates essentially based on the internalizing value system or, as he terms it, 
―pro-social preference‖. It is behaviour associated with ones feelings, e.g. feeling satisfied for 
behaving honourably or feeling ashamed and guilty for committing wrongdoings.  It is important that 
these sense of right and wrong ingrained in the individuals, so that it can be transmuted and 
collectively reflected on how the society functions. The first party enforcement between firms can be 
achieved by combining the contractual firms into one entity to achieve one common objective as 
stipulated by Williamson transaction cost theory (1985).  The advantage of merging is that instead of 
governing different units disparately, now it becomes one closed unit. It evolves into relationship 
between principal and agents rather than relationship between two disparate parties.  
On the other hand, in order for several distinct firms to be privately governed effectively, it requires 
second party enforcement based on multiparty interactions. In order to ensure the enforcement work, 
it requires ―stable community with many interactions, and good information flow about members‘ 
behaviour‖ (Dixit, 2009). However, as the group size expands, the second party enforcement 
weakens as information gathering and channel of communications deteriorates (Li, 2003). According 
to Li (2003), in order for large scale group to become effective, the method of informal governance 
has to be transformed into formal method of governances. Li draws the distinction that in large scale 
formal institutions, it requires high initial fixed cost for the legal system to pass laws and establish 
police force to enforce court‘s decision. In contrast, informal institutions of governance requires less 
fixed cost initially, however, as the group size grew larger,  the marginal cost becomes greater and 
finally becomes less economical to operate beyond certain group size. 
The final level is the third party system managed by outside parties, who are privy to the ongoing 
transactions among multi parties (Dixit, 2009). The third party institutions can be in different forms, 
i.e. (1) private adjudicators (2) party to provide the necessary information for the inputs for 
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enforcements (3) party responsible for enforcements for profit.  However, the disadvantages of 
informal (private institutions) are the extent of effectiveness of private communication network and 
threat of expulsion from the group. As the group size becomes bigger, their effectiveness worsens or 
becomes too costly to maintain the level of effectiveness. Notably, if the enforcement is performed 
by profit motivated party, the party can use its power to extract as much profit from those under its 
protection. 
According to Dixit (2009), how well a country‘s economy progresses is dependent on the extent of  
interactions between the formal governmental institutions– i.e. the constitutions, legislature, courts 
and the police – against the informal  private and social institution – i.e. the norms, behaviour and 
private actions for enforcements against violations. 
Changes to the current formal institutions could cause temporary disequilibrium before new changes 
takes into effect. Reformation can be tedious as the process involves overcoming resistance to the 
political process, revamping the information flow and creating common knowledge to achieve to the 
new state of equilibrium. Dixit (2004) shows that changes to the formal institutions can even weaken 
the performance of the existing informal institutions. Government initiating top-down changes to 
reform the existing institution can turn awry without real understanding how the middle and low 
levels administrators reacted to changes. Without the right incentives, adequate communications and 
proper knowledge conveyed to them, they will be less receptive and motivated towards the new 
changes. 
Before changes were to be made on the existing formal institutions, it is advisable for the policymakers 
to understand the current structure, properties and the underlying reasons for the establishment of these 
current institutions. Any changes enacted without understanding fully the nature of the existing 
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institutions can have detrimental effect on the economic performance of the community and country.  
The establishment of institutions that show success in other countries does not meant that it can be 
implemented successfully in ones country.  The newly implementations for universally recognised 
institutions should be done in such a way that it is customised according to the local customs, rules, 
temperament and environment without causing undue disruptions  to the other current in-placed formal 
or informal institutions. Countries that are able to develop their own formal legal rulings and adopting 
from other countries legal rulings, but able to localise them, are able to establish a better comprehensive 
legal institutions than those countries that only copied legal coding outright from others (Berkowitz et al, 
2003). 
Numerous literatures have been written examining the significant effect of formal institutions on 
economic growth and financial development and to a certain extent on the investor‘s confidence. The 
followings are some of the empirical evidence on the effects of institutions factors, specifically 
democracy, protection of property rights, legal or rule of law and corruption 
2.3.3.4.1 Level of Democracy 
Kormendi  and Meguire (1985) and Scully (1988) are the first papers using institutional indicators to test 
against growth and investment.  They test a sample of 47 countries between 1950 and 1977 using 
macroeconomic variables with civil liberties as the institutional indicators from index constructed by 
Raymond Gastil for Freedom works. Their results indicate that civil liberties have significant impact on 
investments in the country. Meanwhile, Scully (1988) also uses Gastil index by using independence of 
judiciary as a proxy for the rule of law on a sample of 115 countries against income growth. His result 
indicates that countries that have greater civil liberties have income growth nearly double than those that 
have restricted freedom.  
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Barro (1996) and Helliwell (1994) find that there was significant effect on income growth using Gastil 
Institutional index only if education and investment variables were present in the regression. Both 
concluded that democracy has indirect impact on growth via those two exogenous variables.  
Rodrik (1999) examines the impact of shocks on growth on several countries with varying types of 
institutional make up. He finds that countries with poor institution of conflict management by proxying it 
with Gastil‘s civil liberties variables, recorded greater declined in growth than countries with better 
institutions of conflict management. He also examines other factors such as deep latent social conflict 
within the countries, proxied by income and land inequality variables, and the impact of growth after 
economic shocks. His result also indicates that those countries with deep latent social conflict tend to 
experience deeper growth declined due to external economic shocks.  In another words, countries with 
lesser political freedom experienced greater declines in income growth 
In a developing economy, an improving democracy may have significant effect on political and 
economic conditions (Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2006; Borner et al, 1995). Siegle et al. (2004) argued that 
democracy brings political check and balances, responsiveness to citizen priorities, openness, and self-
correcting mechanisms, which in the long term contribute towards growth.  
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2006) find that the level of significance of democracy on growth is highly 
depended on the sample of countries chosen and estimation technique. The author finds that the rule of 
law has shown a more consistent positive effect on growth compared to the affect of democracy. 
Sandholtz and Koeltz (2004) and Hellman (1998) find that post communist states, which embraced 
democracy, were the most successfully reformed and this resulted in higher economic growth. They also 
have lower rate of corruption. Their explanation is that governments, which did not face democratic 
elections, would face more obstacles instituting economic reforms and combating corruption. Corruption 
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thrives in an undemocratic environment, where secrecy is the norm and only the privilege group have 
significant access into the state economic assets. With the introduction of democratic electorate, the 
privileged few would have lesser room to hide their corrupt activities and corrupt officials would more 
likely be thrown out from their office as the government institute transparency as part of economic 
reform. 
Drury et al (2006) postulate that democracy encourages political stability that helped to spur economic 
growth, and at the same time, mitigate corruption. The assumptions were those who voted for democratic 
elected officials would more likely to vote out those officials who are considered corrupted. In contrast, 
in an undemocratic nation, the affect of corruption would have a significant negative effect on growth as 
the process of removing the corrupt official can be cumbersome. 
In contrast, a study by Helliwell (1994) finds that democracy spurs education and gross domestic 
investment, however, has a negative and insignificant effect on growth. 
2.3.3.4.2 Property Rights 
The work of Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) provides additional empirical evidence on the mechanisms 
through which initial institutions and legal origin may influence finance. More specifically, they test for 
the relative importance of ‗contracting‘ and ‗property rights‘ institutions. The contract, which is proxied 
by legal formalism, enables private contracts to be established among individuals. Private rights, which 
protect the property rights of citizens against rulers, act as proxy for citizens‘ protection against 
government expropriation as well as the limitations of the government influence. They treated both 
contract and property rights as endogenous variables and use legal origin and settler mortality as 
instruments for legal formalism and for property rights. They find that there is strong correlation between 
legal origin and legal formalism, and also between settler mortality and property rights institutions. 
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Property rights institutions are found to have a larger and significant impact on long-run economic 
growth, investment and financial development. They posit that individuals can reduce the disadvantages 
inherent in institutional contracts by restructuring these contracts appropriately and diligently assuming 
they are enforceable. However, the failure of property rights, as an institutional factor, can have grave 
consequence as it could reduce the integrity of contracts between individuals and the government and 
would discourage private sectors to invest.  
Clague et al (1996) use contract-intensive money (CIM), which is M2 over GDP minus currency, as 
indicator for a country‘s level of protection on property rights. The rationale using that indicator as proxy 
is that investors won‘t hold their asset in the form of bank deposit or near-money instruments if they are 
not confident that they will be able to exchange the deposits and financial instrument back into hard 
currency. Their results show that countries that have high level of CIM or protection of property rights 
were always associated with higher level of per capita income, total factor productivity and higher rates 
of investment. 
In terms of legal origin, Beck et al (2003) conclude that countries that inherited French civil law tend to 
have lesser levels of private property rights protection. Again, this is consistent with the view that French 
legal origin countries place comparatively less emphasis on the rights of private property holders than 
countries with a Common or German civil law tradition. 
2.3.3.4.3 Rule of Law  
Several studies have traced the impact on the rule of law on the growth. Demirguc-Kunt and Vojislav 
(1998) show that countries with legal institutions that protect outside investors tend to create better 
functioning financial systems that fund faster growing firms. 
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Dollar and Kraay (2000)‘s empirical result indicates that rule of law and property right have significant 
impact on the growth of poor nations, but not affecting income distribution. 
Claessan and Laeven (2003) indicate that countries with strong legal rules would have strong investors‘ 
protections, which would enable smaller firms to secure source of funding, even though with insufficient 
collateral. In contrast, countries with less property protection, smaller investors would have difficult time 
securing funding with marginal collateral. In this vein, Himmelberg et al. (2000) develop a theoretical 
model in which he concludes that effective investors‘ protection would reduce the cost of capital, 
improves capital allocation, and thus increases investment and growth. 
Beck and Levine (2002) examine the impact of legal institution influencing distribution of capital across 
the firms and industries. They find that legal institutions have positive impact on financial institution by 
facilitating distribution of funds to various firms and different industries. By instituting a sound legal 
system over the current financial system, it would induce the financial system to be able to effectively 
distribute capital to the most deserving industries and companies. 
Levine et al (2000) examine the level of legal and regulation development has in influencing the 
deepening of financial sectors. They find a positive connection from cross-country studies between legal 
and regulatory environment with the level of financial development. Countries that ensure the integrity of 
debtor rights to claim, legal system that robustly enforced contracts, accounting standards that are 
transparent and  comprehensive, tend to have better developed financial institutions.  
Beck et al (2003) investigate the mechanism in which legal origin affect financial development. They 
conclude that countries with the legal system, which is the closest to bridging the gap between the 
countries financial needs and current legal system requirement, are able develop a better and more 
effective financial system.  
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Chinn and Ito (2007) find that a country with relatively well developed financial system, the impact on 
savings will only be marginal even if the country decides to deepen its financial system via instituting 
better legal system, reduction in corruption and  liberalised financial market. On the other hand, in less 
developed countries, the effect on savings would be more significant and greater with better legal system, 
less corruption and more liberal financial market. Chinn and Ito (2007) agree with Bernanke that in order 
to balance out the disproportionate level of saving surplus in emerging economies is by adopting 
improved legal system and become more transparent with their financial market.  In essence, these 
measures would eventually reduce the high level of savings that exist in these emerging economies. 
2.3.3.4.4 Corruption 
Sandholz  and Koeltz (2004) findings confirm that corruption tends to increase in a country with weak 
democratic institution and lower income per capital. Mauro (1995) finds empirically that corruption 
imposes substantial economic cost by causing political instability and inefficient bureaucracy, which 
discourages private investment that adversely affects on growth.  Ali (2003) similarly argues that 
countries with high level of economic growth are characterised with positive institutional factors such as 
high levels of judicial efficiency, low levels of corruption, effective bureaucracy and protected private 
property. 
Swaleheen (2007) argues that corruption has negative effect against gross national savings, but not 
against gross domestic savings. The reason is that gross national savings includes savings deposited 
outside the country, which is synonymous to where corrupted money have been invested. However, 
Bardhan (1997) argues that in a country with complicated rules and regulations, corruption may actually 
improve efficiency and increase the countries‘ economic growth. Braun and Di Tella (2000) provide 
evidence that corruption in a country is positively correlated with the rate of inflation. Inflation 
variability makes prices less informative, and can increase the cost of auditing by government 
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procurement agents. It makes difficult to detect whether price increase due simply by inflationary effect 
or ongoing corruption practice in acquiring capital goods.  
2.4  SUMMARY: RATIONALISING THE IMPORTANCE OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
FOR CURRENT RESEARCH.  
The main aim of the thesis it to identify the impact of institutional factors on savings for selected 
emerging economies. As mentioned in the introduction, there has not been any study examining how 
various institutional factors affect the level of savings directly, although institutions can have an 
indirect impact via economic growth. 
Previous theories on savings, i.e. Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH), Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) 
and Consumer Optimization Model, as well as the empirical evidence, were mostly focused on 
finding the relationship using selective demographic factors (e.g. young and old dependency, 
population growth), macroeconomic factors (e.g. real interest rates, inflation, GDP growth), and 
financial factors (e.g. government savings, term of trade and financial development) against savings.  
Hence, the initial point of analysis is to use the LCH model, similar to the previous empirical testing 
to find the relationship between demographic, macroeconomic, and financial variables with private 
savings in the 20 emerging economies. The rationale is to use it as the basic study in order to find any 
similarities or differences compared to the previous empirical evidence. The study also examines the 
regional effect by grouping the countries by region and examining the differences and similarities 
between regions. The empirical results and the comparisons are highlighted in Chapter 4.  
We then extend the study by including the institutional factors, specifically the formal or non-market 
institutions, and to examine their impact on private savings, together with controlling variables, i.e. 
economic, financial and demographic factors. In order to incorporate newly institutional variables 
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into our analysis, we gathered previous theories and empirical evidence related to institutions. The 
hypothesis by La Porta (1997, 2003), i.e. legal origin, and Acemoglu et al (2001, 2004), endowment 
and political process become our framework for analysis to understand the importance of institutions 
on the country‘s economic performance. 
Regarding the literature review on institutions, we first explore Dixit‘s (2009) model on the dynamics 
of informal institutions and the caveats to reforming formal institutions. We also review the effects of 
various institutional properties, i.e. democracy, protection of rights, rule of law and corruptions level, 
on the country‘s income growth and financial development.  We then perform in Chapter 6 empirical 
testing between several institutional factors against private savings, in which we then compare the 
results against previous empirical evidence. The final empirical results will test our developed 
hypothesis on the effect of institutional factors towards private savings. The hypothesis that we have 
developed is to demonstrate the relationship between institutions and savings in light of previous 
empirical evidence between institutions and growth. 
In essence, Chapter 4‘s empirical examination of the effects of the traditional determinants, i.e. 
demographic, macroeconomics and financial factors, on savings is further extended in Chapter 6 to 
include the institutional factors. Hence, the main contribution of this study is to examine the effects 
of different types of institutional factors on savings as well as the institutional effect interacting with 
financial development towards savings. 
Aside from the above impact on savings, we also look at the relationship between growth and 
financial development. On the theoretical standpoint, we refer to two models, i.e. the financial 
development model by Diamond (1983); Diamond and Dybvig (1984); and Becievenga and Smith 
(1991) and the financial liberalization model by McKinnon and Shaw (1973). 
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The rationale for examining both models and previous empirical evidence on financial development 
is to find the relationship between growth and financial development as both variables have a 
significant impact towards savings based on previously empirical evidence on savings. Although both 
financial development and financial liberalization models hypothesize that financial development 
precedes growth, however, a few of the empirical studies pointed out differently due to difference in 
the period of study, methodology, and geographic locations. In order to understand the causality 
effect for long and short term between growth and financial development for the selected 20 
emerging economies for the 30 years of study, we perform time-series econometric testing. The 
results using time series VAR and VEC methods shed some light on whether  financial development 
have causality effects on growth and therefore concur with the financial development theory as well 
as other previous empirical results. 
2.5  HYPOTHESES ON SAVINGS -INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT-
GROWTH NEXUS 
The literature synthesised above has dealt mainly with the effect of institutions on either investments or 
growth and very few studies have discussed the effect on savings. Hence, in this section, we explore the 
relationship further between the effects of formal or non-market institutions on savings, especially in 
emerging economies. 
If the macro economy of a country is grounded on sound fiscal and monetary policies, citizens are 
provided with civil liberties and political representation, private incentives are aligned with social 
objectives, property rights are protected, the rule of law is enforced and unforeseen shock are mitigated 
by social insurance; then a  country is considered to have high quality institutions. On the other hand, if 
these types of institutions were not prevalent or there are a few of them only, then the economic activities 
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of that country could be relegated to small interpersonal exchanges. Firms or agents in a weak 
institutional environment would not be able to engage in complex, long-term and multiple contract 
exchanges supported with sound enforcement of rules, norms or laws. Transaction costs are relatively 
high as private firms have to operate in small scale dealings. Bribery and corruption would flourish as 
firms have to engage in these illicit activities to facilitate transactions. Factor substitution costs are high 
as the economy is engaged in low specialization and using simple technology, hence the production 
operation becomes less efficient and effective. There is often breakdown in rule of law as it is deemed 
unenforceable and few would respect the law. Financial institutions would hardly exist as there are no 
regulations or law which enable them to effectively perform their main function to receive deposit and 
loan funds.  
In this environment, the public would be sceptical about depositing their money as they are less assured 
on the credibility of the savings institutions to keep their money safe and to provide decent return. Most 
of the money would be either be saved under the safety of their home or invested in the black market to 
money lenders based on simple trust. In turn, the financial institutions are not confident in providing 
loans as they lack the legal, enforceable means to recover back the loans from the borrowers in the event 
they default on their payments. In crux, without proper established institutions, there won‘t be any formal 
channel for the public to deposit and borrow money, implying lesser savings and investments in the 
economy. 
Thus, we hypothesise that having a sound non-market institutional environment support with respect to 
the rule of law and property rights and well developed financial institutions are vital for improving 
private savings in the economy. 
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Secondly, we also hypothesise that in the short and long term, improvements in the financial system or 
deepening the financial intermediation process drives the country‘s economic growth by mobilising the 
economy‘s savings for productive investment. In the real world, it is vital for that those who have surplus 
funds are able to provide these funds for those in need. Therefore, households and private sector, which 
require funding, are able to obtain from those with surpluses. It is the role of financial intermediaries, 
according to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Diamond (1984), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and 
Becievenga and Smith (1991), that are best suited to fulfil the role of allocating the financial resources 
from those who have surpluses to those in deficits. Financial intermediaries are able to minimize the 
transaction cost as they are able to operate in larger scale and have technical know-how to perform their 
role.  Without conducive financial institutions and environment , there won‘t be a great deal of investors 
willing to allocate their funds into the country‘s real sector such as in manufacturing, service and 
agriculture, hence the economic growth would be adversely affected. 
In summary, we hypothesise that improved and conducive financial institutions, and environment is vital 
to spur economic growth in the short and long run. 
 2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Three types of theoretical models have been discussed in this chapter. These deal with understanding the 
effect on savings, based on LCH, PIH and Consumer Optimization Model, with additional theory 
examining growth-savings nexus by Solow-Swan. However, LCH and PIH have received their own 
dosage of critics.  Berheim and Scholz (1993) criticised both LCH and PIH for making assumptions that 
the populations were smart enough and well aware of the macroeconomic variables, e.g. earnings, prices, 
household consumptions and macroeconomic trends, to make wise and rational decision on the proper 
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level of savings and consumption. According to Bernhaeim, (1994) Americans lack the financial 
sophistication in making informative decision regarding the optimal level for savings and consumption.  
Then we looked into the importance of financial development in propelling the countries growth. Models 
on growth accounting by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Diamond (1984), Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990) and Becievenga and Smith (1991), has gained ground in explaining the importance of financial 
intermediaries and the process of financial intermediation in improving and distributing income in the 
countries. McKinnon-Shaw model emphasise the disadvantages of a repressed financial system and 
urgency of liberalizing the financial institutions for the countries to enjoy long-term growth. McKinnon 
and Shaw hypotheses have shifted the world paradigm about importance of financial liberalisation in 
allocating financial resources to the deserved lenders, who are able to maximize the returns on their 
credits received. As a result, movement to liberalise the financial system gained ground in the 
international financial community, especially in the developing and third-world countries, which resulted 
in the creation of the Washington Consensus. Incentive are to provide in the form of international bank 
loans for the countries who agreed to implement the resolutions, which primarily deals with liberalizing 
and opening their financial and trading sectors.  
Finally, we discussed the role played by non-market institutions based on respect and enforcement of 
property rights. This proposition first originated in a book by North (1990) and has been followed up by 
numerous authors like La Porta et al (1997,1998,2000), Acemoglu  et al (2001,2004,2005) and Rodrik 
(2000,2005,2008) discussing about the origins and importance of institutions in ensuring long-term 
economic growth. This new approach has resulted in new additions to the original Washington 
Consensus, which includes of salient points such as proper financial codes and standards; independent 
central banks; corporate governance and anti- corruption. The new revamped resolution was coined as 
―Augmented Washington Consensus‖ by Rodrik ( 2005). 
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In our study, we examine the role and importance of non-market institutional factors in affecting 
aggregate savings vis-a-vis financial development and growth. We postulate that non-market institutional 





TRENDS AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS – PRIVATE SAVINGS AND 
DETERMINANTS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Several stylised facts have been noted from previous studies by Schmidt-Hebbel and Serven (1999). 
They noted that the world savings rate have been declining since 1970s and savings rates have shown 
divergent patterns across regions. 
In order to examine closely the savings behaviour and its determinants, we first examine twenty 
emerging economies chosen from three regions, mainly Latin America, MENA and Asia Pacific.  The 
countries selected are: 
1) Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela and Columbia 
2) MENA and other countries close to the region: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Israel and South Africa 
3) Asia Pacific including India : India, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and South 
Korea 
The selections of these countries are based on data availability, proximity and their economic 
performance. 
While the discussion is centered on the three regions identified above, the analysis in this chapter can be 
distinguished into three parts.  
83 
 
The first part provides each country‘s background by briefly discussing the major macroeconomic trends, 
including economic growth and inflation, as well as the country‘s political milestones since 1970s.  The 
discussion is organized into the three regions, and covered in Sections 3.2 until 3.4 accordingly.   
The second part analyses savings and its determinants by region as illustrated in Section 3.5. It discusses 
trends and trajectories of savings and several other determinants of savings - i.e. GDP growth, financial 
development, inflation, real interest rate, young dependency, old dependency and urban growth – for 
each region. A 5-year average to trace distinct changes in trends and amongst countries in the same 
region is examined for the period between 1970s until 2004. It includes analysis and comparison between 
the countries as well as examining their progress and declines thorough out the periods.  The rationale 
presenting in this form is to provide descriptive overview of the saving determinants before these 
determinants are empirically tested. 
 The third part of the analysis is collecting the average statistics of each determinant and grouping them 
according to regions, as shown in Section 3.6. Here, we get a better overview of the performance of 
savings and its determinants for each of the regions.  
Most of the savings determinants that are being used in analyzing each country are derived from 
variables used in the LCH, PIH, consumer optimization models and the past researchers as illustrated in 
the literature reviews (refer to Section 2.2.3). This data, which formed the descriptive analysis, was 
derived from World Development Indicators, International Monetary Funds, Penn World Indicators and 
scholar journals. The specific description of the data can be found at Section 4.3. 




Argentina inconsistent GDP per capita ratio from 1970 to 1990 indicates that the country was either in 
the state of economic or political turmoil, or both. Inflation during that period fluctuated erratically from 
14 percent to as high as 3,000 percent (Exhibit 1.3).  A high growth in one year would then followed by 
negative growth the following years. In the 1970s, most countries in the world including Argentina was 
adversely affected by the OPEC oil embargo, which caused world oil prices to rise rapidly overnight.  
Argentina Central Bank reserves were used to finance importing oil, resulted the country to incur huge 
debt. From 1973 to 1977, the government received credit loan from IMF amounted to USD1.7 billion 
from International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Exhibit 1.5). In 1976 the economic situation deteriorated to the 
extent that GDP per capita fell to minus 3 percent (Exhibit 1.1) and Argentina was experiencing 
hyperinflation at 444 percent (Exhibit 1.3). During that period, Argentina was governed by a new 
military regime, which advocated open economy, stronger peso, importing more foreign goods and 
borrowed extensively (Smith, 1991, pp 16-20). Total debt over Gross National Income (GNI) ratio rose 
from average 3 percent before 1976 to 6 percent in 1978 and the level of debt servicing remained high 
until 1989 (Exhibit 1.4).  By1977, GDP per capita growth increased to five percent before it declined to 
minus five percent the following year (Exhibit 1.1). In 1978, the government introduced new open 
market policy, which included regular devaluation, reduction in gross domestic investment (GDI) and 
privatising several state government agencies, however, the policy backfired, resulting the economy to 
deteriorate.  
In 1981 and 1982, the GDP per capita growth hit minus 7 and minus 6 percent, respectively as the 
economy felt the brunt of the world recession with debt over GNI was as high as 6 to 7 percent of 
GDP(Exhibit 1.4). In 1982, Argentina issued ―circular 1050‖ where it tied adjustable loan rates to 
the value of the U.S. dollar, in which caused monthly interest payment to rise 10 times between early 
1981 to July 1982. Loan guarantees were being extended by the government to the manufacturers to 
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cushion them from the sharp drop in peso to pay off debt in US dollar.  This measure together with 
military involvement in the Falkland war contributed steep rise in foreign debt. In 1983, the government 
decided to freeze the wages, cut defence spending and decided to introduce several privatisation 
measures (Martirena-Mantel, 1989). However, the privatisation measures was hardly well received by 
the investors as they deemed too risky to be involved in, albeit the GDP per capita growth was rather 
mild at 2 percent in 1983 (Exhibit 1.1). In 1985, GDP per capita growth fell to minus 9 percent due to 
severe cutback in provision of credit to private sectors,  which fell from 34 percent in 1981 to 17 percent 
in 1985 (Exhibit 1.2). 
In 1989, Argentina was heavily indebted with accumulated external debt of US$ 65 billion, and output 
production was falling. Inflation peaked at 3,000 percent (Exhibit 1.3). By July 1989, a new government 
came to power headed by President Carlos Menem. In 1991, Domingo Cavallo, the Minister of 
Economy, instituted currency board to peg the local currency against US dollar, i.e. 10,000 australes per 
U.S. dollar in order to eradicate hyperinflation. As a result, this measure managed to reinstate the local 
currency back as the premier currency to conduct day-to-day trading. It also restored Peso as the 
Argentine currency, with a monetary value pegged by law to the ratio of one to one against U.S. dollar 
(Patrice, 2007, pp 33-40).  
From 1991 until 1994, Argentina‘s previously trade surplus turned to deficit. However, overall fixed 
investment has increased, resulted in increased in exports and strengthening of peso. As a result not only 
the fixed exchange rate made imports becoming cheaper, but also Argentine‘s foreign debt increased due 
to increase borrowing to service the loan payment. From1990 to 1991, Argentina registered growth rate 
of 11 percent and 10 percent (Exhibit1.1), however, declined precipitously to 4.5 percent in the following 
year.   
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By1995, Argentina experienced minus 4 percent growth (Exhibit 1.1) as large number of depositors 
withdrew their money from the banks due to financial uncertainties from the recent Mexico financial 
crisis. Even in 1999,  the country‘s per capita growth rate remained at minus 4 percent due to aftermath 
from Asian financial crisis affected Argentina, which resulted export to decline substantially. The 
government later received USD 7.4 billion credit facility from IMF Structural Adjustment loans with 
various austerity conditions attached. The government had to pursue restrictive fiscal policy by imposing 
higher tax and reducing budget for public sector (Taylor, 2002).  In 2001, the government under severe 
financial constraint defaulted on interest payment on the securitized debt amounted to USD93 billion 
(Taylor, 2002). By 2002, fixed pegging against US dollar was scrapped resulted the local currency to 
devalue by 40 percent overnight.  Instead of trading at parity, it has declined to 3 Pesos to 1 USD 
(Exhibit 1.6). By then, GDP per capita registered minus 11 percent growth, which is the worst growth 
since 30 years ago (Exhibit 1.1).  
The bank crisis of 2001and 2002 has contributed to consolidation of the financial sector that has reduced 
the number of financial institutions from 127 in 1995 to 85 in October 2001.  During the financial crisis, 
the Central Bank has injected capital into the state-owned and private domestic banks to remain afloat. 
This has left a bitter taste to the foreign bankers in such that a few of them discontinue their banks from 
operating in Argentina (Mussa, 2002). 
In 2003 the Argentine economy began to record high growth of 8 percent as GDI share increased from 
mere 12 percent in 2002 to 19 percent in 2004 (Exhibit 1.7). This growth was attributed to the surplus in 
trade and the government investment in infrastructure projects.  It was also boosted by the return of local 





In the 1970s, Brazil achieved robust industrial growth by adopting import-substitution policies in several 
sectors, i.e. steel, aluminium, fertilisers and petrol chemical, however, it had to import substantial raw 
and capital products (Carbaugh, 2009, pp256).  Brazil GDP per capita growth (Exhibit 2.1) was relatively 
high before 1980s. It started at 6.1 percent in 1970 before growing and peaked at 11.3 percent in 1973 
before succumbing to oil crisis and reached new lows at 3 percent in 1975 (Exhibit 2.1).  
 In the early 1980‘s the government decided to cut deficit, by reducing imports, while expanding exports 
but yet still pursuing its import-substitution policy.  In 1982, the Mexican debt crisis, caused by the 
Mexican government inability to meet debt repayment, has spread across other Latin American countries. 
International bankers began to lose confidence in the ability of most Latin American countries to meet 
current debt obligation (Abreau, 2004). In 1981 and 1983, GDP per capita growth declined to minus 6 
percent as the economy slid into recession (Exhibit 2.1). With increased in world interest rate, Brazil 
total debt over GNI rose from 3 percent in 1976 to 7 percent in 1982 (Exhibit 2.4) and Brazil received 
loan of USD550 million from IMF (Exhibit 2.5).  
The 1980s became known as the ―lost decade‖ as a result of growth stagnation, hyperinflation and the 
increase in the external debt. However, in 1986, GDP per capita rose to a modest 6 percent growth 
(Exhibit 2.1). Inflation (Exhibit 2.2) accelerated and became uncontrollable before the government 
introduced a new currency called ―Cruzado‖ and implemented temporary wage and price indexation 
freeze programme. While initially the programme managed to stabilize the general price and boost 
consumption, however, eventually producers were not able to sustain the price freeze and the country‘s 
deficit kept on growing (Baer, 2001). By 1988 and 1990, GDP per capita dropped to new lows of minus 
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2 and minus 3 percent, respectively (Exhibit 2.1) and inflation reached to 3,000 percent in 1990 (Exhibit 
2.6).   
The newly elected President Collor de Mello was impeached in September 1992 after two years in the 
office for alleged corruption. In 1994, a new stabilisation plan was instituted named ―The Plano Real‖ or 
Real Plan, which pegged the new currency, i.e. Real, against U.S. dollar in the hope of containing 
inflation  (Baer, 2001, pp199-215). The new economic policy consisted of controlling the exchange rate, 
which should be kept within an interval called ―banda cambial‖ that would be determined by the 
Brazilian Central Bank. These intervals would be periodically revised based on the current inflation rate 
(Baer, 2001, pp199-215). In 1997, inflation was reduced substantially, but not deep enough to avoid 
rapid Real appreciation during the transition phase of the Real Plan.  Previously, in 1996, Brazil decided 
to privatise its service sector, i.e. in telecommunications, banking, energy, commerce, and information 
technology. It resulted increased in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from USD1.2 billion in 1996 to 
USD28 billion in 2000 (Exhibit 2.3).  
In 1998, after agreeing to fiscal adjustment programme and structural reform, Brazil received IMF-led 
international loan amounted to $41.5 billion. A year later in 1999, Brazil ceased pegging Real against US 
Dollar and allowed it to devalue (Exhibit 2.6). The devaluation helped to ease the economy decline as the 
per capita growth only declined to minus 2 percent that year. The government began to institute new 
economic programmes based on three major monetary policies: i.e. inflation target regime, a floating 
exchange rate policy and adoption of fiscal responsibility law. The adoption of these policies helped to 






In the middle of 1970‘s, Mexico became a major exporter of oil. With the increase of oil price, the 
government decided to embark on expanding the economy by investing on social development projects 
and instituting import substitution policies, which entailed heavy capital expenditure. Mexico GDP per 
capita growth peaked in 1973 at 4 percent before declined to one percent in 1977 (Exhibit 3.1) before 
rising to 6 percent in 1978. The growth can be attributed to government expansive fiscal policies by 
investing in infrastructure and market substitution industries, which was financed by foreign credit 
(Lustig, 1998, pp28-59).  
In 1982, Mexico was facing financial crisis with increased inflation, falling oil price, higher interest rates 
and overvalued peso (Lustig, 1998, pp14-20). By 1983, inflation peaked at102 percent from 28 percent in 
1981 as result of the government sudden measure to devalue the currency in order to reduce imports 
(Exhibit 3.2)  
In April 1989, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari announced his government's national development 
plan for duration of 1989-94, which called for annual GDP growth of 6 percent and an inflation rate 
similar to those of Mexico's main trading partners. Salinas planned to achieve this sustainable growth by 
boosting the investment share of GDP and by encouraging private investment 
through denationalization of state enterprises and deregulation of the economy. His first priority was to 
reduce Mexico's external debt. In the middle1989, the government has reached agreement with its 
commercial bank creditors to reduce its medium- and long-term debt (Lustig, 1998, pp28-59) 
In the early 1990‘s, the Mexican economy began to grow again as result from the government pursuing a 
restrictive fiscal policy, a fixed exchange rate, and anti-inflationary policy. GDP per capita income 
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growth in 1990 to 1994 remained between 2 to 3 percent before it declined to minus 8 percent in 1995 
(Exhibit 3.1).  
The 1994 and 1995 financial crisis was attributed from investors divesting their holdings of government 
debt due to perceived risk from the political assassination of one of the presidential candidate in 1994. It 
generated a massive selling by the public resulted Mexican central bank left with depleted reserves. The 
unsustainable situation caused President Zendillo to abandon fixed exchange rate and devalue of peso 
(Allen, 1999, pp62-64). After the 1994 Mexican crisis, Mexican President Zedillo implemented 
privatisation plan by allowing private investment in railroads, satellites, telecommunications sector, as 
well as allowing foreign investors to hold substantial equity in domestic banking (Allen, 1999, pp 70-73).  
 In 1996, the economy managed to rebound to 3.5 percent growth after the government secured credit 
facility of USD 13.3 billion from IMF. GDP per capita continue to grow to five percent in 1997 before 
sliding to 2 percent in 1999 as result of contagion affect from Asian financial crisis as investors pulled 
away from investing emerging economies. In 2001, Mexico growth remained at minus one percent 
before rebounding to reach 3 percent in 2004.  
3.2.4 Chile 
In 1973, Chile experienced recession as GDP per capita growth declined to minus 7 percent (Exhibit 
4.1), and inflation rose to 360 percent (Exhibit 4.2). During that period, Chile faced numerous 
uncertainties as the financial sector was undergoing restructuring. The economy was starting to be 
liberalised and there was a change in government leadership, in which a new military government seized 
into power headed by General Augusto Pinochet. The new government began to index wages against 
inflation, in which lower wages bracket were readjusted proportionately greater than the higher wage 
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bracket. New open market policies were introduced by privatising and deregulating the banking sector as 
well as liberalising the interest rates. Capital movement restriction that was previously imposed was 
lifted. Lower and simplified import tariffs were implemented, in which all the tariffs did not exceed more 
than 35 percent (Ffrench-davis, 2002, pp53-60).  
Chile‘s economy recorded growth of 7 percent in 1977 until 1980 before experiencing a financial crisis 
in 1982 (Exhibit 4.1).  In 1981, the government introduced new savings policy by requiring workers to 
contribute 10 percent of their salaries into privately held pension fund. Its purpose was to increase the 
savings rate of the entire population as well as increase the pool of investment fund (Feldstein, 1998, 
pp33-40) 
In 1982, financial crisis hit Chile as the banking sector face problems of underperforming loans due to 
disbursing huge amount of loan without proper procedures and monitoring. By 1984, a large number of 
banks declared bankrupt and were bailed out by the government (Valdes, 1995, pp163-164). The 
government then decided to recapitalise the banking sector and re-privatise a few of them and as a result 
the banks began to show profitability again. The government also privatised the public utilities and other 
private companies that were nationalised by the government during the 1982 and 1983 crisis. The 
maximum level for import tariff was reduced from 35 percent to 15 percent (Valdes, 1995, pp170-172).  
In 1982, GDP per capita growth was at minus 12 percent before rebounding to 6 percent growth in 1984 
after the government recapitalize the banks (Exhibit 4.1). The increase in growth was also attributed to 
increase demand for exports of fresh fruits and manufactured of goods (Ffrench-davis, 2002, pp53-60). 
Manufacturing output over GDP has increased from 18 percent in 1982 to 24 percent in 1984 (Exhibit 
4.3).   
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In 1990, Chile experienced a slowdown in economy with 2 percent GDP per capita growth rate (Exhibit 
4.1) and faced with burgeoning deficit resulted from bailing out the banks. New government 
privatization plan were accelerated with new fresh approach that emphasised on greater transparency, 
open competitive bidding, and fair pricing to safeguards government property. New sets of rules and 
regulations were also being introduced to strengthen the privatisation plans (Valdes, 1995, pp 163-165).  
By 1991, GDP per capita growth has rebounded and peaked at 10 percent by 1993 before it declined to 4 
percent as the government decided to restrict the growth to prevent from overheating (Exhibit 4.1). GDP 
per capita growth rose to 9 percent in 1995 before declined to minus 2 percent in 1999 due to lower 
export and investors shying away from investing in emerging market. In 2000 until 2003, Chile enjoyed 
positive growth between 2 to 4 percent (Exhibit 4.1). 
 3.2.5 Venezuela 
Venezuela‘s economy is heavily dependent on oil production. When the price of oil increased, the 
country‘s GDP per capita growth would also increase.  In 1973 and 1974, as the price of oil increased, 
the government started to spend considerably on public programmes, including health care, education, 
transport, and food subsidies (Salimano, 2005, pp292-295)  
The GDP per capita growth peaked in 1976 at 4 percent before declining gradually into recession at 
minus 7.4 percent growths in 1980 (Exhibit 5.1). The decline in growth in 1980 was associated with 
steep increase in inflation to 22 percent (Exhibit 5.2). The economy managed to rebound in 1986 when it 
registered GDP per capita growth rate at 4 percent.  
The growth remained relatively unchanged until 1998 before declined to minus 11 percent in 1989. The 
deep recession was due to mounting debt as a result of loss revenue from decline in oil price and high 
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subsidies provided to maintain state enterprise (Salimano, 2005, pp 292-300). IMF has extended credit 
facility to Venezuela to the tune of nearly USD20 billion from 1989 to 1996, with the first disbursement 
at USD 1 billion in 1989 (Exhibit 5.3).  As a pre-condition to IMF structural credit facility, the 
government pursue path of economic liberalisation, financial restructuring, devaluation of peso and 
privatisation of state enterprise (Di John, 2009, pp108-115). At the same period, Venezuela was 
undergoing hyperinflation which reached 85 percent. In 1990 and 1991, Venezuela recorded a positive 
growth of 4 and 8 percent, respectively, before undergoing a cyclical growth patent again (Exhibit 5.1). 
Its growth was negatively affected due to rising inflation in 1993 at 38 percent before reaching 100 
percent in 1996.  
In 2003 the economy underwent recession again with GDP per capita growth recorded minus 11 percent 
mainly due to political upheaval that affected uncertainties in the economy (Exhibit 5.1) (Di John, 2009, 
pp77 and 108). The economy deteriorated as the price of oil hit bottom and inflation rose to 31 percent 
(Exhibit 5.2). In 2004, the economy grew and recorded GDP per capita growth at 16 percent. The high 
growth was mainly due to steep rise in world oil price.  
3.2.6 Columbia 
During 1970s, Columbia economy, like any other Latin American economies, was based on import 
substitution industrialisation. In early 1970s, GDP per capita fluctuated between 3 to 4 percent until 1975 
before the growth slumped to minus 0.1 percent (Exhibit 6.1).  It increased to 2.4 percent and 6 percent 
in 1976 and 1978, respectively, buoyed by the increased in world coffee price. However by 1981, GDP 




From 1981 to 1985, GDP per capita grew between 0 to one percent only (Exhibit 6.1) with high inflation 
rate. The high inflation was attributed to few factors, i.e. unrestricted spending by the government in the 
face of budget deficit, frequent devaluation of the peso and market re-adjustments to the wage structure 
(Edwards, 2001, pp27-40).  
From 1986 to 1990, the GDP per capita grew between 3 to 4 percent due to increase coffee production 
(Exhibit 6.1). By the middle to late 1980s, Columbia coffee was in demand due to poor coffee harvest in 
Brazil from severe drought.  It also benefitted Columbia as the coffee price increased at the same time. 
The export boom generated a large increase in foreign exchange, which increased the value of the peso 
and the price of domestic goods (Homes et al, 2008, pp43-47). It triggered inflation as it reached 30 
percent in 1990.  
The government decided to curb inflation by transferring the windfall profit generated from the rise in 
coffee export to government agencies that were experiencing budget deficit (Edwards, 2001, pp45-49). 
However, the measure did not curb the inflation from rising.  
GDP per capita growth during the 1990s shows mixed signal as it fluctuated erratically between 4 
percent in 1990 and 0 percent the following years with peaks at 3 percent and 4 percents in 1992 and 
1994, respectively (Exhibit 6.1).   
In 1990, the government decided to introduce new economic policies rooted on privatisation, 
deregulation and liberalisation. President César Gaviria Trujillo (1990-94) instituted tariff reductions, 
financial deregulation, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and adoption a more liberal foreign 
exchange rate (Edwards. 2001, pp42-55).The new economic restructuring plan was known as ‖aperture‖ 
or opening  However, by 1996 to 1998, growth dropped to 2 percent as the central bank tightened 
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monetary policy (Exhibit 6.1) and privatisation has slowed down as investors lost confidence due to 
inefficient bureaucracy, and  security concern.  
In 1999, the economy faced recession due to lack of global demand (Homes et al, 2008) with growth at 
minus 6 percent growth, before per capita growth rebounded to one percent in 2000. The recession 
resulted growing deficit with total foreign debt at the end of 1999 was at $34.5 billion. The government 
received USD2.7 billion loans from IMF in exchange to committing towards balance budget and 
structural reforms (Exhibit 6.2).  
3.3 MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICAN (MENA) REGION AND PROXIMITIES 
3.3.1 Saudi Arabia  
Saudi Arabia‘s economy is literally based on production of oil that comprises 90 percent of its export 
earnings and 75 percent of budget revenues. Oil was found in 1936 and currently Saudi Arabia is the 
leader producer of oil.  It has one quarter of world oil reserves and currently produced by the government 
oil company, named Saudi ARAMCO (Wilson, 2004, pp3-6).  
 In 1967, war erupted between Israel and Arab countries, resulted in the increased in world oil price.  
During that period, Saudi Arabia experienced windfall revenue that led to increase in GDP per capita 
growth of 8 percent in 1970 to nearly 22 percent by 1974 (Exhibit 7.1). Due to increased revenue, 
inflation rose from 0.2 percent in 1971 to 34 percent in 1975 (Exhibit 7.2).  During that period, there was 
rapid growth in construction industries with new cities and towns growing rapidly. The rapid expansions 
in urban areas were mainly concentrated in 10 major cities with growing middle class population 
(Wilson, 2004, pp 40-46). 
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In 1976, GDP per capita growth decline from 7 percent to minus 7 percent in 1978 with inflation also 
declined from highs of 32 percent in 1976 to minus 1.6 percent in 1978 (Exhibit 7.2). By the end of 
1979, GDP per capita growth rebounded to 4 percent due to increase in oil price from shortages in world 
oil production from Iran and Iraq war. The oil price rose from $14 per barrel in 1978 to $35 per barrel in 
1981 (Exhibit 7.3). However, by 1982, Saudi Arabia per capita growth nose dived due to falling oil price. 
Saudi Arabia had to cut production from 9.82 million barrels to 6.48 million barrels per day or 35 percent 
decline. Saudi Arabia further cut its production to 2 million barrels per day by 1985.   The government 
also had to cut some of its current account and capital spending, partly by delaying projects and also by 
cancelling some programmes (Cordesman, 2003, pp24-34). 
 Per capita growth remained low from 1985 to 1990 even though the trend is improving (Exhibit 7.1).  
By 1988, GDP growth improved as the oil price was slowly recovering. In 1990, the US-Iraq war created 
worldwide oil shortage, which benefited Saudi Arabia economy.  By 1991 and 1992, per capita growth 
reached 8 and 9 percent, respectively. However, between 1992 and 2000, the per capita growth in Saudi 
Arabia remained steady between 0 to 3 percent as the price of world oil stabilised.  
3.3.2 Egypt 
From 1970 to 1973, GDP per capita growth in Egypt declined from 3.4 percent to minus 2 percent.  
However, after the Arab-Israel war that lasted from1967 to 1973, the Egyptian economy grew quite 
rapidly. It grew to 7 percent in 1975 and 12 percent 1976, however, declined to 3.5 percent in 1978 
(Exhibit 8.1).  In 1973, the government introduced open market policy called ―Infitah‖ to attract foreign 
investment and encouraged private sectors to take the leading role in investment. As most of Arab 
countries became wealthy from oil price increase, the government was able to attract substantial 
investment from the region. The growth was also boosted by the opening of Suez Canal as a source of 
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revenue that increased remittances and investment from Arab nations (Ikram, 2006, pp 52-60).  In 1980, 
GDP per capita growth grew to 8 percent in 1980 before slowing down from growing deficit as a result 
financing the growing public sector expenditure and declined from investment overseas.  
Inflation has risen since influx of foreign direct investment from other Middle East economies enjoyed 
from the increased in oil price.  Inflation increased from 2.1 percent in 1973 to 10 percent in 1979 before 
peaking at 20 percent in 1980 (Exhibit 8.2) 
Beginning 1981, most developing countries experienced slow growth due to weak demand for their 
goods from developed countries. Egypt GDP per capita growth was at one percent in 1981 before rising 
to 7 percent in 1982 and gradually decreased to reach 0 percent in 1986 (Exhibit 8.1).  The slump in oil 
price not only affected its oil export revenue, but also lesser revenue from tourism, Suez Canal 
collection, and workers‘ remittances taking their toll on GDP per capita growth 
Inflation has been rising upwards since it declined in 1982 to 10 percent (Exhibit 8.2). Early 1990‘s, the 
government introduced reforms such as liberalizing exchange and interest rates however, it did not go 
beyond making structural changes to the public sector and GDP growth dipped to minus one percent in 
1991.  Since there were no substantial major reforms instituted such as restructuring the public sector, it 
did not have significant impact on attracting further investment.  
Egypt managed to obtain debt relief from loan payment by Paris Club as a token of appreciation for its 
effort during the Gulf war.  Paris Club is an informal group from 19 of the world's richest countries, 
which provides financial services such as debt restructuring, debt relief, and debt cancellation to indebted 
countries and their creditors. Egypt also received monetary arrangement from other Arab nations for its 
help during the Gulf war. The Egyptian government signed an economic stabilisation programme with 
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the International Monetary Fund in May 1991 and a structural adjustment programme with the World 
Bank in November 1991(Ikram, 2006, pp 68-75).The debt relief from Arab nations, IMF and World 
Bank managed to stabilised GDP growth between 2 to 4 percent from 1992 to 1997 (Exhibit 8.1). Only 
in 1998, during the Asian financial crisis, Egypt per capita growth took a slight dip before recovering at 4 
percent in 1999. 
In 1999, after the Asian financial crisis, Egypt per capita income growth stood at 4 percent before 
declined to one percent by 2002 (Exhibit 8.1).  
3.3.3 Turkey 
Turkey‘s economy has been traditionally based on import substitution policy, where it subsidises 
numerous state enterprises. In the 1970‘s, Turkey was caught unprepared when the oil price rose, 
resulting the government to issue short term debts to international lenders to finance oil imports (Lovatt, 
200, pp 4-8). By the end of the decade, Turkey was facing with high inflation rate which peaked at 110 
percent in 1980 and thus unable to service outstanding loan (Exhibit 9.2). Debt service over GNI jumped 
from 7 percent of export to 36 percent in 1980 (Exhibit 9.3).  During the first half the 1970's decade, 
GDP per capita growth was erratic with sharp peaks followed by steep declined. The per capita growth 
shot from one percent in 1970 to five percent by 1972 before sliding to one percent in 1973 due to oil 
crisis as Turkey had to import oil from neighbouring countries (Exhibit 9.1). It rose rapidly and peaked at 
8 percent by 1977 before succumbing to steep declined in 1979 to minus five percent, due to crisis in 
debt repayment.  
Inflation rose gradually from 7 percent in 1970 to 17 percent in 1976 before escalating into 
hyperinflation of 110 percent in 1980 due to Turkey‘s huge debt and rising oil price. The higher 
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unemployment experienced during the 1970s caused large number of Turkish people to migrate 
elsewhere, which boosted its remittance coffers (Exhibit 9.5).  In 1979 and 1980, Turkish economy is 
characterised with huge debt problem and overhanging high inflation.  
The government then decided to embark on liberalisation strategy by implementing several policies to 
address the balance of payment problem. It includes devaluation of Turkish lira and enactment of flexible 
exchange rates; tighter control on money supply and credit; restrictive public sector spending; and 
encouragement of overseas investment. All the measures were taken as part of Structural Adjustment 
loan from World Bank (Lovatt, 2001, pp10-20).  The policies were successful as it managed to bridge the 
balance of payment and propel the per capita income growth from minus five percent in 1980 to 7 
percent by 1987 (Exhibit 9.1). Inflation rapidly declined from 120 percent in 1980 to 37 percent by 1981. 
From 1981 to 1987, Turkey utilised IMF credit facility between USD 700 million to USD 1.5 billion 
each year to fund its economy (Exhibit 9.4). 
During the Iraq war, 1989-1991, Turkey lost substantial pipeline revenue caused by oil flow disruption 
from Iraq through its Kirkuk pipelines to be exported overseas (Barth and Hemphill, 2000, pp 12-14). 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Emirates decided to compensate Turkey for the losses in revenue.   In 
1989 GDP per capita growth was at 0 percent but rebounded aggressively to 7 percent in 1990 (Exhibit 
9.1).  From 1989 to 1993, the government embarked in borrowing short term loans from the international 
market to finance public expenditure and pay the civil servants salary increase (Barth and Hemphill, 
2000, pp14-18). As a result, the GDP per capita growth plunged to minus 7 percent in 1994 (Exhibit 9.1) 
and 76 percent loss in value of lira against dollar from mounting debt. The collapse of the exchange rate 
caused losses in public confidence resulting substantial capital outflow.   
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By 1997, the growth rebounded to five percent due to stronger export from improve demand overseas, 
increased tourism and increased bilateral trade with Soviet Union.   However, it dropped to minus 7 
percent in 1999 due to several factors, mainly the devastating earthquake at Marmara region, higher 
interest payment on Treasury Bill and contagion effect from Asian financial crisis (Togan and Hoekman, 
2005, pp3-10). IMF came to rescue by extending USD 760 million loan facility (Exhibit 9.4) and Turkey 
began its stabilisation programme, which incorporated crawling peg exchange rate policy.  
In 1999, per capita growth registered minus 8 percent growth before rebounded to 6 percent in 2000, but 
plunging again to minus 9 percent in 2001 (Exhibit 9.1). The short lived growth was due to strong 
demand for its products domestically and internationally, however, the short-lived growth was tampered 
with Turkey‘s growing problem servicing its debt. IMF provided a loan facility of USD 16 billion with 
condition that the government commitment to float the exchange rate and eradicate the inflation (Togan 
and Hoekman, 2005, pp3-10). By 2002, the GDP per capita rose again to 6 percent in 2002.  
3.3.4 Israel 
During the 1970s until middle of 1980s, Israel underwent a period of stagflation, characterised by low 
growth, rising unemployment and rising inflation. After the 1967 to 1973 Arab-Israel war, expenditure 
for defence and public sectors increased, mainly to maintain high employment and achieve social and 
political objectives. With increasing deficit, the government decided to reduce subsidies and devalue the 
currency, which resulted in increase in price for imported products. In addition, the Bank of Israel 
exacerbated the problem by printing more money to finance the growing expenditure, which triggered 
higher inflation (Barkai and Liviatan, 2007, pp171-175). 
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After the war in 1973, GDP per capita growth dropped to 0 percent due to increase in oil price as Israel 
was net importer (Exhibit 10.1).  In 1974, with GDP per capita growth at 4 percent, shekel or Israel 
currency was devalued to contain the growing inflation (Exhibit 10.1). Huge deficit and inflation have 
caused negative impact to the fledgling economy as GDP per capita growth declined to minus 2 percent 
in 1977.  In the same year, a new ruling party introduced a new liberalisation policy by easing capital 
flow and changing the exchange rate system from crawling peg to free float. It caused further devaluation 
as well as increased inflation (Eckstein and Ramot-Nyska, 2008).  
In 1980, GDP per capita was at 4 percent before slumping down to 0 percent in 1984 (Exhibit 10.1). The 
economic situation deteriorated with inflation reaching an annual rate of 374 percent and Israel was in 
the brink of bankruptcy due to non-payment debt.  In July 1985, the government adopted the ―Economic 
Stabilisation Policy‖, which consisted of several policies.  Firstly, the exchange rate was devalued by 18 
percent. Secondly, the domestic price was allowed to rise to 17 percent before it is being frozen. Thirdly, 
the subsidies were reduced as well as tax was increased. Fourthly, the Israel Central Bank kept a tight 
rein on the money supply (Eckstein and Ramot-Nyska, 2008). After the implementation of these policies, 
GDP per capita rose rapidly from 0 percent in 1984 to 6 percent in 1987 before plunging to 0 percent 
again in 1989 due to restrictive monetary policy instituted after the 1985 stabilisation programme 
(Exhibit 10.1). 
Inflation was already at all time high when it reached 130 percent in 1980 (Exhibit 10.5). It remained 
steady until 1983 due to the sterilization of exchange rate policy pursued by the government (Eckstein 
and Ramot-Nyska, 2008). However by 1983, the inflation skyrocketed from 146 percent to 374 percent 
in 1984 due to huge debt, high unemployment and unstable currency. After the institution of the 1985 
Stabilisation programme, the inflation rate declined to 300 percent by 1985 and 48 percent by 1986 
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before re-stabilised at 20 percent in 1987 (Exhibit 10.2). The rate remained relatively the same until 
1991.  
By 1990s, Israel government decided to further liberalise the financial and the commercial sector by 
instituting several measures. Telecommunication, port and banking sectors were open for privatisation. 
Effective tariff rates for imported goods are cut to less than one percent. From 1987 to 2003, foreign 
exchange rate control was gradually abolished so that full convertibility of Israel currency (shekel) can 
be achieved.  
One of the important milestones in 1990s was the influx of Jewish immigrants from former USSR 
countries that not only brought cheap labour but also professional skills as large number of them are 
highly educated (De Fiore, 1998). The other significant event was the signing of the peace process in 
Madrid in 1991 and peace treaty between Israel and Jordan that has helped to reduce Israel's economic 
isolation from its neighbours and opened up new markets for Israeli exporters further worldwide (Ben-
Basat, 2002, pp78-87). The peace process encouraged an unprecedented inflow of foreign investment in 
Israel, and provided tremendous boost to the economic growth in the region. 
In 1991, the GDP per capita growth stood merely at 1.4 percent and began to grow to 4 percent before 
declining to 0 percent in 1997 due to weak demand from the international market leading to Asian 
financial crisis (Exhibit 10.1). It rebounded to 2 percent in 1998 before recorded 6 percent jump on 2000.  
The starting of Intifada in 2001 and downturn in hi-tech industries in the early 2000 have adversely 
affects Israel economy as the per capita growth rate declined to minus 3 percent for 2001 (Ben-Basat, 




 3.3.5 Morocco 
Morocco‘s economy is heavily reliant on tourism which contributes to half of its GDP and industrial 
output, while phosphate mining, construction and manufacturing contribute a quarter of GDP. 
Agriculture contributed 14 to 20 percent of the country's GDP, but it employed 40 to 50% of the working 
population in the country (Exhibit 11.2). Since most of the cultivated crops were dependent on the rain 
fall, the agriculture productivity was very seasonal as it depended on the condition of the climate. Per 
capita growth was very inconsistent as the country‘s GDP was dependent upon the seasonal nature of the 
agriculture harvest. In certain periods, GDP per capita could rise up to 8 or 10 percent per year and other 
years, it would plunge to minus 5 or minus 8 percent (Exhibit 11.1).  
Morocco was considered a major world producer of phosphate. When the price of oil increased, it 
negatively affected the country‘s GDP per capita growth. Since the price of phosphate also skyrocketed, 
the profit generated from exporting phosphate enable the government to finance the adverse effect of the 
rising oil price, which they imported. In 1976, Morocco enjoyed a period of high growth with GDP per 
capita income peaked at 8 percent due to escalating phosphate price as the price increased from USD14 
to USD42 per ton. The Moroccan government then decided to pursue expansionary fiscal policy by 
increasing civil servant salaries and subsidies for basic consumable items. As the world price of 
phosphate fell and the Moroccan government pursuing expansionary policy, its economy began to 
experience growing budget deficit. By 1979, Morocco‘s GDP per capita growth stood at 2.2 percent with 
oil and phosphate price increasing concurrently, however, the revenue generated unable offset the 
growing government deficit (Lawless and M. Findlay, 1984).  By 1981, the GDP per capita fell to minus 
five percent as the country faced with growing deficit, mainly due to soaring oil price, high interest rate, 
rapid appreciating dollar and failure by the government to reduce the country‘s expenditure. GDP growth 
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fell to 3 percent in 1983 as the country was burdened with high deficit (Exhibit 11.1) and in 1984  IMF 
granted loan worth USD200 million.  
Prior to 1985, Morocco pursued an economy based on import substitution and control by the government 
directive.  Financial system was heavily regulated and interest rates were repressed. Monetary policy was 
conducted primarily through the directive of the government. The government has major interest in 
various key sectors and they provided favourable credit terms to these sectors.  The objective was to 
develop large public enterprise sector, including financial institutions (Nsouli, 1995, pp11-20). Austerity 
measures were adopted, in which subsidies were eliminated, wages were frozen, and public investments 
were reduced.  
In 1987 to 1995, Morocco government pursued financial reform, in which the main objective was to 
reduce direct intervention by the government, liberalise interest rates, enhance the effectiveness pursuing 
monetary policy, and promote competition among banks (Nsouli, 1995, pp11-12).  From 1987 and 1992 
the per capita GDP plunged to minus five percent and minus 6 percent as it experienced one the worst 
drought for years. The per capita growth also was affected due to the Gulf war during the early 1990s as 
it affected the tourist industry badly. The following years in 1990s the economy experienced erratic 
growth as the drought took toll on the agriculture products, and declining demand for agriculture 
products (Exhibit 11.2). Slow pace in opening up the economy hampered it from experiencing consistent 
growth for a period of time. It was reflected by minus 8 percent per capita growths in 1995 followed by 
positive10 percent growth the following year (Exhibit 11.1). From year 2000 until 2006, the GDP per 
capita growth was still showing erratic fluctuation but at a lesser degree as the growth jumped to 6 
percent in 2000 and plunge to 2 percent in 2006. All these are attributed to the seasonal climate that has 




Tunisia‘s economy is mostly dependant on oil, phosphate, agriculture and tourism receipts with most of 
its exports are shipped to EU nations. In 1970s, the country was under the directive or "Dirigiste" 
economic system, in which subsidies were given to preferred state enterprises (Hassan, 2005).  
In 1972, Tunisia enjoyed extremely high GDP per capita growth of 16 percent due to the increased oil 
price (Exhibit 12.1). Due to the surplus in the receipt of oil revenue, Tunisia was able to subsidise the 
underperforming state enterprise for several years under pretext of "dirigiste" economic system (Hassan, 
2005). GDP per capita experienced a minus 2 percent decline in 1973 before rebounding to five percent 
in 1974 and maintain for several years until 1980 (Exhibit 12.1).  The GDP was at 4 percent between 
1983 and 1985 before balance of payment crisis hit Tunisia. As the price of oil plummeted with growing 
number of sectors being subsidised, the government began to face soaring budget deficit. The economy 
deteriorated further as Tunisia was hit with severe drought and decline in tourism intake (White, 2001, 
pp 25-30).  
In 1986, Tunisia signed for the IMF stabilisation and World Bank structural adjustment programmes in 
order to secure credit facility to fund their growing budget deficit. Under the IMF and World Bank 
programmes, Tunisia agreed to liberalise its prices, reduce tariffs, and reorient itself towards market 
economy (White, 2001, pp12-15).  In 1987, Tunisia installed a new leader through a bloodless coup. 
President Habib Ali Bourguiba was replaced by his prime minister, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and the 
economy dipped slightly in 1988 to minus 2 percent due to political instability (Perkins, 2004, pp157-
165). In 1996 Tunisia entered into an "Association Agreement" with the European Union (EU) which it 
agreed to remove tariffs and other trade barriers on most goods by 2008 (White, 2001, pp145-150).From 
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1988 onwards until 2003, the economy grew steadily with recorded growth between 3.5 to 6 percent 
GDP per capita, buoyed by its diversified economy and less reliance on agriculture.  
Tunisia‘s inflation rate has been traditionally low with less than 10 percent (Exhibit 12.2). From 1984 
until 1995, the inflation rate remained at high single digit, before it began to decline gradually to low 
single digit from 1996 to 2006.   
3.3.7 South Africa 
In the 1970s, the South African economy was heavily dependent on gold exports. In 1971, the Breton 
Woods currency convertibility to gold ended as the United Stated decided to abandon the Gold exchange 
standard. Gold price in the world market was thereafter determined by supply and demand, which would 
significantly affect the country‘s GDP per capita growth (Tarp and Brixen, 1996, pp5-10).  
South Africa‘s GDP per capita growth was characterised by random fluctuation due to historical 
economic and political turmoil. In the first half of the 1970s, GDP per capita fluctuate between 2 to 4 
percent before declined to minus 2 in 1976, due to increased in world oil price (Exhibit 13.1). Even in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s when the oil price was at its peak, South Africa managed to record a 
reasonable GDP per capita growth, even though it is net importer of oil. This is primarily due to soaring 
gold price recorded in 1980s. However, by 1983, the GDP per capita plunged to minus 4 percent due to 
rapid decline in gold price and drought that has affected the agriculture productivity (Exhibit 13.2) before 
rebounding to 2 percent in 1984. 
In 1970s and 1980s, South Africa took substantial loans from foreign banks to finance its trade import 
and by 1985 it faced debt amounting to USD24 billion. In the mid 1980s, European Communities and 
United States imposed limited sanctions on South Africa for its apartheid‘s policy, resulting dwindling of 
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foreign investment into the country. A group of banks withdrew credit facilities and discontinue the 
existing credit line, which caused the government to default servicing its debt and plunge the economy 
into tailspin (Jones, 2002, pp31-43). 
The economy, however, managed to claw back in 1988 by recording 2 percent GDP per capita growth 
before plunging again in 1991 and 1992 to minus 3 and minus 4 percent, respectively. This was due to 
economic uncertainty of previous economic sanctions, even though apartheid system has well been 
abolished and sanction has been lifted (Exhibit 13.1). From 1994 to 1996, new investment began to pour 
in and South Africa managed to record positive growth of one to two percent, from 1994 to 1996. In 
1998, South Africa experienced a slight dip in growth to minus 2 percent due to the contagion effect 
from Asian financial crisis as investors began to divest their fund from emerging countries and the gold 
price declined to the lowest level since 1985 (Mc Neil, 1998). Since then, it has increased gradually and 
recorded 2 percent in 2000 and 3 percent in 2002. 
3.4 ASIA PACIFIC REGION 
3.4.1 India 
During the 1970s and 1980s, India‘s economy was based on inward looking policy of import-substituting 
industrialisation with high tariffs imposed on most imported goods to discourage foreign goods and 
services entering the country and competing against local products.  Like most developing economies, 
most of India‘s major industries, such as mining, telecommunication, steel, and energy were nationalised.   
New licenses were required for starting up new companies, producing new products and expanding 
product capacities. Even, when companies were on the brink of bankruptcy, they have to get approval 
from the government to close them down (Srinavasan and Tendulkar, 2003, pp 4-10). Strict foreign 
exchange rate control was imposed to stop from illegal foreign exchange. Historically, India has a fixed 
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exchange rate system, where the rupee was pegged to the value of a basket of currencies of major trading 
partners (Srinavasan and Tendulkar, 2003, pp 112 and 122).  
 In 1973, OPEC oil embargo caused spike in oil price and threw the Indian economy into chaos.  India 
had no foreign exchange reserves available to pay for the imported oil and the import bill was growing 
faster while export earnings remained sluggish (Srinavasan and Tendulkar, 2003, pp13).   
In early 1970s, export earning only contributed 4 percent of GDP compared to 24 percent in 2006 
(Exhibit 14.4). India experienced economic recession from 1972 to 1974 with the economy undergoing a 
period of stagflation with increase in oil price, slow manufacturing output, and high inflation between 17 
to 18 percent (Exhibit 14.2). In 1975, GDP per capita grew close to 7 percent caused by sudden decline 
in inflation. Whenever inflation rose, GDP per capita growth would fall. The underlying reason for the 
inflation was production shortfall of certain commodities that resulted supply shortages. Since India 
depended on agriculture production, any irregularities in its output would have tremendous impact on its 
economy.   
In  1977 and 1978, the industrial sector, which includes manufacturing, as well as construction, public 
utilities, and mining, registered increased output that drove GDP per capita growth to 5 and 3 percent in 
1977 and 1978, respectively (Exhibit 14.1). However, the growth rate declined in 1979 due to increased 
in world oil price as India is net oil importer.    
In the 1980s, per capita growth has been growing moderately between one to eight percent with the 
highest rate recorded was in 1988 at 7.4 percent. Even though in late 1980‘s, India‘s economy has been 
growing faster but it has been accumulating huge debt.  During that period, the government led by Rajiv 
Gandhi eased restrictions on several areas, e.g. capacity expansion by companies, price controls and 
corporate taxes reduction. While this has increased the rate of growth, it also led to high fiscal deficits 
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and a worsening of current account (Srivasan and Tendulkar, 2003, pp20-25). In 1980, inflation stood at 
16 percent before gradually declined to 8 percent in 1982 and relatively unchanged until 1988 (Exhibit 
14.2).  
Due to the worsening balance of payment at the end of 1980s, Minister Narasimha Rao and finance 
minister Manmohan Singh introduced economic reform in 1991. The major item in the reform is 
abolishing the ―License Raj‖ (i.e. the investment, industrial and import licensing), abolishing public 
monopolies, allowing automatic approval of foreign direct investment in many sectors, restructuring 
capital markets, deregulating domestic business, and reforming the trade regime (Gupta, 2008).   
The GDP per capita income grew slowly from minus one percent to 3 percent in 1993 due to recent 
transformation to a more liberalise and open economy (Exhibit 14.1).  By 1994 to 1996, the country grew 
from five percent to 6 percent, before growth declined in 1997 due to bottleneck in the country‘s 
infrastructure, low manufacturing productivity and high level of debt (Kaushik, 2004, pp20-24). It then 
rebounded in 1998 to five percent before declining in 2000 until 2002. Since 1990, the inflation had 
begun to slowly receding from highs of 14 percent to 10 percent by 1994 before declining further down 
to 6 percent in 1998 and 3 percent by 2000 (Exhibit 14.2).   
GDP per capita growth rate from 2000 and 2003 was growing rather slowly around 2 to 3 percent, but by 
2003 to 2006, India was experiencing high growth at 7 to 8 percent.  It reflected by the influx of growing 
capital investment into the country and the contribution of the service and manufacturing sector towards 
the per capita GDP growth. Service and manufacturing sector has been growing between 7 to 11 percent 
each year from 2002 to 2006 (Exhibit 14.5 and Exhibit 14.6). Foreign direct investment grew from 
merely USD 5.6 billion in 2002, which is one percent of GDP, to USD22 billion in 2006, which is 2 
percent of GDP (Exhibit 14.3).  
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3.4.2 Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
South Korea, since the middle of 1960s, has decided to restructure its economy to become export 
oriented country due to its lack of natural resources and insignificant domestic market. The government 
played a key factor in planning the country‘s long term strategy.  During the earlier period, South Korea 
industry was largely based on producing low-value-added and labour intensive products, e.g. textiles, 
silk, and plywood, which faced stiff competition and protectionism from other import developing 
countries.   
By middle of 1970s, the government decided to restructure the manufacturing sector by transforming the 
industry from producing low-value-added products into high-valued-added and capital intensive 
industries (Yi, 1996, pp10-25). In the early 70s, the country enjoyed phenomenal growth rate, which 
exceeded more than five percent except in 1972, and 1980. In 1972 the growth was adversely affected by 
high cost of oil import.  GDP per capita growth started at around 6 percent in 1970 before declined to 2 
percent in 1972 due to rising oil price.  
By 1973, it managed to grow at a phenomenal growth rate of 10 percent (Exhibit 15.1). In 1975, GDP 
per capita growth stood at five percent before jumping to 9 percent in 1977. It declined to minus 3 
percent in 1980, mainly because of rise in oil price and the political disturbance resulted from the 
assassination of President Park Chung Hee (Bedeski, 1994, pp36-39).  
Inflation rate was rather erratic as it started at 16 percent in 1970 before plunging to 3 percent in 1973 
(Exhibit 15.2). The decline in 1973 inflation was the result from the actions by the government raising 
taxes on oil imports, expanding investments, increasing exporting goods to Middle East and increasing 
foreign borrowing (Yi, 1996, pp19-23; Dornbusch and Fischer, 1993). By 1975 and 1975, inflation rose 
again to 24 and 25 percent due to wage increased and importation of capital goods. In 1977, it declined to 
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10 percent as the government imposed tight monetary and fiscal policy, as well as controlling the prices 
on certain staple items (Exhibit 15.2). However, it rose again the following year, and reached peak of 28 
percent in 1980 despite the effort by the government to tighten the fiscal and monetary policy. The 
inflation peaked in 1980 due to the socio-political unrest resulted from the assassination of President 
Park (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1993).  
In 1980 when the GDP per capita growth plunged to minus 3 percent in 1980, the economy was lethargic 
with growing foreign debt and high inflation. The government then decided to take the initiative by 
driving up export and manufacturing output (Yi, 1996, pp24-28) and it led to GDP per capita to grow 
rapidly to 9 percent in 1983. In 1987, it grew to 10 percent due to vast infrastructure expenditure 
undertaken in preparation to host 1988 Olympics (Exhibit 15.1). However, it slowed down in 1989 amid 
the slowdown in the global recession.  
 Inflation rate in 1980 was 29 percent before it plunged steeply to 7 percent in 1980 and 2 percent by 
1984 (Exhibit 15.2). The dropped in inflation from 1981 to 1982 could be attributed to low energy and 
raw material prices, the depreciation of the US dollar and low interest rates. In addition the government 
began to pay more attention to price stability, and labour productivity outstripped the growth of wages 
(Dornbusch and Fischer, 1993). Inflation rate remained steady until 1987 before rising again to 7 percent 
in 1988 leading to Olympics game as the inflation was driven by material imported for construction 
(Exhibit 15.2). In 1989, it dipped slightly to 8 percent before rising again to 9 percent in 1990.   Early 
1990s, the GDP per capita growth slowed down to five percent in 1992 to 1994 due to government 
easing the growth to contain the inflationary pressure as it was peaking to 9 percent in 1991. However, 
due to the weak growth appearing in other Asian countries, who were major recipients of Korean export 
products, the GDP per capita declined in 1996 before plunging to minus 8 percent in 1998.  
112 
 
During that period, South Korea was burdened by huge foreign debt, declining import, increasing interest 
rate and bankruptcy to 8 of the 30 biggest major conglomerates or ―Chaebols‖(Chamberlain, 2001, 
pp104-108). Gross foreign debt had increased to $105 billion by the end of 1996, almost double that in 
1994 and equivalent to 20.1 per cent of GDP, compared with around 12.6 per cent of GDP at the end of 
1990. By then, Korea had to borrow from IMF and have to adhere strictly to restructuring of their 
financial system. These reforms included significant changes in the financial institutions system, the 
corporate sector, the labour market and government regulations (Chung and Eichengreen, 2005, pp4-10). 
 By 1999, the GDP per capita skyrocketed to 9 percent growth due to growth in production output by 11 
percent; however it slowed down in 2001 caused by the  delayed in public funding that was supposed to 
be infused into the working capital of the Chaebols and also due to labour unrest.  It then rose to 6 
percent growth in 2002. 
Inflation rate remained relatively consistent in the 1990s at around five percent except in 1998 when it 
increased to 7.5 percent (Exhibit 15.2). The inflation was derived from capital goods importation. 
However, in 1999, the inflation rate dropped significantly to one percent due to government drastic 
curtailment on imported capital goods as well as adherence to IMF strict conditions of the need to 
generate surplus balanced of payment. This surplus generated derived from curtailment of imported 
goods equivalent to 13 per cent of GDP (Chung and Eichengreen, 2005, pp9-14). As the economy began 
to recover and more capital goods are imported for investment purposes, inflation began to rise again to 
reach 4 percent in 2001 before easing to 3 percent the following year (Exhibit 15.2). The increase in 
2001 was due to higher oil price, increase public service charges, and higher prices for farm livestock 




3.4.3 Philippines  
During the 1970s, Philippine adopted import substitution strategy and the domestic manufacturers 
obtained financing from international borrowers. The economy was mainly based on export oriented low 
value products and most of the raw materials have to be imported (Canlas et al, 2009, pp2-29).  
GDP per capita growth started at one percent in 1970 and peaked again at 6 percent in 1976. During the 
1977 and 1978, electronics and garment increased their production for export, which indicated by 
moderate growth in manufacturing output between 4 to 6 percent (Exhibit 16.3). In 1980, IMF provided 
USD 200 million loan under Structural Adjustment Loan programme (SAL), in exchange the 
government has to liberalise the interest rate and exchange rate system, open the trade barrier and reduce 
the import tariff (Baliscan and Hill, 2003, pp80-84). GDP per capita growth stood at minus 0.6 percent 
and began to decline in 1984 and 1985 to minus 10 percent as the economy was declining due to political 
upheaval and overthrowing of President Ferdinand Marcos.  
GDP per capita growth managed to recover to one percent in 1986 and increased to 4 percent by 1988 
(Exhibit 16.1). The growth was resulted from the government expansionary fiscal policy and also due to 
increase consumer demand. From 1989, it began to drop from 4 percent to minus 3 percent in 1991.  The 
economy deteriorated as the debt kept growing, thus the government decided to tighten monetary policy 
to avert from further crisis.  
In 1991, the economy was experiencing severe recession due to major earthquake in 1990 and attempted 
coup (Baliscan and Hill, 2003, pp86-91).  From 1991 until 1996, the economy gradually increase and 
reached 4 percent before the country engulfed by natural disaster from massive flooding, i.e.  El Nino 
effect in 1997 and the financial crisis in 1998.The economy declined and suffered recession with minus 3 
percent growth before recovering to reach 4 percent growth in 2000. However, it declined again in 2001 
114 
 
to 0 percent due to a major banking failure that caused losses in investors‘ confidence and also political 
turmoil from the impeachment of President Estrada. Global economic and electronics-demand slowdown 
combined with softer prices of resource-based commodities depressed export performance in 2001 
(Baliscan and Hill, 2003, pp93-98). In 2001, Macapagal Arroyo took over to become President of 
Philippine and she managed to resuscitate the economy reflected by GDP per capita growth reached 4 
percent by 2004 (Exhibit 16.1). 
Inflation was at double digit figures from 1970 until 1986 except between 1975 to 1978 (Exhibit 16.2). It 
peaked in 1971 at 21 percent, 1974 at 34 percent from the rise in cost of oil import and 50 percent in 
1983 due to escalating deficit that had caused difficulty to pay for imported goods. In order to avert the 
country from brink of bankruptcy, the IMF agreed in February 1983 to grant $543 million emergency 
credit to the government. This was followed by a $300 million credit from the World Bank and other 
credit of similar amount from major New York banks with significant interests in the Philippines (Canlas 
et al, 2009, pp39-45). Inflation managed to rise rapidly from 1986 to 1991, i.e. from one percent to 18 
percent. The inflation rose due to several factors, mainly attributed to uncertainty in the economy as a 
result of 1989 fail coup attempt, low yield from agriculture from prolong drought and the eruption of 
Mount Pinatubo in 1991 that caused chaos in the economy. From 1992 until 2003, the inflation remained 
stable at single digit.  
3.4.4 Indonesia 
Indonesia recorded a modest and consistent growth from 2 to 7 percent in 1970 until 2003, except for 
certain years, i.e.  1982 and 1998, when both recorded below zero percent. In 1970, agriculture 
contributes 45 percent of GDP (Exhibit 17.4), while manufacturing output contributed only 10 percent 
(Exhibit 17.5). By 2006, manufacturing sector contributed 27 percent, in contrast, only 14 percent by the 
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agriculture sector (Exhibit 17.4). During the 1970s, oil was becoming the main revenue generator to 
finance the countries public expenditure, especially after the oil boom (Thee, 2003, pp27). 
 GDP per capita growth peaked at 7 percent in 1970s before declining to 3 percent in 1976. It recorded 6 
percent growth between 1977 and 1980 (Exhibit 17.2). In 1982, GDP per capita fell to minus 0.8 percent 
as the manufacturing growth slowed to one percent only.  As the price of oil bottom up in 1986, 
Indonesia began to rethink ways to diversify its economic activities by attracting more foreign 
investments (Thee, 2003, pp99-104).  
From 1986 until 1996, growth remained relatively modest between 4 to 6 percent. Between 1986 until 
1989, the government decided to introduce financial and trade reform. The trade reform includes 
reducing tariff and licensing requirements while the financial reform includes banking sectors being 
deregulated and more banking licenses being provided.  New rules are also being written to liberalise the 
capital market to attract foreign investors (Dick et al, 2002, pp235-244). 
However, FDI inflow was insignificant prior to 1994 before it recorded two to three percent of GDP until 
1996 (Exhibit 17.3). By 1998, Indonesia was in the midst of the financial crisis when GDP per capita 
growth dropped to minus 14 percent as the investors divested their investment and Indonesia was having 
difficulty servicing its outstanding debt (Exhibit 17.1).  
GDP per capita growth managed to rebound to record 3 percent growth in 2000 before dipping to 2 
percent in 2001. The slight dipped in 2001 was attributed to the late release of loan amounted to USD5 
billion by IMF resulting delays in financing key projects to propel the country out of recession 
(Matsumoto, 2007, pp21-22) 
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 Inflation mostly remained at single digit except for a few exceptional years when it rose rapidly in 1973 
to 1976 from 11 percent to 41 percent (Exhibit 17.2). The inflation can be attributed to the rising world 
oil price even though Indonesia was a major exporter. Inflation also rose to 18 percent in 1980 because of 
the second spike in oil price. However, during the 1998 crises, inflation soared to 59 percent due to steep 
devaluation of its currency that caused imported goods to be very expansive.  
3.4.5 Thailand 
In the 1970s, Thailand‘s economy was based primarily on agriculture production and import substitution 
economy. The country‘s other source of revenue derived from other sectors such as tourism, overseas 
remittances and light manufacturing, especially textile (Heenan and Lamontagne, 2001, pp41-45).  
Agriculture contributed 26 percent of GDP (Exhibit 18.6), manufacturing only 16 percent (Exhibit 18.4) 
and service industry contributed the major portion which is 49 percent (Exhibit 18.5).  GDP per capita 
income growth started strong in 1970 at 8 percent (Exhibit 18.1), however, it declined abruptly to 2 
percent in 1971 to 1974  
GDP per capita grew to 7 percent from 1976 to 1978 before declining to 3 percent in 1979 (Exhibit 18.1). 
The growth remained steady at 3 to 4 percent until mid 1980s before the government embarked on the 
policy of deregulating and liberalising the financial and trade sector (Hernández et al, 1999).  
In 1988, import restrictions were removed on more products and in 1990 new policies on tariff 
reductions were introduced. Between 1990 and 1994, financial restrictions were slowly deregulated with 
the loosening control on savings accounts and lesser requirement imposed on capital reserved 
requirements on commercial banks. Also the restrictions on capital out flows were reduced to make it 
easier to remit money out of the country (Hernandez et al, 1999).  
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Inflation rose from 1976 at 4 percent to reach 20 percent in 1980 due to the rising oil price before falling 
again to one percent in 1984 when the oil price fell (Exhibit 18.2). Inflation remained relatively low 
during the 1980s Even when financial crisis hit in 1997, inflation remained relatively low at 6 percent 
and dropped to one percent in 2000.  
GDP per capita income growth fell to minus 3 percent in 1997 and further minus 12 percent in1998 
before rebounding to 3.5 percent in 1999. The main cause of the recession was attributed to the mass 
selling of Baht in the open market as the investors deemed Baht to be overvalued on several reasons. It 
was triggered by the decline in manufacturing output that resulted in reduced demand in exports, 
increased budget deficit and increased short-term debt by private sectors (Dixon, 2000).  
Bank of Thailand attempted to support Baht by pegging it against US dollar, however the exercised 
failed, which forced the central bank to float the currency that eventually caused its value to collapse. It 
dropped from average 25 Baht per 1 USD to 41 Baht per 1 USD in 1998 (Exhibit 18.7). Subsequent 
panic ensued in the financial market as debtors unable to pay their loans and creditors unable to redeem 
their investment as the collateral plunged in value from decade-long overvalued property.  Later, 
Thailand managed to recover from the recession amid at slower pace between one to five percent from 
1999 to 2002 (Exhibit 18.3) after IMF injected USD14.2 billion of loan bailout with strict financial and 
trade conditions.  GDP per capita growth managed to rise in 2003 to 6.5 percent (Exhibit 18.1) driven by 
strong manufacturing output growth of 11 percent (Exhibit 18.4).  
3.4.6 Malaysia 
Malaysian GDP per capita since 1970s has experienced a moderate growth between 3 to 7 percent 
growth, except for a few years when the economy grew unexpectedly high, and other years when it hit 
lows due to regional or global recession. In 1970 GDP per capita grew rapidly from 3 percent in 1971 to 
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9 percent in 1973. This was underpinned by a boom in export-oriented and labour-intensive industries, 
such as electronics, textiles, and wool products. According to the second Malaysia plan (1971-75), 
Malaysia has positioned its manufacturing sector into becoming export-oriented (Sivalingam, 1994, pp4-
8). The essence of the plan was to attract FDI from large multinational corporations to relocate their 
manufacturing site in Malaysia to mainly produce electronic products and components. From 1970 until 
1973, manufacturing sector registered double digit growth as it peaked in 1973 at 23 percent (Exhibit 
19.5). 
 In 1974, the economy decelerated due to increase in oil price, thus Malaysia face mild recession in 1975.  
The economy managed to recover and grew at 9 percent by 1976 (Exhibit 19.2). From 1977 to 1984, 
Malaysia experience uninterrupted and moderate growth from 3 percent to 7 percent before the global 
economic recession adversely affected Malaysia.  In 1986, GDP per capita growth dropped to minus 4 
percent growths before rebounded in 1988 to 7 percent. From 1988 onwards, Malaysia recorded 
relatively high GDP per capita growth between 6 to 7 percent until the 1998 economic downturn when it 
dropped to minus 9 percent.  
The prolonged high growth during the late 1980s can be attributed to several factors, mainly the increase 
influx of recorded FDI and GDI. FDI increased from USD423 million in 1989 to reached peaked of 
USD5 billion by 1993(Exhibit 19.4), or from 2 percent of GDP to 9 percent of GDP. The FDI inflow 
remained relatively high between USD 4 to USD 6 billion per year (Exhibit 19.4) until the economy 
experienced financial recession in 1997. GDI also increased from USD 6.7 billion a year to USD 41 
billion by 1996 (Exhibit 19.7). From 1989 to 1995, GDI registered over more than 20 percent increased, 
except in 1992 and 1994, where it recorded 3.4 percent and 12 percent, respectively.  
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 By 1998, Malaysia experienced currency crisis when a substantial outflow of funds from the actions of 
portfolio investors caused financial destabilisation in foreign exchange market, financial institutions and 
stock market. The government later on imposed selective capital control in order to restrict the outflow of 
local currency  and pegged the currency in September 1998 at 1 USD to 3.8 Ringgit Malaysia (RM)  to 
destabilise the currency (Exhibit 19.6) (Ghosh and Ariff, 2004, pp3-8).  
In 1999 and 2000, the economy was again poised to move upwards on the growth path as it recorded 4 
and 6 percent growth, respectively. However, in 2001, it dropped to minus 2 percent as GDI dropped to 
minus 4 percent and FDI dropped to 0.6 percent from 4 percent from 2000 (Exhibit 19.4 and 19.7). By 
2002, the per capita GDP growth rebounded to 2 percent and peaked at five percent by 2004.  
Historically, Malaysian inflation rate was below five percent in 1970s except in 1973 and 1991 when 
there was increased in world inflation (Exhibit 19.3).  The low inflation was attributed to the government 
policy in controlling price on selected staple products. In 1972, inflation stood at only 3 percent, before 
rising rapidly, due to increase in the oil price, to 11 and 17 percent in 1973 and 1974, respectively.  In 
1981 it reaches 10 percent rate but fell below one percent as the oil price dropped to record lows from 
1984 to 1987.  Inflation has remained under five percent from 1987 to 2003, except in 1998 financial 
crisis when value of ringgit Malaysia fell to nearly 40 percent, resulted imported goods becoming more 
expansive. Inflation was recorded at 6 percent then, but fell in the subsequent years when the ringgit 
Malaysia was pegged to US dollar. 
3.4.7 Singapore 
Singapore spilt from Malaysia Federation in 1963 and during the inception the economy was mainly 
based on its role as entrepot for its neighbouring countries due to its strategic location in the Straits of 
Malacca (Bercuson and Caling, 1995, pp11-18).  
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In the early 1970s, share of manufacturing output commanded 23 percent of the country‘s GDP output 
only (Exhibit 20.3).  Two to three percent of the GDP was from agriculture sector (Exhibit 20.11) while 
the rest from service sector, mainly Singapore‘s role serving as the main hub for import and export 
between its neighbouring countries with other regions.  It‘s GDP per capita growth in 1970 started very 
high at 12 percent and maintained that level until 1972 before the onset of OPEC oil crisis in 1973 and 
1974 that caused its growth to decline to 2 percent (Exhibit 20.1). It then rebounded to 6 percent growth 
in 1976 and rising to 8 percent in 1980.  However, by 1982 its economy stuttered as its growth fell to 2.5 
percent due to the world recession.  
Since Singapore is an open economy, and most of its revenue was generated from import and export of 
goods and services, any world or regional economy slump would adversely affected Singapore, as 
reflected by the 1982 decline in its GDP per capita growth.  In 1985, the economy was once again 
affected and the GDP per capita slowed to minus 1.6 percent growth due to recession originated from 
neighbouring countries (Exhibit 20.1). The countries‘ GDPs were adversely affected due to falling 
commodity prices, including oil, resulting lower business being traded via Singapore‘s port. Singapore‘s 
GDP per capita growth increased to 8 percent in 1988 before declined to 3 percent in 1992. The drop in 
the per capita growth was due to decline in merchandise import and export as it slumped from 327 
percent in 1987 to lows of 273 percent in 1991 and 1992 (Exhibit 20.6).  
GDP per capita growth then rebounded to 9 percent in 1993 before the economy slowed down in 1998 to 
minus five percent due to Asian financial crisis. However from 1996 to 1998, the currency was slightly 
affected as it depreciated from 1 USD dollar to 1.7 Singapore dollars (Exhibit 20.4). In 1999, it recorded 
6 percent growth due to strong demand for its electronics and IT products. However, by 2001 the 
economy shrank again to minus five percent as the demand for IT and electronic products slackened as 
indicated by the manufacturing output falling to minus 12 percent in 2001 (Exhibit 20.5).  
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Inflation in Singapore historically was lesser than 4 percent except on certain years before 1982(Exhibit 
20.2). The key determinant of inflation in Singapore were imported goods, hence Monetary Authority 
Singapore (MAS) able to curb inflation rate by regulating exchange rate by allowing it to fluctuate within 
an undisclosed band set against a trade-weighted nominal effective exchange rate (Stone, 2009, pp54).  
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3.5  SAVINGS DETERMINANTS BY REGION 
3.5.1 Private Savings  
LATIN AMERICA 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
ARGENTINA 20.7 22.5 19.3 17.8 14.7 14.8 18.8 
BRAZIL   24.1 26.3 22.2 22.1 17.0 14.8 15.5 
MEXICO   17.8 19.5 24.7 19.6 15.2 17.9 17.1 
CHILE   15.6 13.4 14.8 20.3 22.3 23.1 24.6 
VENEZUELA 37.8 30.2 24.6 18.8 19.2 21.0 23.9 
COLUMBIA 11.2 13.9 11.8 13.3 12.6 8.6 8.8 
Mean   21.2 21.0 19.6 18.7 16.9 16.7 18.6 
Std Dev   9.1 6.5 5.4 3.7 3.8 5.2 5.9 
SKEWNESS 0.9 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.9 0.0 -0.1 
(Table 3.5.1.1 – LATIN AMERICA Private Savings) 
Private savings in Latin American economies have been declining from an average of 21 percent in the 
1970-74 period to only 18.6 percent in the 2000-04 period. In Argentina, the private savings rate declined 
from 1991 until 2001 to  15 percent, as local currency were overvalued with Peso against US dollar 
remained stubbornly pegged at  parity, resulting more people to consume imported goods rather than 
saved (Hornbeck, 2002). Savings rate decreased in Brazil in early 1990s as the government instituted the 
Real plan, which froze the price of most products and salaries as well as instituted price indexation. In 
Mexico, the government‘s measure of devaluing the currency has negative impact on savings in the 
early1990s. The declined in savings in Columbia in early 1990s was mainly caused by the declined in 
agriculture growth output, especially coffee production (Exhibit 6.3). The standard deviations (SD) of 
savings among the countries over the thirty years have also declined indicating that savings gap among 
these countries has also decline. Even the skewness of the distribution indicates that the distribution has 





MENA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
S. Arabia   62.4 46.6 28.6 3.7 17.5 20.5 27.6 
EGYPT   1.7 -2.4 -0.6 -4.0 -0.9 -1.5 1.4 
TURKEY   10.6 10.4 6.8 13.1 14.6 14.0 14.4 
ISRAEL   18.7 15.5 15.4 16.7 21.7 22.9 24.4 
MOROCCO 12.9 4.7 5.8 8.8 7.1 5.9 4.8 
TUNISIA   29.9 30.3 31.8 32.4 25.1 22.9 20.8 
SOUTH AFRICA 13.7 15.9 15.3 15.2 11.2 9.6 10.7 
Mean   21.4 17.3 14.7 12.3 13.8 13.5 14.6 
Std Dev   19.3 16.1 13.6 11.1 8.5 8.9 10.2 
SKEWNESS 1.5 0.9 1.1 0.3 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 
(Table 3.5.1.2 – MENA Private Savings) 
Private savings in MENA, including South Africa and Turkey, have also declined from average 21.4 
percent in the 1970-74 period to 12 percent by the 1985-89 period. However, the discrepancies between 
the high and lows indicated by the standard deviation (SD) is quite large, specifically in early 1970s with 
SD at 19 percent before narrowed down to 9 percent by 1990-94 period. It is mainly due to the Tunisia 
having an average savings rate of more than 25 percent as compared to Egypt with negative savings. 
In Saudi Arabia, savings rate has declined from average 62 percent in the 1970-74 period to 4 percent in 
the 1985-89 period. Since the oil price peaked at USD$37 per barrel in1980, private saving never reach 
over the level of 50 percent that was typical during the1970s. The savings decline in Turkey in the 1980-
84 period was largely due to huge deficit and the overhanging high inflation.  The high savings rate 
registered in Israel from 1990s onwards could be attributed to low and stable inflation rate that has 
caused real deposit rate to be positive. Depositors were more confident to save their money in the banks 
since they could earn positive return. Private savings in Morocco fluctuated within single digit between 3 
to 9 percent from 1974 to 2006. The low saving rate (Exhibit 11.3) was mostly affected by the high rate 
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of inflation prevailing from 1974 until 1994 (Exhibit 11.4). In South Africa, after the economic sanction 
was imposed in 1989 in opposition to the country‘s upholding apartheid system, the private saving rate 
began to decline gradually beginning 1990 (Exhibit 13.3). 
ASIA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
INDIA   10.8 11.8 9.5 9.9 10.9 10.4 10.8 
S. KOREA   14.8 27.2 29.6 38.1 39.5 39.8 37.3 
PHILIPPINES 14.4 15.5 15.5 13.4 9.4 8.3 11.9 
INDONESIA 16.7 22.4 23.7 23.0 22.0 20.7 17.2 
THAILAND 27.6 26.6 25.9 29.8 35.1 34.2 28.8 
MALAYSIA 21.8 27.3 24.5 29.5 29.0 37.4 38.3 
SINGAPORE 42.3 46.6 53.1 50.2 53.0 56.2 50.1 
Mean   21.2 25.3 26.0 27.7 28.4 29.6 28.5 
Std Dev   10.5 11.2 13.7 13.9 15.7 17.3 15.0 
SKEWNESS 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 
(Table 3.5.1.3 – ASIA PACIFIC Private Savings) 
Unlike the other two regions, savings in Asian countries has increased gradually from 21 percent in the 
1970-74 period to 29 percent in the 2000-04 period. However, SD shows a wide dispersion between 10 
to 15 percent between the countries. This reflects that certain countries, such as Singapore, Malaysia and 
South Korea have high savings rate, in which their savings have increased between 8 to 17 percent 
within the thirty years; in contrast India and Philippines rate remained stagnant. Their savings rate has 
remained low under 15 percent as compare to Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore whose 
savings exceed more than 25 percent over GDP. 
Private savings in India has been rather consistent since 1970 and has been registering 9 to 12 percent of 
GDP (Exhibit 17.6). Malaysian private saving over GDP has remained relatively high since 1970 at 22 
percent. In 1991, Employee Provident Fund (EPF) was established to manage employees‘ retirement 
benefits via contribution from the employees and employers. The employees are obligated to contribute 
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certain fractions of their income into savings, while their employers will match the same or higher 
contribution into the employees‘ account (Ang, 2008).  Since1991, private savings rate has kept 
increasing until it reached 42 percent of GDP before declined slightly in 2001 to 37 percent (Exhibit 
19.1).  
Singapore level of private savings was high due to obligatory contribution imposed towards the 
employees and employers. Those in private sectors are obligated to enrol into social security scheme, 
called CPF, in which the employees are obligated to contribute certain percentages of their income, 
ranging from 13 to 25 percent. Meanwhile, the employers will match the employees‘ contribution by 
contributing between 20 to 25 percent into the scheme (Mun and Ying, 2009). The private savings started 
at 41 percent of GDP in 1970 and rose to 55 percent due to changes in the percentages of contribution by 
employee and employers subjected to the government rulings (Exhibit 20.1). 
3.5.2 GDP Per Capita Income Growth 
LATIN AMERICA 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
ARGENTINA 2.0 0.6 -1.6 -2.8 5.3 1.0 -0.6 
BRAZIL   8.4 3.5 -0.9 2.5 -0.3 0.5 1.6 
MEXICO   3.1 3.5 1.0 -0.8 2.0 1.4 1.4 
CHILE   -0.2 1.9 -0.2 5.6 5.4 3.9 2.8 
VENEZUELA 0.4 0.5 -4.7 -1.0 1.7 -1.1 -0.1 
COLUMBIA 4.6 3.0 0.4 2.4 2.3 -0.4 1.8 
Mean   3.1 2.1 -1.0 1.0 2.8 0.9 1.2 
Std Dev   3.9 4.5 5.0 4.7 4.1 4.2 5.4 
SKEWNESS -0.2 -1.3 -0.1 -1.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 
(Table 3.5.2.1 – LATIN AMERICA GDP Per Capita Growth) 
GDP per capita growth for Latin America, as shown in Table 3.5.2.1, is moderate and remained slightly 
U shaped from 1970 until 2004. It began on average at 3 percent in the 1970-74 period and declined to 
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minus one percent in the 1980-84 period before gaining slowly to average one to two percent in the 
2000-2004 period. Most of the Latin American economies were having problems with negative growth in 
the 1980s. Chile was the only economy that has shown improved growth in the 1980-84 period with 
growth rate of five percent and growing at modest rate until 2000. The distribution is slightly negative 
skewed, except in 1990-94 period, which indicates the modes are slightly to the left of the mean average 
in the distribution. 
MENA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
S. Arabia   16.4 1.1 -7.9 -4.1 1.8 -0.6 1.5 
EGYPT   0.6 7.2 4.7 1.6 1.5 3.1 1.8 
TURKEY   2.3 2.0 1.3 2.8 1.8 2.6 2.9 
ISRAEL   5.1 0.8 1.7 2.0 2.8 1.8 0.8 
MOROCCO 1.6 3.6 0.4 2.8 1.4 0.8 3.5 
TUNISIA   6.2 3.7 2.0 0.1 2.9 3.7 3.6 
SOUTH AFRICA 2.0 0.0 0.4 -1.0 -1.9 0.3 2.1 
Mean   4.9 2.6 0.4 0.6 1.5 1.7 2.3 
Std Dev   6.2 3.8 5.3 4.0 3.7 3.6 3.0 
SKEWNESS 1.4 0.3 -1.5 -0.6 -0.2 -0.3 -0.9 
(Table 3.5.2.2 – MENA GDP Per Capita Growth) 
GDP per capita growth in MENA regions began higher than Latin American at five percent in the 1970-
74 period and declined to averaged 0.4 percent in the 1980-84 period before climbing to 2 percent the 
2000-04 period. The growth trend shows a U-shaped curve, which is similar to the Latin Caribbean 
regions.  Saudi Arabia was the country that was hit hard by recession in the 1980s as their growth rate 
registered minus 8 percent in the 1980-84 period and minus 4 percent in the 1985-89 period. The SD 
GDP per capita growth was similar to Latin American region between 3 to 6 percent. The distribution 




ASIA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-2004 
INDIA   -0.2 1.4 3.2 3.7 2.7 4.7 4.3 
S. KOREA   5.9 6.8 4.6 8.1 6.8 3.7 4.8 
PHILIPPINES 2.5 3.3 -1.4 0.1 -0.5 1.5 2.7 
INDONESIA 5.6 5.0 4.7 4.2 6.2 0.3 3.2 
THAILAND 4.3 5.5 3.3 7.3 7.6 0.8 4.0 
MALAYSIA 5.6 4.8 4.2 1.9 6.5 2.6 3.3 
SINGAPORE 9.3 5.8 5.8 4.9 5.8 3.0 3.9 
Mean   4.7 4.6 3.5 4.3 5.0 2.4 3.7 
Std Dev   3.6 1.8 2.3 2.8 2.9 1.6 0.7 
SKEWNESS 0.1 -1.6 -1.7 -0.9 -1.0 -1.6 -1.0 
(Table 3.5.2.3 – ASIA GDP Per Capita Growth) 
Growths in Asian economies were better than other regions. The average growth from 1970s until middle 
of 1995 was mostly above 4 percent, except in the 1980-84 period at only 3.5 percent. The worst of the 
Asian economy was during the latter half of 1990s when the average was at 2.5 percent due to the 
financial crisis that wreak havoc in 1997 and 1998. The difference in growth across Asian countries 
during any period was small indicated by SD that was lesser than 3 percent. Philippines growth rate was 
low from 1980 to 2000 due to political and economic turmoil. Malaysia growth rate was moderate from 
1970 until 2000, except in the 1985-89 period and the 1995-99 period due to the economic recession.  
3.5.3 Credit to Private Sectors 
 (Table 3.5.3.1 – LATIN AMERICA Credit to Private Sectors) 
LATIN AMERICA 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-2004 
ARGENTINA 17.7 18.6 29.2 23.1 16.4 22.2 16.3 
BRAZIL   40.5 52.9 44.5 91.7 75.9 38.7 30.3 
MEXICO   32.2 23.7 16.2 13.1 27.4 23.7 17.2 
CHILE   7.9 22.0 68.4 59.7 56.9 66.4 77.1 
VENEZUELA 30.3 46.8 54.5 43.8 20.9 12.9 11.0 
COLUMBIA 24.0 28.1 34.3 28.1 31.1 35.8 27.1 
Mean   25.4 32.0 41.2 43.3 38.1 33.3 29.8 
Std Dev   11.2 14.3 18.7 28.9 26.2 17.8 22.6 
SKEWNESS -0.1 0.3 0.6 1.5 2.0 0.9 1.5 
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Credit to private sector, as a proxy variable for financial development, in Latin American has a hump-
shape trend from 1970s to 2004. It started with average 25 percent in the 1970-74 period and rose to 43 
percent in the 1985-89 period before receding to 30 percent in the 2000-04 period. The increase in the 
1980s was due to the government monetary policy of increasing the credit supply to compensate the 
escalating hyperinflation before they decided to tighten supply of credit in order to contain inflation. 
Brazil has the highest average of credit supplied during 1985-89 period, when it shot to 92 percent before 
decline to 40 percent by 1995-99 period. 
MENA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-2004 
S. Arabia   5.2 15.5 36.3 70.5 53.3 56.4 55.6 
EGYPT   16.6 20.1 28.0 35.3 28.8 47.0 60.9 
TURKEY   19.1 19.5 18.6 19.6 18.4 23.7 21.6 
ISRAEL   34.2 54.7 70.8 56.9 61.1 70.4 87.3 
MOROCCO 37.1 49.8 60.6 62.7 66.5 77.1 75.8 
TUNISIA   44.1 54.5 63.7 69.1 67.5 68.6 72.9 
SOUTH AFRICA 67.2 62.2 63.1 74.5 101.5 121.6 128.3 
Mean   31.9 39.5 48.7 55.5 56.7 66.4 71.8 
Std Dev   19.5 19.9 20.6 19.7 25.5 28.8 30.9 
SKEWNESS 0.5 -0.1 -0.4 -0.8 0.3 0.6 0.4 
(Table 3.5.3.2 – MENA Credit to Private Sectors) 
MENA region experienced a steady average growth of credit to private sector as reflected in the 
increased of credit from 32 percent in the 1970-74 period to reaching 80 percent in the 2000-04 period. 
The rapid increase in the region reflected by the steep increased in South Africa, which nearly double its 
credit to private sector from merely 67 percent to 128 percent by 2000-04 period. Other countries that 
have similar rapid growth patterns are Israel, which nearly triple, while Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt 




ASIA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-2004 
INDIA   14.1 20.7 26.1 29.8 24.5 24.0 31.9 
S. KOREA   41.7 40.1 53.1 57.0 62.0 72.9 97.6 
PHILIPPINES 29.8 36.1 44.3 20.5 27.4 52.5 37.9 
INDONESIA NA NA 13.2 26.3 48.4 48.7 22.2 
THAILAND 21.5 37.1 47.5 62.2 102.0 148.1 99.1 
MALAYSIA 26.3 43.3 78.5 119.3 114.7 191.8 163.6 
SINGAPORE 57.3 68.7 94.9 99.1 97.5 114.6 114.7 
Mean   NA NA 51.1 59.1 68.1 93.2 81.0 
Std Dev   14.7 NA 28.3 38.0 36.9 60.6 52.1 
SKEWNESS 0.8 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.4 
(Table 3.5.3.3 – ASIA PACIFIC Credit to Private Sectors) 
Credit to private sector for Asian region remained at moderate level between 50 to 60 percent between 
1980 until 1994 before it climbed to average 93 percent. The sudden increased in the region was due to 
the influx of foreign direct investment in the region and the loose monetary policy exercised by the 
government. In the following years, due to the financial recession in 1997-98, credit supply declined to 
average 80 percent. SD across the countries was high between 28 to 60 percent from 1985 to 2004. This 
was because countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand has credit supplied between 60 to 120 
percent, as oppose to countries such as India, Philippines and Indonesia with credit supplied between 20 
to 48 percent. The distribution shows positive skewness indicating most of the credit figures are lesser 
than the average. Malaysia has one of the most expansionary monetary policy with credit supply above 




LATIN AMERICA 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
ARGENTINA 38.3 227.6 268.1 863.3 505.1 0.8 8.3 
BRAZIL   NA NA 132.4 532.3 1667.2 19.3 8.7 
MEXICO   10.3 19.1 56.1 82.0 16.3 24.5 6.0 
CHILE   198.7 150.4 22.4 20.3 17.5 6.0 2.8 
VENEZUELA 4.2 9.0 13.0 33.0 41.0 53.8 20.8 
COLUMBIA 14.9 23.7 22.9 24.0 26.6 17.8 7.3 
Mean   NA NA 85.8 259.1 379.0 20.4 9.0 
Std Dev   117.8 118.1 127.5 607.1 807.3 23.0 7.8 
SKEWNESS 3.3 1.9 3.2 4.0 2.2 1.9 1.3 
(Table 3.5.4.1 – LATIN AMERICA Inflation) 
During the early 1970s, Chile and Argentina were experiencing hyperinflation, while other Latin 
American countries‘ inflation rates were at double digit. Columbia was experiencing high inflation 
between average 15 to 25 percent during the 1970-79 period. During the 1985-89 period, Argentina and 
Brazil experienced hyperinflation of more than 500 percent. Chile inflation declined during the 1980s 
due to strict monetary policy and while at the same period, the government decided to open up and 
liberalise the economy. During the 1985-89 and 1990-94 periods, Latin American region recorded 
average inflation rates of 260 and 379 percent, respectively. Later, inflation declined steeply the 
following years to an average of 9 percent in the 2000-04 period after Argentina and Brazil observed 






MENA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
S. Arabia   9.4 15.4 1.3 -1.2 1.7 0.9 -0.2 
EGYPT   4.8 10.7 15.8 18.9 14.1 6.9 4.7 
TURKEY   13.1 33.5 51.5 51.1 73.7 80.7 38.0 
ISRAEL   18.1 47.2 177.5 81.8 14.3 8.2 1.6 
MOROCCO 6.2 9.4 10.2 5.0 6.2 2.7 1.6 
TUNISIA   NA NA 8.9 7.3 5.9 3.9 2.8 
SOUTH AFRICA 7.5 11.8 13.5 15.7 12.4 7.3 5.5 
Mean   NA NA 43.8 25.5 18.3 15.8 7.7 
Std Dev   8.2 18.4 74.7 51.8 24.4 27.3 14.5 
SKEWNESS 1.8 1.5 3.2 4.9 2.3 2.1 2.7 
(Table 3.5.4.2 – MENA Inflation) 
MENA recorded average inflation rate of 40 percent in the 1980-84 period.  The high inflation rate in the 
region was attributed to Israel high inflation, which ran up to an average of 177 percent. The following 
years the average inflation gradually declined yet remained relatively high at double digit rate between 
15 to 25 percent from 1985 to 1999. Inflation only declined to 8 percent by the 2000-04 period. SD 
between countries was high, especially in the 1980-89 period at an average of 75 percent. This was 
mainly due to very low inflation reaching negative figures in Saudi Arabia versus Israel inflation running 
between 80 to 177 percent during that period. The skewness was positive indicating that majority of the 
inflation figures were less than the average. 
ASIA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
INDIA   10.4 5.6 9.4 8.0 10.6 7.0 3.7 
S. KOREA   13.7 16.7 12.6 4.2 7.0 4.4 3.2 
PHILIPPINES 18.9 10.1 20.4 9.4 11.0 7.0 4.6 
INDONESIA 19.0 14.9 12.4 6.9 8.6 20.5 8.0 
THAILAND 9.0 7.0 8.4 3.2 4.8 5.1 1.7 
MALAYSIA 6.9 4.1 6.0 1.3 3.8 3.5 1.5 
SINGAPORE 9.3 2.6 4.9 0.7 2.9 1.0 0.8 
Mean   12.5 8.7 10.6 4.8 7.0 6.9 3.4 
Std Dev   10.4 5.4 5.2 3.4 3.3 6.3 2.5 
SKEWNESS 0.8 0.7 2.7 2.0 1.0 4.6 1.7 
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(Table 3.5.4.3 – ASIA PACIFIC Inflation) 
In contrast to the other two regions, the inflation rate in Asia is considered mild. Its highest inflation rate 
was at 12 percent in the 1970-74 period before declining to 10 percent in the 1985-89 period. It declined 
further to hit 3 percent in the 2000-04 period. One of the countries that experienced the highest inflation 
rate in that region is Indonesia with rates running between 10 to 20 percent from 1970 to 1984 period 
before declining to single digit. It surged back to an average of 20 percent during the 1995-99 period at 
the peak of financial crisis before declined again. SD for inflation across countries was between 2 to five 
percent which is considered low as compared to other two regions. 
3.5.5  Real Deposit Interest Rate 
LATIN AMERICA 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
ARGENTINA NA -48.9 -59.9 2838.4 -181.9 7.6 7.0 
BRAZIL   NA NA 39.2 969.8 2400.1 12.1 9.6 
MEXICO   NA -8.5 -15.5 -18.0 2.9 -2.6 -1.2 
CHILE   NA 12.7 14.2 3.5 5.4 6.5 2.0 
VENEZUELA NA NA NA -23.1 -5.6 -25.7 -0.9 
COLUMBIA NA NA NA 8.3 4.5 10.5 2.5 
Mean   NA NA NA 629.8 370.9 1.4 3.2 
Std Dev   NA 26.8 64.0 2723.5 1315.0 18.6 5.7 
SKEWNESS NA -0.5 -2.4 4.8 3.9 -2.6 0.6 
(Table 3.5.5.1 – LATIN AMERICA Real Deposit Interest rate) 
Real deposit interest rate in countries in 1980s such as Argentina and Brazil was extremely high in order 
to mitigate the runaway inflation and currency devaluation they were experience during that period. On 
the other hand, Mexico and Venezuela was experiencing negative real deposit rate from 1980s until 
recently. However, the negative interest rate has improved from negative double digit registered during 
the early 1980s to minus single digit by 2000. Only Chile and Columbia has their real deposit interest 
rate relatively stable with less than 10 percent since 1980s.  
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MENA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
S. Arabia   NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
EGYPT   NA -5.9 -5.5 -7.8 -2.1 3.1 4.1 
TURKEY   -10.6 -27.3 -16.2 -5.6 -7.5 -1.8 8.8 
ISRAEL   NA NA 25.9 -32.7 -1.8 4.6 4.6 
MOROCCO NA -4.5 -4.2 3.4 1.1 5.1 2.8 
TUNISIA   n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
SOUTH AFRICA NA -4.4 -4.2 -2.0 3.5 6.9 4.8 
Mean   NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
(Table 3.5.5.2 – MENA Real Deposit Interest rate) 
. The real deposit rates for most countries in the region such as Turkey and South Africa prior to 1990s 
were negatives. It is only after the 1990 decade that the rates transformed to positives. The negative rates 
were due to high inflation that exceeded the current nominal rates. Morocco, South Africa and Israel real 
interest rates peaked in the 1995-99 period, prior to the Asian financial crisis. However, Turkey has been 
experiencing negative rates since 1970s and only registered positive in the 2000-04 period.  
ASIA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
INDIA   NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
S. KOREA   2.7 -0.1 -0.4 5.8 2.4 5.2 2.1 
PHILIPPINES NA -2.4 -5.5 3.4 3.5 2.7 2.0 
INDONESIA -2.8 -5.9 -4.4 10.4 8.9 3.3 4.1 
THAILAND NA -0.9 3.3 7.8 5.7 5.2 1.1 
MALAYSIA -1.4 1.3 2.7 4.0 2.7 3.2 1.7 
SINGAPORE NA 1.0 3.2 2.9 0.6 2.4 0.2 
Mean   NA -1.3 -0.2 5.7 4.0 3.7 1.9 
Std Dev   12.1 4.3 8.1 4.0 3.5 5.2 2.1 
SKEWNESS -1.1 -1.1 -1.7 -0.1 1.3 -2.6 1.4 
(Table 3.5.5.3 – ASIA PACIFIC Real Deposit Interest rate) 
The average real deposit interest rate in Asia, except India, shows minus 1.3 percent in the 1975-79 
period. It turned positive in the 1985-89 period at 6 percent before gradually declined to 2 percent by 
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200-2004 period. SD was between 4 to 8 percent from 1975-79 to 1995-99 period which is rather modest 
compared to MENA and Latin American region. 
3.5.6 Youth Dependency Population 
LATIN AMERICA 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
ARGENTINA 29.1 29.5 30.4 30.6 29.7 28.3 27.1 
BRAZIL   41.6 39.4 37.6 36.4 34.2 31.3 28.7 
MEXICO   46.5 45.7 43.8 40.7 37.3 34.6 32.2 
CHILE   38.7 35.3 32.0 30.4 29.8 29.0 26.6 
VENEZUELA 44.8 42.2 39.9 38.6 37.3 35.1 32.7 
COLUMBIA 45.0 42.5 39.7 37.5 35.9 34.0 32.0 
Mean   40.9 39.1 37.2 35.7 34.1 32.1 29.9 
Std Dev   6.0 5.5 4.8 4.0 3.3 2.8 2.6 
SKEWNESS -1.2 -0.7 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 
(Table 3.5.6.1 – LATIN AMERICA Youth Dependency Population) 
The youth dependence population in Latin America on average, i.e. that age between 0 to 15 years, has 
decline steadily from 41 percent in 1970s to 28 percent by 2005. It has been declining by an average of 2 
to 3 percent every 5 years since 1970. This also indicates in the long-term the population growth rate is 
fast declining. 
 
MENA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
S. Arabia   44.4 44.5 43.5 42.0 41.9 40.2 36.5 
EGYPT   42.7 42.2 42.1 42.2 41.5 38.8 35.4 
TURKEY   41.5 41.0 39.8 38.0 35.0 32.2 29.7 
ISRAEL   32.9 33.0 33.0 32.1 30.4 28.8 28.1 
MOROCCO 46.5 45.7 43.8 40.7 37.3 34.6 32.2 
TUNISIA   45.3 43.0 41.3 39.4 36.7 32.6 28.2 
SOUTH AFRICA 42.0 41.8 41.2 40.0 37.8 35.0 32.8 
Mean   42.2 41.6 40.7 39.2 37.2 34.6 31.8 
Std Dev   4.2 3.9 3.4 3.3 3.8 3.8 3.2 
SKEWNESS -1.4 -1.4 -1.5 -1.3 -0.4 0.1 0.2 
(Table 3.5.6.2 – MENA Youth Dependency Population) 
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The youth dependence population trend for MENA region is similar to Latin American. It shows 
declining trend from 42 percent in the 1970-74 period to 32 percent in the 2000-2004 period. The decline 
reflected the same trend across all the countries in the region. The trend show lesser decline for the first 
20 years of only 2 percent decline to reach average of 39 percent in the 1985-89 period. After 1990 it 
then declined by 3 percent every 5 years before reaching lows of 32 percent in the 2000-04 period. This 
rapidity of the decline reflected the same across all the countries as SD remain relatively the same at 3 to 
4 percent from 1970 to 2004. 
ASIA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
INDIA   40.5 39.7 39.0 38.4 37.4 36.1 34.3 
S. KOREA   40.7 36.4 32.4 28.2 24.5 22.1 20.2 
PHILIPPINES 44.9 43.8 42.6 41.3 40.2 38.8 36.9 
INDONESIA 42.2 41.3 39.7 37.4 34.7 31.9 29.5 
THAILAND 43.7 41.5 37.5 32.5 28.8 26.4 24.2 
MALAYSIA 43.7 40.9 39.0 38.2 37.0 35.1 32.6 
SINGAPORE 36.4 30.4 25.9 23.0 21.7 22.2 21.1 
Mean   41.7 39.1 36.6 34.1 32.0 30.4 28.4 
Std Dev   2.8 4.5 5.6 6.6 7.1 6.8 6.6 
SKEWNESS -1.1 -1.3 -1.1 -0.7 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 
(Table 3.5.6.3 – ASIA PACIFIC Youth Dependency Population) 
The youth dependency for the Asian region also decreased at a faster rate. It started at 41.7 percent in 
1970 and ended up on average of 28 percent in the 2000-2004 period. However the SD is bigger than the 
rest of other regions, where it registered between 6 to 7 percent from 1980s onward. The reason was the 
youth dependency of Singapore in the same period was half compared to Philippines, i.e. Singapore was 
marginally above 20 percent whereas Philippines was more than 49 percent of the population.  
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3.5.7 Old Dependency Population 
LATIN AMERICA 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
ARGENTINA 7.4 8.0 8.5 8.9 9.4 9.9 10.2 
BRAZIL   3.7 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.6 5.2 5.8 
MEXICO   3.7 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.5 5.0 5.4 
CHILE   5.2 5.5 5.7 6.0 6.3 6.9 7.6 
VENEZUELA 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.9 4.3 4.7 
COLUMBIA 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.6 4.9 
Mean   4.4 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.5 6.0 6.4 
Std Dev   1.5 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 
SKEWNESS 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 
(Table 3.5.7.1 – LATIN AMERICA Old Dependency Population) 
On the other hand, the old dependency population, i.e. those above 65 age, for Latin American region 
was showing steady increased from 4.5 percent in the 1970-74 period to 6.4 percent in the 2000-04 
period. It is increased by 0.3 percent of total population every five years. SD remained the same 
throughout the years. 
MENA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
S. Arabia   3.1 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.8 
EGYPT   3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.8 4.1 4.4 
TURKEY   4.3 4.5 4.4 4.1 4.2 4.8 5.4 
ISRAEL   7.1 8.2 8.7 8.9 9.4 9.9 10.0 
MOROCCO 4.0 3.8 4.1 3.9 4.0 4.5 4.9 
TUNISIA   3.7 3.6 3.8 4.2 5.1 6.0 6.5 
SOUTH AFRICA 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.8 
Mean   4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.6 5.1 5.4 
Std Dev   1.3 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.2 
SKEWNESS 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.1 
(Table 3.5.7.2 – MENA Old Dependency Population) 
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For MENA region, the percentage remained stable between 4.1 to 4.3 percent in the 1970-74 period until 
1985-89 period before it began to rise. From 1990-94 period, it rose by average 0.3 percent every five 
years until reaching five percent by 2000-04 period. 
ASIA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
INDIA   3.3 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.4 
S. KOREA   3.4 3.6 4.0 4.6 5.3 6.4 8.1 
PHILIPPINES 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.6 
INDONESIA 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.6 4.0 4.5 5.1 
THAILAND 3.5 3.7 4.0 4.3 4.9 5.8 6.7 
MALAYSIA 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.1 
SINGAPORE 3.7 4.4 5.0 5.4 5.8 6.6 7.7 
Mean   3.4 3.6 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.9 5.7 
Std Dev   0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.3 1.8 
SKEWNESS 0.2 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.4 
(Table 3.5.7.3 – ASIA PACIFIC Old Dependency Population) 
Asian region old dependency population also shows steady increased. In 1970-74 period, it stood on 
average of 3.4 percent and nearly double thirty years later to 5.7 percent in the 2000-04 period. On 
average it increased by 0.3 percent every five years from 1970-74 period until 1985-89 period. Then it 
increased steeply by 0.8 percent beginning in the 1990-94 period until the 2000-04 period. 
3.5.8 Urban Growth 
LATIN AMERICA 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-2004 
ARGENTINA 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.3 
BRAZIL   4.4 4.2 3.5 3.0 2.4 2.3 2.1 
MEXICO   4.4 3.9 3.1 2.7 2.4 1.9 1.5 
CHILE   2.6 2.2 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.5 
VENEZUELA 4.5 4.4 3.7 3.1 2.8 2.7 2.4 
COLUMBIA 3.3 3.2 3.2 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.0 
Mean   3.6 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8 
Std Dev   1.0 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 
SKEWNESS -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.2 
(Table 3.5.8.1 – LATIN AMERICA Urban Growth) 
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Initially, there is a considerable migration to urban areas in the 1970‘s with average urban migration 
between 3.3 to 3.6 percent growths every year. It gradually declined to 1.6 to 1.8 percent by the 2000-04 
period. Similar declining trend reflects across most Latin American countries. Overall, the standard 
deviation is less than one percent across the countries, which reflects less variation in growth. However, 
there are two countries, which urban rates were lesser than the rest, i.e. Argentina and Chile. Both 
countries urban rates have been slightly over 2 percent in the 1970-74 period before declined marginally 
to 1.5 percent in the 2000-04 period. 
MENA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 
2000-
2004 
S. Arabia   8.2 8.1 8.0 6.4 3.3 2.6 2.5 
EGYPT   2.8 2.5 2.6 2.5 1.8 1.7 1.9 
TURKEY   4.4 3.5 5.3 4.5 3.0 2.5 2.2 
ISRAEL   3.8 2.8 2.2 1.8 3.7 2.6 2.2 
MOROCCO 4.4 4.3 4.1 3.7 3.2 2.3 1.8 
TUNISIA   3.6 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.3 2.1 1.6 
SOUTH AFRICA 2.4 2.3 2.8 3.4 3.0 3.2 2.4 
Mean   4.2 3.9 4.1 3.7 3.0 2.4 2.1 
Std Dev   1.8 1.9 1.9 1.4 0.9 0.5 0.4 
SKEWNESS 1.4 1.6 1.1 0.8 1.2 0.0 0.8 
(Table 3.5.8.2 – MENA Urban Growth) 
Similarly, MENA region recorded high urban rate in the 1970-74 period with an average of 4.2 percent 
in the 1970-74 period. It declined to 2 percent by 2000-04 period. Saudi Arabia recorded the highest 
migration rate of 8 percent rate from 1970 until mid 1980s as they developed new townships for new 
residents. By the middle of 1980‘s, there was declined in migration as lesser new township being built 
due to economic slowdown from the decline in oil price. By 2000-04 period, the average urban rate grew 
to 2.1 percent only.  
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Likewise, individual MENA countries growth rates remained close to the average regional rate with 
declining growth trend, except in South Africa, Egypt and Israel. South Africa growth trend reflects a 
mild hump-shape with lower rates at 2.4 percent during the 1970-74 period and began to increase to 3.4 
percent in the 1980-84 period before declined to 2 percent in the 2000-04 period. Meanwhile, Israel 
urban growth fluctuated between 2 to 4 percent growth due to never-ending regional conflict with its 
Middle East neighbours to building new settlements for their population. On the other end, Egypt growth 
rate remained relatively constant around 2 percent for the past thirty years. 
ASIA   1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-2004 
INDIA   3.7 3.9 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.3 
S. KOREA   5.6 5.0 4.3 3.5 2.4 1.5 0.9 
PHILIPPINES 4.2 3.8 5.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.4 
INDONESIA 4.7 5.0 5.2 5.0 4.7 4.6 4.1 
THAILAND 4.9 4.7 3.4 2.5 1.9 1.3 1.8 
MALAYSIA 4.8 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.8 4.7 3.8 
SINGAPORE 1.8 1.3 2.7 1.4 3.1 2.9 1.0 
Mean   4.2 4.0 4.1 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.5 
Std Dev   1.2 1.3 0.9 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.3 
SKEWNESS   -0.9 -1.5 -0.8 -0.9 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 
(Table 3.5.8.3– ASIA PACIFIC Urban Growth) 
Urban growth in Asia on the average declined slower than the rest of the region. It started on average of 
4 percent during the 1970-74 period before declined to 2.1 percent by the 2000-04 period. Its standard 
deviation across the countries on average is marginally over one percent from 1970 to 2000. The only 
figure that remained odd is Singapore as it not only an independent nation but also a major city in its 
entirety. There is no other location within Singapore that can be classified as rural. Therefore, its urban 
migration growth rate is in fact its country‘s population growth rate. The rates fluctuated considerably as 
the rate was a result of international migration, i.e. expatriates who seek work into the country. 
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India with the second highest world population shows the same declining trend as the region‘s average 
rate. Its average growth rate was between 3 to 4 percent from the 1970 until 1984 before declining to 2.3 
percent by the 2000-04 period. South Korea reflects dramatic decline as its migration rate was around 
five percent in the 1970-74 period before ending at one percent in the 2000-04 period. The dramatic 
steep decline was during the 1990s onwards as President Park introduced rural revitalizing programmes 
to discourage urban migration, especially young people from migrating into the cities. 
3.6 WITHIN REGION COMPARISON: SAVINGS AND OTHER DETERMINANTS 
After determining the average of each variable, these averages are then pooled together within 
each region as shown in each table below.  The reason pooling all the average variables together 
within the individual region is to observe in more detail their trends and trajectories for the past 
thirty years between 1970 until 2004. 
3.6.1 Latin American Region
LATIN AMERICA 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-2004
PRIVATE SAVINGS 21.2 21.0 19.6 18.7 16.9 16.7 18.6
GDP  Per Capita 3.1 2.1 -1.0 1.0 2.8 0.9 1.2
Credit to Private Sec 25.4 32.0 41.2 43.3 38.1 33.3 29.8
Inflation NA NA 85.8 259.1 379.0 20.4 9.0
Real Deposit Rate NA NA NA 629.8 370.9 1.4 3.2
Youth Dependency 40.9 39.1 37.2 35.7 34.1 32.1 29.9
Old Dependency 4.4 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.5 6.0 6.4
Urban Growth 3.6 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8  
Private savings and youth dependency in Latin America show declining trend from 1970 to 2004; in 
contrast, old dependency ratio shows increasing trend. GDP per capita growth rates do not show any 
observable correlations to saving as it reflects mild U-shaped trend. Credit to private sectors and inflation 
show a mild hump-shaped trend, which reflects both are closely correlated.  
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We can conclude from our observation regarding Latin American region that youth dependency with its 
declining trend has positive correlations with private savings, while old dependency with its increasing 
trend reflects negative correlation with savings.  GDP per capita growth, inflation, real deposit interest 
rates did not bear any significant correlations with private savings in Latin America. 
3.6.2 MENA Region
MENA REGION 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-2004
PRIVATE SAVINGS 21.4 17.3 14.7 12.3 13.8 13.5 14.6
GDP  Per Capita 4.9 2.6 0.4 0.6 1.5 1.7 2.3
Credit to Private Sector 31.9 39.5 48.7 55.5 56.7 66.4 71.8
Inflation NA NA 43.8 25.5 18.3 15.8 7.7
Real Deposit Rate NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Youth Dependency 42.2 41.6 40.7 39.2 37.2 34.6 31.8
Old Dependency 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.6 5.1 5.4
Urban Growth 4.2 3.9 4.1 3.7 3.0 2.4 2.1  
Private savings, inflation and youth dependency in MENA region shows similar declining trend from 
1970. It can be inferred that private savings is positively correlated with inflation and youth dependency. 
It corroborate with previous researches regarding inflation, in which inflation is a proxy to uncertainties. 
The more uncertain is economy, the higher will be aggregate savings, and vice versa. 
 In contrast, credit to private sectors and old dependency variables show an increasing trend. It can be 
inferred that increased in financial development is associated with lesser savings. The individuals do not 
have to save more in order to buy big ticket items, such as houses, cars and other lumpy goods as they 
are able to access loans from banks to purchase them. 
 With respect to the relationship between youth and old dependency, both variables should indicate 
inverse correlation with savings as postulated by LCH. Only youth dependency shows declining trend, 
which indicates positive correlation with savings. GDP per capita income shows declining trend from the 
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1970-74 period and recovering in later years, which also show similar trend to savings. It indicates that 
there is a positive correlation between both variables. 
3.6.3 Asia Pacific Region 
ASIA REGION 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-2004
PRIVATE SAVINGS 21.2 25.3 26.0 27.7 28.4 29.6 28.5
GDP  Per Capita 4.7 4.6 3.5 4.3 5.0 2.4 3.7
Credit to Private Sector NA NA 51.1 59.1 68.1 93.2 81.0
Inflation 12.5 8.7 10.6 4.8 7.0 6.9 3.4
Real Deposit Rate NA -1.3 -0.2 5.7 4.0 3.7 1.9
Youth Dependency 41.7 39.1 36.6 34.1 32.0 30.4 28.4
Old Dependency 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.9 5.7
Urban Growth 4.2 4.0 4.1 3.6 3.4 3.0 2.5
 
Private savings in Asian region indicate steady long-term growth trend. Similarly, variables such as 
credit to private sectors, and old dependency show increasing trend, while youth dependency similar to 
previous regions shows declining trend. 
The trend in Asia Pacific region indicates that financial development and old dependency have positive 
correlations with savings. In that sense, the financial deepening is associated with more people to invest 
into bank deposit, therefore increase savings. Similarly, it can be concluded that the increase number of 
retirees or old dependency population helps to increase savings. This meant that more retirees even 
though their income diminish, their expenses also decreased, but at greater rate than income. Hence, they 
would leave with surplus funds, which they would channel into savings. 
Youth dependency shows a negative correlation with savings, which corresponds with LCH. Increased in 
savings is associated with lesser proportion of youth dependency population throughout the years.  
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Inflation, GDP per income growth and real deposit interest rate do not show any obvious trend to link 
with savings. Therefore, we can conclude that Asian GDP per capita growth, inflation and real deposit 
interest rate do not have any significant correlations with private savings. 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
Based on the stylised facts, we have noted that most regions have experienced a decline in savings except 
the Asian Pacific region. Latin America experienced steady decline from average of 21 percent to 18 
percent from the 1970-74 period to the 2000-2004 period, respectively. MENA region also depicts 
similar declining trend from 21 percent in the 1970-74 period to 15 percent in the 2000-2004 period. 
However, Asia Pacific regions (excluding China) have experienced a steady increase in savings from 21 
percent in the 1970-74 period to 29 percent in the 2000-04 period. 
The gap in savings rate within the region is lesser in Latin America region than other regions as depicted 
in Table 3.6.1.1 with standard deviation of less than 10 percent over the thirty years. Among the top most 
consistent savers is Venezuela with average savings more than 20 percent. The lowest saver in the region 
is Columbia with average savings around 10 percent per year over the thirty years. 
 Asia Pacific countries show the largest gap within the region with standard deviations of more than 10 
percent (refer to Table 3.6.1.3). It is typified with low savers countries such as India with average savings 
of 10 percent compared to Singapore with average savings close to 50 percent. In MENA countries, the 
low savers are typified by Egypt with savings that is close to zero compared to high savers, i.e. Saudi 
Arabia with saving that reached more than 60 percent during the early 1970s but later declined as income 
from oil  declined (refer to Table 3.6.1.2). 
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The third stylized fact is that there is correlation among savings and income growth. From the average 
trend of the regions, Latin America and MENA shows the GDP per capita growth are also in the same 
declining trend as savings, which indicate significant positive correlation between both variables. (Refer 
to Section 3.7.1 and 3.7.2). However, Asia Pacific region shows no significant correlation as saving in 
Asia was showing increasing trend, compared to per capita income growth showing levelled growth 




CHAPTER 4    
PRIVATE SAVINGS AND DETERMINANTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although there are several theories that can be used to explain changes to savings, in this chapter 
we are using life cycle model (LCH) as an empirical framework for analysis across countries. The 
origin of Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH) can be traced back to the study of Modigliani and 
Brumberg (1954). 
The crux of the theory is based on the premise that the motivation for savings is driven by 
retirement.  An individual would maximize his consumption and savings based on present value 
of utility, which is constrained by ones limited budget. The limited budget is the summation of the 
current asset plus the present value of the lifetime income. It is therefore assumed that one‘s level 
of consumption is not based on the present income but depended on the expected future income. 
Households will save during the period of high income relative to the low consumption, and will 
support higher consumption via dissaving during periods of relatively low earnings.   
Further research modified this theory by introducing an early life-cycle stage of dependency, 
which would adversely affect savings. As such, based on demographic studies (Leff, 1969; Tobin, 
1967), human life cycle can be divided into three stages, i.e. young dependency, productive 
working life and retirement age.  The theory postulates that during young dependency and 
retirement age, consumption will exceed savings and savings mostly occurred during the 
productive working life. 
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One of the pioneers to use the LCH model in empirical testing is Tobin (1967).  He included per 
capita income, rates of interest and wealth in his model for testing the LCH theory on 1960‘s US 
data.  Subsequently, many other researchers have tested the theory by including macroeconomic 
and financial factors, as well as employing other econometric methodologies to analyse the effect 
of savings at the national or cross country level.  
Drawing upon established research, this study seeks to examine and extend the LCH theory by 
focusing on emerging market economies and incorporating the importance of institutional factors.  
The LCH theory has proven its resilience in empirical testing with regard to the inclusion of other 
determinants in order to analyse the effect on savings, regardless of the period of investigation or 
geographic location.  In extending this research, this chapter concentrates on using the traditional 
determinants of savings in testing the LCH model for specific emerging economies. Later,   in 
Chapter 6, we test the LCH model by including institutional factors.  
 There are 20 developing countries that are being sampled and they encompass various regions, 
Asia Pacific (Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and 
Thailand), Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela), Middle 
East and Africa (Egypt, Israel, South Africa, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia).  
4.2 METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
4.2.1 Methodology 
The methodology that will be used is the common panel least square method or Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) as proposed by Zellner (1962). It assumes that the average values of the variable are 
constant and across the entire sectional unit in the sample. The intercepts are assumed to be the same for 
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each variable and for each period. We also assume that the error terms among cross sections to be 
contemporaneously correlated as recommended by Zellner (1962). The idea behind the pooling method 
is to transform the model so that the error terms across the cross section are uncorrelated.  So, if the 
correlation between the error terms in the individual equation had been set to zero in the first place, the 
common panel least squares method is equivalent to running separate OLS on each equation. In addition, 
the correlations between error terms in different time periods are assumed to be zero.  
Arnold Zellner (1962) introduced SUR or Seemingly Unrelated Regression equation model. It is 
essentially a Generalised Least Squares (GLS) method applied to several equations, each with its own 
dependent variable. Even though the error terms can be highly correlated across the equations, Zellner 
realised that the estimation can be made efficient by combining them together into larger matrices, 
assuming that the exogenous variables in the different equations are not correlated. Binkley and Nelson 
(1988) assert that when correlation across equations exists, the combined estimation provides 
considerable efficiency when there is multicollinearity within the equation.  Zellner (1962) used data 
based on firm based investment collected yearly for 20 years. He shows that ordinary least squares (OLS) 
can be estimated in each individual equation, however, it is not as efficient as using feasible generalised 
least squares (FGLS) with its unique variance-covariance matrix form, which would be illustrated later.  
SUR model resolves problems regarding the suitability of parameter variation across two dimension 
matrix and appropriate stochastic specification by establishing a system of N equations containing T 
observations. For example, assume there is a set of N cross sections with T time series observations on 
each equation, i.e. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥 𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡                    i =1,......, m     Equation 4.1 
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Here i represents the equation number, and t = 1, …, T is the observation index. The number of 
observations is assumed to be large, so that  T → ∞, whereas the number of equations m remains fixed. 
Each equation i has a single response variable yit, and a ki-dimensional vector of regressors xit. If we 
stack observations corresponding to the i-th equation into T-dimensional vectors and matrices, then the 
model can be written in vector form as,       
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖+𝑢𝑖         𝑖=1,2,…….𝑁      Equation 4.2 
where yi and ui are T-dimensional vectors, Xi is T x Ki and 𝛽i  is a Ki-dimensional vector. 







𝑋1 0 … 0
















This can be written compactly as: 
𝑦 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜇 
The assumptions for vector of stacked disturbances are that E(μ) =0 and the NT × NT covariance matrix 
is comprised of N
2
 blocks of the form E(u
i
u′j ) = σijIT where IT is a T × T identity matrix. It is assumed  
that the T disturbances in each of the N equations have zero mean, equal variance, uncorrelated and that 
covariances between contemporaneous disturbances for a pair of equations are  nonzero but equal. Non-
contemporaneous covariances are all zeroes. The full covariance matrix of u is given by Ω = Σ ⨂ IT 
where Σ = [σij] is the N × N contemporaneous covariance matrix and ⨂ denotes the Kronecker product. 
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Each of the N equations is individually assumed to satisfy the classical assumptions. The individual 
equations are related, even though superficially they may not seem to be; they are only seemingly 
unrelated. The GLS (generalized least squares) estimator is readily defined as: 
𝛽 (∑) = (𝑋(∑  ⨂𝐼𝑇)
−1)𝑋−1)𝑋(∑  ⨂𝐼𝑇)
−1𝑦, 
With a covariance matrix given by 
𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝛽 (∑) = (𝑋( ∑−1⨂𝐼𝑇)
−1)𝑋−1  
GLS estimator is known to reduce OLS when there is an absence of contemporaneous correlations (σij = 
0, i ≠ j); or the same set of explanatory variables is included in each equation (X1 = X2 = . . . = XN).  There 
are many variants of this particular FGLS estimator. Obviously, OLS belongs to the class with ∑ = 𝐼𝑁, 
but Zellner (1962) proposed the first operational estimator that explicitly utilised the SUR  structure. He 
suggested an estimated covariance matrix calculated from OLS residuals obtained from 
𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑖+𝑢𝑖        𝑖=1,2,…….𝑁 , namely S = (sij) where sij = (yi − Xibi)′(yj − Xjbj)/τ and bi is the OLS estimator of βi. 
S has been referred to as the restricted estimator of Σ, but estimation can also be based on the unrestricted 
residuals derived from OLS regressions which include all explanatory variables from the SUR system 
Eviews provides ways to estimate pooled specifications that include AR terms. Eviews allow the 
residuals to follow a general AR process:  
𝑖𝑡 =  𝑝𝑟𝑖
𝑝
𝑟=1
𝑖𝑡−𝑟 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡  
for all, where the innovations are independent and identically distributed, assuming further that there is 
no unit root.  Autocorrelation coefficients are allowed to be cross-section. 
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𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝑋𝑗𝑡 𝑏𝑗 +  ∑ 𝑝𝑗𝑟 (𝑌𝑗 (𝑡−𝑟) − 𝑋𝑗 (𝑡−𝑟))
𝑝𝑗
𝑟=1  +∈𝑗𝑡         Equation 4.3 
It is assumed to be serially independent, but possibly correlated contemporaneously across equations.  At 
the beginning of the first iteration, Eviews estimated the equation by nonlinear least squares and uses the 
estimates to compute the residuals. It then constructs an estimate of ∑ using 𝑠𝑖𝑗 = (𝜖 𝑖 ′𝜖 𝑗 /max⁡(𝑇𝑖𝑇𝑗 )) and 
perform nonlinear GLS to complete one iteration of the estimation procedure. These iterations may be 
repeated until the coefficients and weights converge. 
The following is the empirical specification for the private savings behaviour: 
𝑃𝑅𝑉𝑆𝐴𝑉 =
𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑌𝑇𝐻_𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝐿𝐷_𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝐺𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 +   𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑅𝐷_𝑃𝑅𝑉𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝐿𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑃_𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿_𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝑆𝐻𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡+𝛽10𝑈𝑏𝑛_𝑔𝑕𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑇𝑜𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽12𝑅𝐸𝑀𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡           Equation 4.4 
i stand for the country, PRVSAV is the private savings at time t, YTH_DEPt is the young dependency at 
time t, OLD_DEPt is the dependency ratio at time t, Ubn_gtht is for share of urban population,  
GDPcap_GTHt is the per capita GDP growth at time t, GDPCAP is the initial per capita income at time t, 
CRD_PRVt is the domestic credit to private sector at time t, RDEP_INTt is for log of  the real deposit 
interest rate at time t,  L_INFLAT  is the log of inflation rate at t, GOV_SHRt is the government share of 
consumption over GDP at time t, OPEN is for trading openness at time t and TOT is for Terms of Trade 
at time t. The justification for incorporating these specific variables in the model is discussed below 





4.2.2 Data Description 
Private saving variable is extracted from Penn State database 6.1, where it is synonymously associated 
with current savings expressed as a percent of Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP). According to Penn 
World definition, current savings is taken after deducting government share (CG) and consumption share 
(CC) of Real Gross Domestic Product (CGDP) from 100 percent. The 100 percent represents the overall 
Real Gross Domestic Product. Hence, private savings or current savings includes the domestic savings 
held by the household and the private sectors only and excluding government savings. All the figures are 
in real terms, instead of nominal.  Meanwhile, Beck et al (2000) uses private savings based on gross 
national disposable income minus consumption expenditures, and gross public savings, based on current 
price. In consideration to the data availability for the years and countries to be examined, Penn World 
current savings is the closest proxy for private savings. 
Credit to private sectors over GDP (Crd_Prv) variable is used extensively by numerous studies to proxy 
for financial development, and to reflect the growth of financial intermediaries in a country (Beck et al, 
2000, Levine and Zervos‘ 1998, and Levine, 1998). It is measured as credits supplied by financial 
intermediary to the private sector divided by gross domestic product (GDP). Mainly it is used to measure 
the extent to which financial intermediaries are used by the private sectors as a source of funding. 
According to Beck et al (2000), this measure includes credit issued by deposit money banks and other 
financial intermediaries, but excludes credit to the public sector. It also measures the amount of savings 
that is channelled through debt-issuing financial intermediaries to private borrowers (Beck, 2003). 
Indirectly, it also depicts the way how the government conducts its monetary policy. The increase in the 
credit supply to private sector or money supply is an indicator of a loose monetary policy by the 
government either to resuscitate the economy or to sustain the current growth of the country. Vice-versa, 
the decrease in the credit supply to private sector is indicative of strict monetary policy pursued by the 
152 
 
government monetary agency to curb the rise in inflation from overheating the economy. Basically, the 
variable is chosen it is the closest substitute to reflect financial development of a country. Financial 
development is expected to improve aggregate savings and investments as it reduces information 
asymmetry, lessens transaction cost, improves corporate governance and assists in risk management 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998 and Wurgler, 2000). The data is obtained from WDI. 
Real per capita income growth (GDPcap_GTH) is used as a measure for the average individual income 
growth or the increase in the standard of living and the source is from World Development Indicators.  It 
is expected that real income growth would have significant outcome on savings as new cohorts or 
generations would have greater income than the previous generation, hence would contribute towards 
increased aggregate savings. Another measure is the initial level of GDP per capita income at constant 
2000 price (GDP_Cons) and it is in log form. Based on Solow growth theory, it is expected that newly 
developed countries with lower averaged income base would experience greater growth than developed 
countries due to growth convergence before all the countries reached steady state level. We would also 
attempt to find whether the same convergence phenomena occurred in savings for the countries since 
savings is considered as the endogenous variable.  
Inflation rate in the log form is used as a proxy to a precautionary measure in lieu of the level of the 
uncertainties of the economy (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1993). It is measured a change in Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). Real deposit interest rate is derived from nominal deposit interest rate minus the inflation 
rate and is also being transformed into natural log. Since real rate is hardly available across for most 
emerging economies, therefore, we decided to use the real deposit rate as it is the closest to the real 
figure.  
The demographic variable can be represented by two variables that are the young dependency period 
(YTH_DEP) and old dependency (OLD_DEP). Young dependency refers to the segment of individuals 
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who are between 0 to 14 years old, where an old dependency refers to the population over 65 years.  
Between these two periods, i.e. 14 until 65 years old, is the productive working age and the individual is 
expected to earn enough income to support their young dependents as well as preparing for old age. The 
young and old dependent population are expected to spend more, which will result dissavings. Increase 
in both non-working age population are expected to have negative effect on private savings. 
Another important determinant of private savings is government savings. Masson (1988) derives the 
government savings from tax revenues less transfer payments and government consumption. Due to the 
inconsistency and unavailability of the data in most countries, we decided to use government 
consumption or expenditure over GDP (Gov_Shr) as reverse proxy to the government savings. The data 
for government consumption derived from WDI, in which it includes all government current 
expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees). It also 
includes most expenditure on national defence and security, but excludes government military 
expenditures that are part of government capital formation.   
Based on Ricardian Equivalence (RE), government savings have a crowding out effect on private 
savings, or in another word, government savings have negative effect on private savings. Under the 
assumption of Ricardian Equivalence, it is expected the greater is current government consumption, the 
lesser will be the government savings, but the greater will be private savings due to the precautionary 
measures taken. In conclusion, increase in government spending would have contemporaneous positive 
effect on private savings. 
The growth of urban population (Urb_Gth) is considered being a major factor affecting private savings 
rate. According to Laoyza et al (2000), the increase in urban population tends to lower the overall 
aggregate savings as rural population in general tends to save more as precautionary motive since their 
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aggregate income is subjected to seasonality.  Urban growth variable is used as a measure of the increase 
of the country‘s population that have migrated from rural to urban area. 
Openness or trade openness is to measure the degree of trading between the host countries with the 
outside world. It measures the extent of trade liberalisation adopted by the country and the degree of 
integration into the global trading community. Trade openness is expressed in terms of export plus 
import as a percentage of GDP. It is expected to have positive impact on saving via increase in per capita 
income growth. 
Terms of trade according to World Bank Database is defined as the capacity to import less export of 
goods and services in constant prices. The population would expected to save more for precautionary 
purposes if the terms of trade is volatile and reflects unfavourably to the current balance of payment 
account. The terms of trade variable is expressed in terms of percentage of GDP.  The source is from 
WDI. 
Remit or workers‘s remittances represent current transfers by migrant workers and wages and salaries 
earned by non-resident workers. The data are reported by countries in their balance of payments (BoP). 
The numbers can be significant as few of the emerging economies, such as India and Egypt have sizable 
workers who work overseas and remit certain percentage of their salaries back home. With the increase 
of migration inflows, remittance source has become a source of capital inflows and income in many 
emerging economies. This would also be reflected in the money saved into the financial institutions. 
4.3 CORRELATION 
Table 4.1 identifies that there is significant and high negative correlation between private savings and 
youth dependency (51 percent). This is consistent with LCH theory which indicates there should be an    
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Table 4.1 CORRELATION MATRIX OF VARIABLES
Variable S_GDPGDPCAP_GTH LGDP_CAP OLD_DEP YTH_DEP CRD_PRV LG_RDEP GOV_SHR LG_INF UBN_GTH OPEN REMIT TOT 
S_GDP 1
GDPCAP_GTH 0.33 1
LGDP_CAP 0.36*** -0.09* 1
OLD_DEP 0.26*** -0.04 0.59 1
YTH_DEP -0.51*** -0.12*** -0.48*** -0.74*** 1
CRD_PRV 0.38*** 0.02 0.2*** 0 -0.22 1
LG_RDEP -0.13** -0.22*** 0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 1
GOV_SHR -0.2*** -0.19*** 0.49*** 0.15*** 0.04 0.14*** -0.02 1
LG_INF -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.04 -0.01 0.1* -0.22*** 0.53*** -0.17*** 1
UBN_GTH 0.09* -0.02 0.59*** 0.38*** -0.37*** -0.17*** 0.18***` 0.36*** 0.21*** 1
OPEN 0.39*** 0.11** -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 0.62*** -0.32*** 0.02 -0.44*** -0.34*** 1
REMIT -0.41*** -0.05** -0.43*** -0.21*** 0.25*** -0.12** -0.25*** -0.05 -0.13** -0.32*** 0.14*** 1
TOT 0.18*** 0 0.25*** 0.02 -0.12** -0.05 -0.06 0.08 0.02 0.22*** -0.07 0.09* 1
***significant at 1 % level
**   significant at 5% level






inverse relationship between youth dependency and private savings.  Per capita income has a high 
significant positive correlation with urban growth, at 59 percent, this indicates high level of 
population migrate to urban area and is associated with increase in per capita income. 
The variables with lower correlation rates with private savings, but yet have significant  
association at five percent level, are: credit to private sectors, per capita income, old 
dependency, real deposit rate and inflation. Only credit to private sector and per capita 
income level show positive correlations with private savings, which indicates that the 
increased in both variables are associated with the increased in private savings. In contrast, 
inflation, real deposit rate, remittance and government share of expenditure show negative 
correlations with private savings. The negative correlations signifies an inverse relationship 
that is higher, the lower is the savings rate. 
Other variables that have high significant correlations are credit to private sector with the 
openness variable. This indicates that the increased in money supply and financial deepening are 
correlated with the increased in the level of trade openness in these countries. However, there is 
negative correlation between youth and old dependency, signifying that the greater is the 
increase in the population of the young generation, the smaller is the percentage of the retirees, 
or old dependants. 
Another pair of variables that shows significant correlation is real deposit rate and inflation. In 
contrast, the inflation and openness ratio show negative correlation at one percent significance. 
This indicates that the greater is the trade openness, the lower is the inflation, which can be 
attributed to deflationary effect from imported goods that deflate the average prices of goods and 





4.4.1 Main Findings 
Each control variable is added into the right hand side (RHS) side of equation in order to observe 
the impact of additional exogenous variable on private savings.   In this standard pooling 
technique we assume all the intercepts are the same.  This pooled technique or Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimation was applied to minimize the cross-section 
heteroskediticity and contemporaneous correlation (Zellner, 1962).   
Based on Table 4.2, a one percent increase in GDP capita growth will result in significant 
increase of 0.4 percent in private savings, cēterīs paribus.  
A one unit increase in log GDP per capita income will result an increase of 6.7 percent increase 
in private savings. The results corresponds with previous studies (Masson ,1998; Schrooten and 
Stephen, 2005) indicating positive relationship between growth and savings. 
The demographic variables indicates that one percent increase in youth and old dependency 
population results in a significantly decreased private savings ratio of 0.95 percent and 3 percent, 
respectively. The F-test by normalizing the entire coefficient to zero rejects the null hypothesis 
that none of these variables have a significant effect on private savings. The F-test indicates that 
at least one of these variables has a significant effect on private savings. The Jarque-Bera 
normality test indicates that the p-value is less than 1 %, thus indicating the disturbances are 
normally distributed. 
From Column1 to Column 9, the per capita variables and the demographic age population 
variables show consistently significant effect on private savings.  As more control variables are 




TABLE 4.2  POOL REGRESSION ON PRIVATE SAVINGS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
C 15.73** 19.65** 58.41** 55.84** 24.08* 11.32** 16.77** 23.93** 16.14**
GDP per Capita 
Growth
0.42** 0.63** 0.42** 0.15** 0.27** 0.34** 0.22** 0.26** 0.16**
Log GDP per Capita 6.67** 7.5** 2.88** 4.14** 7.43** 8.65** 6.26** 5.33** 4.99**
Youth Dependency/ 
Pop
-0.95** -1.02** -1.63** -1.75** -1.07** -1.01** -0.85** -0.85** -0.78**
Old Dependency / Pop -2.83** -3.88** -1.92** -2.41** -2.47** -1.93** -1.52** -1.42** -0.65**
Credit to Private 
Sector/GDP
-0.02** 0.11** 0.1** 0.06** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** -0.01
Log Real Deposit Int -1.46** -1.29** -0.18 0.06 0.08 -0.26 -0.22
Log Inflation -0.29 -1.9** -1.37** -1.21** -1.37** -0.29
Goverment Share -0.99** -0.84** -0.8** -0.66** -0.63**
Urban Growth -0.08** -0.02** -0.03** -0.04**
Trade Opennes 0.04** 0.04** 0.12**
Remittance -0.73** -0.94**
Terms of Trade 0.34**
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.70 0.79 0.77 0.80 0.81 0.84 0.86 0.78
F-test 2130** 1460** 528** 471** 363** 361** 352** 389** 146**
Jarque-Bera 26.9** 23 4.8 5.8 14.8 13.9 15.6 14.4 8.1
***significant at 1 % level
**   significant at 5% level
*      significant at 10% level  
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indicate their effect became lesser as their impacts are being mitigated by other variables, albeit 
still remain significant.  
Private savings increase from 0.15 to 0.4 percent for every one percent increase in GDP per 
capita growth and likewise it increases from 5 to 6 percent for every one unit increased in log 
GDP per capita income as more control variables added. The positive sign in the initial per capita 
income also indicates that there is no convergence effect on savings in the long-term in contrast 
to neoclassical Solow model that hypothesises that there will be convergence effect on growth if 
empirically the initial GDP per capita reflect a negative coefficient. This result corresponds with 
previous result, i.e. Carroll and Weil, 1994; Masson et al, 1998; Schrooten and Stephan, 2005; 
and Aghion et al; 2006, which shows positive relationship between growth and savings as the per 
capita income growth increases, the population will save more. The results corresponds with 
LCH of the positive effect growth would have on the aggregate savings. 
Young and old dependency population variables indicate negative impact at five percent 
significance level as hypothesised by Modigliani (1986). The youth dependency population 
indicates that a one percent increase in youth population would result in a decrease of between 
0.8 to 1.4 percent of savings. Likewise, a one percent increase in old dependency population 
would result in decrease of between 0.6 to 4 percent in the population. The results reflect 
similarly the same by previous researchers, i.e. Soyoung and Jong-Wha, 2008; Schrooten and 
Stephan, 2005; Hondroyiannis and  Papapetrou, 2005; Higgins and Williamson, 1996; Kelly and 
Schmidt, 1996; and Fry and Mason 1982. Overall, their studies reflect that the greater the 
increase in youth and old dependency population, the lesser aggregate private savings. 
Furthermore, Higgins and Wiliamson (1996) studies indicate that the declining population of 
youth dependency have altered the general composition of the population that resulted in 
noticeable increase in overall savings and growth rates. Both variables exhibit the coefficients 
decreased further as the control variables such urban growth, trade openness, remittance and 
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terms of trade are added into the equation. This could be attributed to the increased in aggregate 
income contributed by these factors towards the economy, which caused diminishing negative 
impact the youth and old dependency have on savings. 
The equation in column 3 Table 4.2 indicates that credit to private sectors ,as a proxy for 
financial deepening, has a negative impact on privates savings, i.e.an increased by one percent in 
credit to private sectors ratio would decreased private saving by 0.02 percent, cēterīs paribus. 
However, as more control variables being introduced, the sign changed from negative to positive 
relationship with private savings.  By adding more controlling variables, i.e. inflation, 
government share of consumption, urban growth, deposit interest, trade openness, and 
remittance, the credit to private sector would significantly increase the aggregate private savings. 
This coefficient remain constant at 0.03 percent, which indicates that one percent increase in 
credit supplied has increased saving by 0.03 percent. The result concurs with the result of Cooke 
(2003) and Athukorala and Sen (2004) which shows positive relationship between increased in 
financial development with savings.  
However, it contradicts studies by Chin and Ito (2007) which show an adverse impact of 
financial development on savings. The better developed the financial system and infrastructure 
of a country, the lesser is the aggregate national savings. The rationale is that the population do 
not have to rely to accumulate substantially in order to purchase big ticket items. With the 
increased financial facilities, there are a lot of opportunities for them to pay off these items using 
credits offered by the financial institutions. This explains the reason that the greater opportunities 
offered by the financial sector in seeking credit, the lesser the public need to save considerably.   
However, with addition of terms of trade in Column 9, domestic credit to private sector variable 
become insignificant, which indicate to some extent the mitigating impact of terms of trade  
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The next variable to be incorporated is the real interest rate (row 7 in Table 4.2). Real interest 
rate shows that it has a negative impact on private savings in column 3 and also column 4 with 
inflation added in. As the real interest rate increases by one percent, the private savings ratio 
declined by 2 percent.  The negative relationship is indicative of income effect becoming more 
dominant than substitution effects as the increase in the interest rate would cause the private 
savings ratio to decline.  In another words, the higher is the real interest rate increases, the 
greater is the return earned by savers, however, the lesser is the savings as the extra income 
would induce them to spend more However, its impact has become insignificant as additional 
control variables from column 5 to 8 were introduced, i.e. government consumption, urban 
growth, openness, remittances and terms of trade. Therefore, it indicates that even though in 
Columns 3 to 4, the real deposit rate has shown significant effect on savings but its level of 
significance diminished rapidly as newer variables are introduced from Columns 5 to 9. The 
results of income effects reflect the previous findings by Loayza and Shankar (2000), in which 
increased in interest rates have negative impact on private savings in the short term. However, 
the results is in contrast with other results by Fry (1978, 1980), Gupta (1984), Ogaki et al (1996) 
and Masson et al. (1998) which found positive or substitution effect to be more dominant 
towards private savings. Other studies such as a Bandiera et al (2000) and Agrawal (2001) find 
there is no significant effect of interest rate on savings. As a result of vast disparity in the 
findings, the significance of interest rates and magnitude towards level of savings are still 
debatable depending on the size and type of sampling as well as the methodology being used. 
Inflation rate (row 8 in Table 4.2) used as a proxy for economic uncertainties does not show any 
significant effect initially in the regression. However, with adding more control variables in 
subsequent columns, i.e. government consumption, urban growth and remittances, inflation 
becomes significant but negatively related to private savings. The result indicates that one 
percentage point increase in inflation would cause decrease between one to two percent in 
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savings. It can be implied that the greater the level of uncertainties, the lesser will the household 
save, which is in contrast with the previous studies done by Hussein and Thirlwall (1999),  
Loayza and Shankar (2000), Chowdry (2004) and Hondroyiannis  et al (2005).  Their studies 
postulate that as the economic situation become more uncertain, the more likely the public will 
save more for precautionary sake.  On the other hand, the negative relationship could be 
explained by the money spent per item. The result of inflation has caused more money needed to 
be spent per item than previously, which caused increased in overall aggregate private 
consumption that translated into lesser aggregate savings.  
The equation in column 5 indicates government share of consumption variable has a significant 
negative impact on private savings rate. According to Ricardian Equivalence (RE) hypothesis, 
the lower is the government savings due to increase consumption or lower taxes, the higher is the 
private savings in anticipation of higher taxes that will be imposed in the future. The assumption 
is that the higher is the government consumption rate, the lower is the level of its savings. The 
result of the regression indicates reversal of the RE effect. As the result of Columns 4 to 8 
indicate, the negative effect of government consumption on private savings reflects that the 
higher is the government consumption (or lower government savings), the lesser is the private 
savings. The results indicate the contemporaneous positive relationship between government 
savings and private savings, instead of opposite relationship based on the RE hypothesis. 
According to Ricardian Equivalence, the higher is government spending, the lesser will be the 
contemporaneous private savings. Our results are similar to the findings by Dalmagas (1992), 
who found positive relationships between government savings and private savings.  However, 
the results are in contrast to other studies such as Chowdry (2004), Loayza and Shankar (2000),  
Edwards (1996), Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991), whose findings show negative relationship 
between government and private savings, which confirm with RE hypothesis . The result shows 
that household and private sectors in emerging economies do not increase their savings after 
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realising that the  government would be spending more. Apparently, there is non-Ricardian 
Equivalence effect as they do not anticipate that the government would increase future tax to 
finance the current expenditure. 
Urban growth (row 10 in Table 4.2) has a significant but negative impact against private savings 
as shown in the equation from columns 6 to 9. Based on column 6, for every increase of one 
percent in urban growth, there is expectation of a decrease of 0.08 percent in savings. However, 
as more control variables are added, the percentage of savings decreased to between 0.02 to 0.04 
percent  for every one percent increase in urban growth. This agrees with the analysis of Loayza  
et al (2000), which states that the rural folks tend to have higher savings than urban folks as 
future insurance as they have no other means to fallback  if they fall sick, inflicted with disease 
or retired. In contrast to the urban population, they have other means such as health insurance 
and pension scheme to support them if they experienced unexpected accidents. As a result, they 
require lesser savings to support them compared to rural folks. 
Trade openness (row 11 in Table 4.2) shows that it has positive impact on private savings as 
indicated in Columns 7 through 9. Based on column 8, 10 percent increase in trade openness 
contributed towards 4 percent increased in private savings. It denotes that the more open the 
economy, the lesser is import or export restrictions. This translates to greater capital mobility 
between countries, which affects income growth and savings.  
Workers‘ remittances (row 12 in Table 4.2) show a significant negative effect in the regressions 
in Columns 8 and 9. It shows the higher is the remittances the lower is the private savings.  It is 
in contrast to the general assumption that higher inflow of remittance into the country, the higher 
will be the private savings as more cash pouring in. The negative relationship indicate the 
inclination of the household to spend more on consumption in the expectation that more money 
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pouring in from remittance of their close ones working overseas. By spending more, it inevitably 
has dampening effect on the overall private savings. 
Finally, terms of trade shows a positive coefficient indicating that the more favourable the terms 
of trade for the economy, the more likely is the increase in the standard of living, which 
translates to an increase in savings. The result is in contrast to the findings by  Matsubayashi  
(2002) and Cashin and Dermont (2003) which found the relationship to be negative. The result in 
column 9 indicates that one percent increase in terms of trade would contribute to 0.34 percent 
improvement in savings. The results corresponds to the finding by Agenor and Aizenman (2004) 
and  Chowdry (2004) whose result indicates that a permanent increase in terms of trade has a 
significant positive impact on savings.  
4.4.2 ROBUST TEST 
The next step is to cluster all the twenty countries into three distinct regions, i.e. Asia Pacific, 
Latin America and Middle East and North Africa.  In this exercise, Asia Pacific comprised 
countries such as India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Singapore and South Korea. 
The Latin American countries consist of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Venezuela and 
Columbia. The analysis on MENA region also includes two outside countries, which are South 
Africa and Turkey since they are close to this region. The MENA countries include Tunisia, 
Israel, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. In another words, there will be cluster of six to seven 
countries in each region. 
4.4.2.1 Asia Pacific Region 
For SUR estimation on Asia Pacific we refer to Table 4.3. In Asia Pacific region, the first three 
variables, i.e. per capita income growth, level of per capita income and youth dependency have 




TABLE 4.3 POOL REGRESSION ON PRIVATE SAVINGS IN ASIA PACIFIC REGION
ASIA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
C -27.96*** 5.86 3.41 6.41 4.64 -3.17 -18.73 34.38*** 59.46**
GDP per Capita 
Growth
0.12** 0.29*** 0.45*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.46*** 0.47*** 0.16* 0.38***
Log GDP per Capita 8.08*** 6.37*** 6.19*** 6.24*** 6.35*** 6.84*** 9.94*** 5.32*** 1.66
Youth Dependency/ 
Pop
-0.25*** -0.79*** -0.7*** -0.74*** -0.68*** -0.65*** -0.71*** -0.96*** -0.98***
Old Dependency / Pop 0.95** -0.64 -0.83 -1.11 -0.96 -0.58 -0.69 -2.03*** -2.35***
Credit to Private 
Sector/GDP
0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.09***
Log Real Deposit Int 1.42*** 1.37*** 1.4*** 1.65*** 1.61*** -0.42 -1.06**
Log Inflation -0.46 -0.58 0.41 0.4 -1.48** -1.91***
Goverment Share -0.14 -0.06 -0.1 -0.06 0.3
Urban Growth -0.05*** -0.16*** -0.03 -0.02
Trade Opennes 0.03** 0** 0.04**
Remittance -1.51*** -1.58***
Terms of Trade 0.46***
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.92 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.9 0.94 0.92
***significant at 1 % level
**   significant at 5% level
*      significant at 10% level
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variables. Based on the coefficient, one percent increase in GDP growth in that regions would 
caused increase of between 0.16 to 0.42 percent in savings. Higgins and Williamson (1992) find 
that the economic growth and prosperity in Asia Pacific region have resulted in an increase in 
private savings. They attributed that the main factor on savings increased was attributed to 
decline in the fertility rate that led to the increased in the percentages of working aged 
population. Carroll and Weil (1994) study on 38 countries using Granger causality and find that 
increased in growth contributed towards increased in savings in Asia Pacific. 
Youth dependency shows negative sign which is consistent with our previous empirical testing 
on all countries. However, old dependency variable shows an insignificant effect from Columns 
2 to 7 even though the sign shows a negative relationship. The insignificance relationship 
between old dependency and private savings is an indication that there is mixed signal that the 
old dependency population has a significant effect on the aggregate private savings. Only in 
Columns 8 and column 9, with additional control variables, i.e. remittance and terms of trade 
(TOT), does the old dependency variable become significant again. The mix result indicates that 
old dependency population in Asia Pacific do not carry major impact in reducing the level of 
savings.  Modigliani and Cao (2004) find old dependency do not have significant impact on 
savings due to different spending habit. In China, the working aged group is supposed to take 
care of the elders, in another words, children are considered substitute as savings as they would 
support the parents when the parents grew old, hence the elderly is part of an extended family 
living together. The elderly do not spend greatly  as their needs are being cared for by their 
working children. 
Domestic credit to private sector and real deposit interest variable shows a positive and 
significant effect across the board, indicative of the dominant role that these two factors in 
affecting the population to save more. With new policies towards liberalisation and financial 
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deepening in the mid 1980s in Asia Pacific and early 1990‘s in India, the financial deepening 
effects  become more significant in influencing the levels of savings. Athukorala and Sen(2004) 
study on the determinants of savings in India and find that an increase in more bank branches as 
proxy for financial development has witness increased in savings. However, studies by Loayza 
and Shankar (2000) using credit to private sectors as proxy for financial development has found 
a negative relationship with savings.  Fry (1978, 1980) and Gupta (1984) studies in Asia find that 
interest rate has positive effect on savings. The study is also confirmed by other studies in other 
developing countries such as by Rossi (1988) and Balassa (1992).   However, Agrawal (2001) 
finds that an increase in savings in Asia was not mainly attributed by the interest rate effect, but 
rather from income growth effect. Other factors that played important role is the mandatory 
government retirement scheme that has spurred the saving growth.  
Inflation rate however shows a very mixed signal as from column 4 to 7 as it shows insignificant 
effect. Only after the addition of the terms of trade and remittance, i.e. in column 8 and 9, into 
the equation, does the inflation shows a significant negative effect.  The insignificant impact 
shows that even with the high inflation or low inflation, it does not seem to affect the behaviour 
of savings among Asia Pacific population. It can be explained that the average inflation rate in 
Asia Pacific region is not as high as the other emerging countries, e.g. Latin American countries, 
therefore it does not have significant impact on how the population saves. Other factors may 
have played a more significant role than inflation in affecting private savings. Findings by 
Agenor and Aizenman (2003) on non-oil countries in Sub-Saharan countries and others by 
(Corbo & Schmidt-Hebbel, 1991; Haque et al 1999; Masson et al., 1998) did not find any 
relationship between inflation with savings, in contrast to other finding by (Loayza  and Shankar 
,2000; Chowdry; 2004, and Hondroyiannis et al, 2005), which find significant positive 
relationship between both variables. 
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Government expenditure variable do not have any significant impact on savings as indicated 
from Columns 5 to 9. This seems to imply that private savings level was not influenced by 
government spending contemporaneously. The public are ambivalent of the effect the current 
government spending has towards increased in the future marginal tax that could adversely affect 
their disposable income. Since government spending does not have any impact, it also meant that 
government savings would have similar insignificant effect on savings or the non- Ricardian 
Equivalence effect.  It has a similar result as Haque and Montiel (1989) which found that 
government savings has an insignificant effect on private savings due to liquidity constraints on 
household budgets. 
Urban growth ratio has a negative significant impact on private savings as shown in column 6 
and 7. However, with the addition of two other variables, i.e. terms of trade and remittance, the 
negative effect of the urban growth against private savings was normalized and hence 
insignificant. Apparently, the terms of trade and remittance factor have become the dominant 
factor, which renders the effect of urban migration irrelevant in affecting private savings.  
Openness variable indicates that it has a positive and significant on savings, however the effect is 
barely significant as indicated by the coefficient value. The coefficient indicates that one percent 
increase in rate of openness would result in a decrease of 0 to 0.04 percent in private savings. It 
signifies that with increased in open market and the influx in the import and export volume, it 
has decreasing impact on savings of the populations. 
Workers‘ remittance has a significant impact on savings as depicted in Columns 8 to 9. 
Countries like India, Philippines and Indonesia have a significant number of workers working 
overseas, which would have major impact on savings. However, even though the workers‘ 
remittances have a significant impact, the signs are negative, which again implied that the 
household tend to spend more in lieu of expected inflow of money send by their close ones or 
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relatives.  Terms of trade shows a positive effect indicating that the impact of favourable terms 
of trade has an indirect impact in enhancing the level of private savings. The effect concurs with 
the results by Agenor and Aizenman (2004) and Chowdry (2004), which shows that permanent 
increase in terms of trade has a desirable affect on private savings.  
4.4.2.2 Middle East and North African Region (MENA) 
For MENA including Israel, Turkey and South African countries, per capita growth has mixed 
impact on private savings ratio as depicted in Column 3 to Column 9 in Table 4.4 Only in the 
first two columns, per capita GDP growth depicted a significant effect at one percent level while 
adding more control variable render the impact of per capita growth insignificant. This can be 
attributed to the inconsistent per capita growth experienced by countries like Morocco, Tunisia, 
Turkey and South Africa that may cause no real affect on behaviour of savings as compared to 
other factors that are more dominant. The finding corroborated with the results by Deaton (2000) 
who found that growth has a negative impact on savings. His findings led to his conclusion that 
the extra income earned by household was instead used for household expenses rather than 
savings.  However, per capita income in level form shows a significant and positive effect on 
private savings across even though additional control variables were added into the equation. 
The MENA youth and old dependency age groups population sizes have shown to have 
significant albeit negative impact on private savings. The empirical results re-confirm the LCH 
theory that the dependency age groups have a negative effect on private savings. 
Based on the coefficients, the results indicate that one percent increase in youth dependency 
population ages 15 and lesser would caused 1 to 2 percent decline in savings. Similarly, one 
percent increase in old dependency aged group by one percent would result 1 to 2 percent 
decreased in savings, ceteris paribus. In comparison with the coefficient of the other two 
regions, i.e. Asia Pacific and Latin American, the negative impact of youth and old 
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TABLE 4.4 POOL REGRESSION ON PRIVATE SAVINGS IN MENA REGION
MENA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
C -56.96*** -43.76*** 13.65 31.87*** 19.35 -19.72 -41.68 -60.25*** -30.07
GDP per Capita 
Growth
0.5*** 0.39*** 0.09 -0.15 -0.18 -0.21* -0.18 -0.12 -0.08
Log GDP per Capita 8.4*** 8.63*** 8.61*** 7.73*** 9.67*** 16.38*** 17.31*** 20.39*** 14.58***
Youth Depend/ Pop 0.21*** -0.03 -1.46*** -1.58*** -1.47*** -1.39*** -1.18*** -1.29*** -0.98***
Old Depend / Pop -0.61*** -0.83*** -2.06*** -2.03*** -1.95*** -1.54*** -1.28*** -1.86*** -0.56
Credit to Private 
Sector/GDP
-0.08*** -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.25*** -0.24***
Log Real Deposit Int -1.69*** -2.21*** -2.56*** -2.1*** -1.69*** -1.24* -0.83
Log Inflation -1.85*** -2.34*** -2.71*** -1.64** -1.35* -1.91***
Goverment Share -0.37** -0.4*** -0.58*** -0.62*** -0.4***
Urban Growth -0.23*** -0.28*** -0.27*** -0.23***
Trade Opennes 0.15** 0.1 0.02
Remittance 0.69 -0.06
Terms of Trade 0.57***
Adjusted R2 0.8 0.79 0.76 0.82 0.83 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.93
***significant at 1 % level
**   significant at 5% level




dependency on savings are greater. The coefficient of youth dependency population is more than 
twice the impact as compared to the other two regions, i.e. more than one percent impact on 
savings in MENA region as compared to lesser than one percent in the other two regions. Credit 
to private sectors also shows a significant impact on private savings. However, instead of 
positive signs, it is showing negative signs, which meant that the more financial deepening 
occurred in the countries the lesser is private savings. The underlying reasons of this 
phenomenon in contrast to the general conclusion is that most of these countries Egypt, Turkey, 
Tunisia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Israel  private savings ratio are showing either decline or 
unchanged trend since 1970.  Meanwhile, the domestic to private sector trend seems to move in a 
gradual upward trend and, henceforth explained the negative relation. It also indicates that with 
lesser financial development, and lesser opportunities to buy expensive items from banks credit, 
there is tendency for the MENA population to accumulate saving to buy these items by cash. 
The real deposit interest rate in MENA region, Turkey and South Africa indicates that it plays a 
very significant role as all the regressions across the table show significant but negative effect, 
except for the last column. With the negative effect, it means that the income effect indeed is 
more dominant than the substitution effect.  
The inflation also shows a significant negative relationship, which is similar to the main 
empirical findings of the 20 emerging economies. Compared to the result in Asia Pacific region 
in which its inflation do not have significant impact on savings, the inflation in MENA region 
shows significant negative relationship across all the equations. Descriptive-wise, on average the 
inflation rate in Asia Pacific is rather mild compared to the one experience in MENA region, 
includes Turkey and Israel reached inflation more than 100 percent. Given the high inflation 
prevalent in most of the period throughout the 1980s and 1990s, most of the population won‘t 
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have enough money from their income for savings as large proportion of their income is spent on 
daily expenses that have experienced rapid price increase. 
The MENA government share on consumption shows a significant negative impact on private 
savings. In other words, the more the government consumes and spends, the lower is the rate of 
private savings. The empirical result is in contrast to the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis, 
which stated that the more government spending, the greater contemporaneous level of savings 
by the public in anticipation of higher taxes by the government. The findings  depicts that the 
population are not too concern about the impending tax rise to their disposable income, in so 
much as they are willing to increase instead of cutting their spending. This also implies that the 
public could not grasp the impact of future marginal tax increase on their income to enable them 
to save more to compensate the loss of purchasing power. In other words, it is assumed that the 
public are imperfect to perceive tax implications of government spending (Seater, 1993).  
The urban growth variable show that is has a significant but negative impact on private savings 
on all regressions across the table, which is similar to the previous finding. In contrast to the Asia 
Pacific region, which depicts mixed results after adding more control variables, the MENA urban 
growth variable shows a definite negative impact at one percent significance level. On average it 
shows that with the increased of urban growth by one percent, it would result decline by 0.2 to 
0.3 percent of private savings, ceteris paribus. This confirms the finding by Loayza et al (2000), 
which found that urban workers tend to have lesser savings rate than its rural counterpart. 
Trade openness factor variable shows a mixed result as the regression in Column 7 shows it 
played a significant positive impact, however, columns 8 and 9, with additional control variables 
of terms of trade and workers‘ remittances, the result turns insignificant. The result indicates that 




The result from workers‘ remittances variable shows that it has insignificant relationship with 
private savings, which in contrast to the findings in the macro analysis in Chapter 2. Based on 
the macroeconomic analysis, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Egypt have relatively significant 
number of its workers migrated overseas to find employment, and hence the level of remittance 
receive should be high, which would have significant effect on the level of private savings in the 
country. The insignificance result may indicate that other variables such as government 
expenditure, inflation and urban growth might have a greater effect on private savings, in which 
it overwhelmed the effect of remittances.  
Terms of trade variable indicate positive significant result on private savings as the result is in 
the same as studies done by Agenor and Aizenman (2004) 
4..4.2.3 Latin American Region 
GDP per capita growth in Latin American countries, similar to MENA region, shows a rather 
mixed result on private savings as shown in Table 4.5. Columns one to three and seven to nine 
reveal that per capita growth has a significant positive impact on private savings, while column 
four to six, show the impact of per capita growth is insignificant. Based the trend analysis, most 
of the GDP per capita growths in most Latin American countries are either low or erratic, except 
Chile, from the middle 1970s until early 2000s. With the unpredictable and low income growth, 
it helps to explain the insignificant impact on savings as there is no surplus income to be 
allocated for savings. On the other hand, per capita income in the level form shows a significant 
positive affect towards the private savings as shown in the regression from column 1 to column 
9. The result is similar to the other two regions. It reconfirms the notion that the greater is the per 
capita income, the greater is its impact in positively affecting the rate of private savings. 
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TABLE 4.5 POOL REGRESSION ON PRIVATESAVINGS IN LATIN AMERICA REGION
LATIN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
C -71.76*** -79.64** -39.99*** -25.81*** 3.04 -53.02*** -79.09*** -84.09*** -61.18***
GDP per Capita 
Growth
0.09* 0.05 0.19* 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.1** 0.1** 0.13***
Log GDP per Capita 12.05*** 12.72** 6.51*** 8.33*** 7.64*** 11.16*** 11.15*** 11.43*** 9.28***
Youth Dependency/ 
Pop
0.04 0.08 -0.01 -0.67*** -0.88*** -0.33** 0.06 0.11 0.08
Old Dependency / Pop -1.56*** -1.55** 0.44 -0.84** -1.67*** -0.78** -0.07 0.11 -0.14
Credit to Private 
Sector/GDP
0.03** 0.13*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02**
Log Real Deposit Int -1.39*** -1.37*** -0.51** -0.92*** -0.57*** -0.59*** -0.75***
Log Inflation 1** -0.08 0.31 0.7*** 0.69*** 0.81***
Goverment Share -0.8*** -0.7*** -0.52*** -0.53*** -0.55***
Urban Growth 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06***
Trade Opennes 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.12***
Remittance 0.31 -0.47
Terms of Trade 0.33***
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.78 0.72 0.63 0.84 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.94
***significant at 1 % level
**   significant at 5% level





Youth and old dependency populations against private savings shows mixed results as half of the 
equations, from column 4 to 6, show significant negative result, while the rest, column 7 to 9, 
show insignificance. 
The mixed results might be indicative of the fact that other variables, e.g. trade openness, terms 
of trade, and real deposit rate play a more dominant effect, as shown in Columns 3, 7 and 9, 
which may render the youth dependency variable to become insignificant. Unlike Asia Pacific 
and MENA region, in which the youth dependency population shows negative significant 
impact on private savings, the mix result in Latin American region indicates that the youth 
dependency population played minor role in affecting savings.  
Credit to Private sector variable, similar to MENA and Asia Pacific region, indeed shows a 
significant positive impact towards private savings in all equations across the table. It shows the 
dominant role that financial deepening in affecting positively toward the behaviour of private 
savings. Major deepening and restructuring of the financial sector in the middle to late 1980s in 
most Latin American countries has positively affected the level of private savings. On average a 
one percent increase in domestic credit to private sector ratio would result in increased by 0.02 
to 0.13 percent of private savings.  
Real deposit interest rate also has a significant negative impact towards private savings. The 
empirical result is similar to other regions, in which all show a negative significant impact 
which can be attributed to income effect.  
Inflation affects on savings shows mixed result as equations in column 7 to 9, shows significant 
positive impact, while equations in Columns 5 and 6, show an insignificant effect. The mixed 
result is similar to Asia Pacific region, however, different from MENA region which shows 
significant positive results. The insignificant results show that inflation, as a proxy for period of 
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uncertainty, do not have any impact on savings. The population did not take precautionary 
measures to save more from high inflation that prevailed in Latin American from mid 1970s 
until middle of 1990s. Overall, the mix result indicates that inflation has an insignificant impact 
on savings and even if there is an impact, it would be only minor.  
Government consumption explicitly shows a significant but negative relationship on private 
saving, similar to MENA region, which is reverse to RE effect. Similar to previous explanation, 
either the public may not be fully aware that the impact of current government spending or they 
are just ambivalent to realise the effect it will have on the future tax increased due to the 
government overspending.   Dalamagas (1992) and Hondroyiannis (2005) find that in low debt 
countries, the government savings or surplus seem to have positive effect on private savings as 
the public are considered myopic and debt illusion.  
Urban growth and openness variables also show significant positive relationship towards private 
savings. Interestingly, unlike in MENA and Asia Pacific region, urban growth variable in Latin 
region shows a positive relationship, i.e. the greater the urban population, the greater are the 
savings. Latin America openness variable shows unequivocal significant positive relationship 
towards private savings. One percent increase in openness resulted in 0.12 to 0.13 percent 
increased in private savings over GDP.  Compared to Asia Pacific region, the Latin  openness 
coefficient is 3 to 4 times bigger than Asian, which imply that increased in one percent of 
openness ratio, would have 3 to 4 times bigger impact towards private savings in Latin America 
than Asia Pacific region. 
Workers‘ remittances variable, like in MENA region, does not indicate any significant impact 
on private savings.  Unlike the MENA region, the percentage of workers‘ remittances to GDP in 
Latin America is too small to have a significant impact on private savings. Finally, terms of 
trade shows a positive significant impact towards private savings, similar to other regions. It is 
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also similar with the finding from the main, in which a one percent increase in terms of trade 
would result 0.34 percent increase in private savings. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
Based on the main results for all the emerging economies, the GDP growth, and financial 
development variable, i.e. credit to private sector, show a significant positive relationship with 
savings, albeit their coefficient diminishes as more variables added.  Youth and old dependency 
variables show a negative effect on savings in all the equations, which support most savings 
theories. Real interest rate became insignificant as the equation was augmented which indicate 
lesser role it has on savings when other economic factors are involved. Urban growth has shown 
a negative impact indicating that as more migration the lesser will be the rate of savings. The 
trade openness and terms of trade indicate that both have significant effect, which meant that as 
the country reaps benefits from increased trading and improved terms of trade, the population 
would experienced an increase in real income, that would translate into improved savings. 
However, inflow remittance shows a negative impact on savings indicating that the extra 
income earning are being channelled more into consumption rather than savings. 
By applying a similar test on the Asia Pacific region, the results are mostly similar to those  
tested on all 20 emerging economies, i.e. Table 4.2, except for old dependency which shows 
mixed results with several equations show insignificance effect, while others show negative 
effect on savings. According to Schultz (2004), the elderly in the region tend to stay together in 
an extended household and those over 59 tend to have greater wealth and save more.  
Government share, or government expenditure over GDP shows an insignificant effect  on 
private savings. It indicates that the population are ambivalent on the increased spending by the 
government, therefore they are unconcerned about the possibility of increased taxation in the 
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future. Remittance inflow variable shows a negative impact on savings, which meant that 
aggregates savings decline as remittance increased.  
However, in the MENA region, the GDP per capita growth, trade openness and remittances do 
not show any significant effect on savings.  It seems that trade openness and remittances have 
not been able to generate enough surplus income to positively affect the saving‘s level. GDP per 
capita growth shows a positive effect on savings as similar to the Life Cycle Hypothesis (LCH).  
However, youth and old dependency show a clear negative impact on savings in all equations as 
expected according to LCH.  Credit to the private sectors also shows a negative impact, which 
indicates the increased in financial deepening caused lesser savings as more opportunities 
available to obtain loans to purchase big ticket items.  Inflation and real deposit interest rate also 
show a negative impact indicating the higher the inflation or greater is the economic 
uncertainties, the lower is the level of population savings. The negative impact of interest rates 
indicates the income effect as increase in savings cause people to spend.  Urban growth also 
shows a negative effect as increase in urbanization of areas and migration to urban areas caused 
people to save less.  This is due to social insurance available in urban areas, such as pension 
funds and hospitalization plan that resulted people to save less for contingency. An increase in 
government share or expenditure also has a negative impact on savings, which also implies that 
government savings have a positive effect on private saving. In another words, it is reverse to 
the Ricardian Equivalence effect. Finally, terms of trade shows a positive impact on savings as 
the more favourable the terms of trade, the lesser to pay for imports in real terms, which 
contribute to surplus income that can be set aside for savings.  
 In Latin America region, the youth dependency shows mixed results as more variables being 
augmented into the equation, the relationship become insignificant. Like the MENA region, 
Latin America inflow remittances show an insignificant relationship with savings. Unlike other 
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regions, urban growth in Latin America has a positive effect on savings, which indicates that 
with an increase in income the greater is the propensity to save.  
Overall, the results from SUR regressions indicate that the macroeconomic variables, i.e. 
GDP growth, per capita income, inflation, real interest rates, trade openness and terms of 
trade have mostly shown significant effects on the level of private savings for the emerging 
economies. In contrast, the demographic variables, i.e. old and youth dependency ratios, 
show mixed results.  For example, old dependency shows an insignificant effect on savings 
in Asia-Pacific region, , while in Latin America it is the youth dependency that shows an 
insignificant effect on savings. Furthermore, urban growth in Asia Pacific and MENA region 
shows a negative relationship, while in Latin America it shows a positive impact on savings.  
Apparently, Asia Pacific and MENA regions have experienced increased in savings, in 
contrast to decline in savings in Latin American Region, due to greater migration to urban 
areas. The inflow remittance variable shows an insignificant effect on savings in MENA and 





CHAPTER 5    
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH: A COINTEGRATION 
ANALYSIS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Most of the studies on savings incorporate financial development and growth. However, the 
main question remains: what is the relationship between financial development and income 
growth or level of income as these variables relate to savings? Are there any indirect linkages 
between financial development and income or growth on savings? In other words, there can be 
two scenarios:  (i) Does financial development affect savings indirectly via its effect on income 
level or (ii) Does income level affect savings indirect via its effect on financial development? 
Therefore in this chapter, we would analyse the relationship between financial development and 
its relationship with level of income in the context of selected emerging economies. 
There have been numerous studies that have been conducted on financial development and 
income growth relationship. Different studies involved different sample size of countries, and 
different types of methodology. Some of the studies conducted analyse the relationship between 
financial development and financial are as follows:  
5.2 METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
Our objective is to find short term and long term directional causality between financial 
development and income growth in order to understand which variables take precedence first. 
We would apply the Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) and Error Correction model (ECM) to 
determine the short and long-term causality effects. Before proceeding with this model, we have 
to identify the integration order of each variable as we need to know whether it is of the correct 
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order of integration and not spurious to the model. We will use credit to private sector over GDP 
and log GDP per capita income as a proxy for financial development and income growth, 
respectively.  Both variables are taken from World Development Indicators (WDI). 
In order to use the VAR method, both variables need to be transformed as stationary processes, 
otherwise, the result would not be meaningful. A non-stationary variable or order of integration 
one can be transformed into stationary variable by first differencing. However, by differencing, 
according to Granger (1986), the long-term trend within the data would be cancelled out and 
only the short-term result would show.  
5.2.1 Unit Root Test 
We proceed to test the variables to determine whether they are stationary or nonstationary (unit 
root) variables by finding out the order of integration.  The data is considered nonstationary if it 
is spurious or non mean reverting when a shock is applied on it.  After the variable is differenced 
by k times before it becomes stationary then it is said to be integrated to the order of k or I(k).   
The work on unit root testing in times series data was first pioneered by Dickey and Fuller 
(1979, 1981), who derive a T test (known as the DF test) based on the model which can be 
written as  ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝜔𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜇 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 . The test assumes that yt is a random walk and is not 
autocorrelated.  If yt is found to be autocorrelated, the solution is to apply ρ lags on the variables 
that can lead to the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.   
The augmented Dickey Fuller model can be written as follows: ∆𝑋𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑇 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡−1 +
∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 ∆𝑋𝑡 + 𝑡 .  It is important to apply the correct number of lags as too few lags will not 
remove all the autocorrelation, thus skewing the results. On the other hand, too many lags will 
increase the coefficient of standard of errors due to the increase in the degrees of freedom, which 
will inevitably reduce the test power. This will then result in the null hypothesis being rejected 
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less frequently. These tests are conducted on the presumption that the null hypothesis has unit 
root in the data series and the alternative is stationary.   
The other common unit root test is the Phillips-Perron test, which is similar to ADF but with 
automatic correction to allow for autocorrelated residuals (Phillips and Perron, 1988). It 
incorporates a nonparametric adjustment to the t-test to deal with autocorrelation when the data 
is not AR(1).  Its null hypothesis is similar to that of the ADF test with unit root present in data 
series against the alternative which has none.  
Since this study is on panel data, the appropriate test for the order of integration needs to be 
rooted within the panel unit root testing model rather than a single unit root test. According to 
Baltagi (2008), the panel data unit root test gives a better estimate for the cross-sections (N) and 
time (T) dimensions as both of them tend asymptotically towards infinity. The panel estimator 
tends to average across the individuals and the power of panel unit-root test increases with an 
increase in N. The increase in power is more robust than the single test applied on DF and ADF 
tests for small samples. 
Levin and Lin (LL, 1992) developed a unit root test based on the following equation. ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 =
𝑎𝑖 + 𝜌𝑌𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 ∆𝑌𝑖 ,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 ,𝑡 . The model allows for two fixed effects in the 
same equation, denoted by ai  and θt, which are unit specific fixed effects and unit specific time 
trends. The unit specific fixed effect is important as it allows for heterogeneity across all units of 
the panel as the coefficient of the lagged Yi is restricted to be homogeneous across all units of the 
panel. LL presumes that each cross section is independent and LL test is assumed to reflect a 
pool DF and ADF test.  
The LL null hypothesis is the variable contains unit root against the alternative without unit root. 
According to Baltagi (2008), LL‘s assumption is based on the independence of the units across 
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sections and is rendered irrelevant if cross sectional correlation is present. O‘Connell (1998) also 
shows that LL suffered from significant reduced size distortion due to contemporaneous cross 
correlation among the error terms.  
Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997) (IPS) extended the LL test by allowing for heterogeneity on the lag 
coefficient of Yi, t-1 variable. The test is based on averaging the individual unit-root test statistics 
which is basically averaging the individual ADF t-statistic.  It allows for separate estimation of 
each cross section by  estimating disparate  parametric values for  the residual variance and the 
lag lengths.  The model is specified as follows: ∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖𝜌𝑖𝑌𝑖 ,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜑𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝛿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 +
𝜇𝑖 ,𝑡 .  
The null hypothesis is the same as LL test where all series are stationary, however, the 
alternative is only a certain fraction of the series is stationary as opposed to LL alternative test, 
which all series are stationary. According to Baltagi (2008), if there is large enough lags in the 
ADF regression, the IPS t-test performs better than LL test. 
Maddala and Wu (1999) proposed a Fisher-type test, i.e. P = −2 ∑ ln pi
N
i=1  . It combines the unit 
root test from N unit root tests done on N cross sections in the panel data. The test has χ2 
distribution with 2 degrees of freedom as Ti →∞ for finite N. The Fisher test unlike IPS test does 
not need to have a balanced panel.  Different lag lengths can be applied with the independent 
ADF regressions and can be used with other unit root tests. Maddala and Wu (1999) find that the 
Fisher test with the bootstrap based critical values performs the best and is the preferred choice 
for testing nonstationary and also in testing for cointegration in panel data. Both of them find that 





5.2.2 Vector Autoregressive (VAR) Method 
Sims (1980) criticised the structural modelling approach for predetermining the variables into 
endogenous and exogenous and impose unnecessary restrictions for identification. Instead, VAR 
model is most suitable to forecasting time-series under the assumptions that all the variables are 
endogenous. Accordingly, if two variables are not cointegrated than the conventional Granger 
causality test are valid to be used within VAR framework. However, if the two variables are 
cointegrated than the VECM framework can be applied to study the long term relationship 
between two variables. 
VAR equation can be illustrated as below 
  yt = a0 + a1yt−1 + a2yt−2 + γ0xt + γ1xt−1 + ⋯.     Equation 5.1
   
𝑥𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛽1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑦𝑡−2 + 𝜌0𝑥𝑡 + 𝜌1𝑥𝑡−1 + ⋯    Equation 5.2 
 
It is assumed that yt is affected by the past values of xt and yt. At the same time, xt is affected by 
the past values of the yt and xt series. Based on the above equation, by controlling past x and past 
y, it help to forecast future y. Accordingly, it can be termed that ―x Granger causes y‖ if past x 
and past y is useful to predict y. Generally it is said that x Granger causes y if past x is useful in 
addition to past y for predicting yt. However, it has nothing to say about contemporaneous 
causality between y and x, or it does not allow us to determine whether xt is an exogenous or 
endogenous variable in an equation relating to yt to xt (Wooldridge, 2005). There are several pros 
and cons in applying VAR to determine causality. The advantages are: 
i. You need not specify a variable is exogenous or endogenous beforehand. It also does not 
require for restrictions to be imposed as arbitrary restrictions can cause some vital 
information to miss out in the mist of regressing the equation 
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ii. VAR allows various forms of variables into the equation and not solely depended on its own 
lag. VAR equation is expected to be overly parametized, in which most of the coefficient 
would be removed from the model.  
iii. Each equation can be estimated without bias by using OLS as the variables are 
asymptotically efficient and considered stationary.  
While the disadvantages are: 
i. VAR tend to rely less on underlying theory to provide specification to the equation. There is 
tendency for data mining as researchers tend to achieve results that are congruent to his 
earlier expectations.  
ii. If there are k equations, and each with m variables and with n lags for each m variables, then 
there will be (k + nm2) parameters to be estimated. There will be loss of degree of freedom 
as too many lags specified, especially on small size samplings. It would also result in large 
standard errors and wide confidence intervals for the specified coefficients.   
iii. The VAR in its true form should be limited to stationary variables. However, if the variables 
are not stationary, there are those who believe it should remain at its level form and not 
subjected to any differencing. They argue that any actions to difference would erase the long 
term information imbedded in the variable and maintain that it should consist of 
combinations of level and first difference forms.  
5.2.3 Cointegration Method  
VAR using Granger causality only shows short-term bivariate causality effect among the 
variables. Only the variables, which are originally are stationary without any differencing will 
show long term bivariate causality. In order to test the long term correlation between non-
stationary variables, they have to be subjected to the test of cointegration. Then error correction 
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model will be used to identify the long-term direction of the causality by applying the necessary 
restrictions.  
Two types of cointegration methods can be used. One is the Pedroni- Granger based 
cointegration method and the more rigorous is the Johansen method. If there is cointegration, 
then the next step is to proceed to identify the exogeneity of the variable by using the Johansen 
error correction model. 
5.2.3.1 Pedroni Cointegration Method 
Pedroni (1997, 1999 and 2000) propose several tests for cointegration in panel data, which 
allows extensive heterogeneity. Pedroni‘s test allow for multiple regressors for the cointegration 
vector to vary across different sections of the panel and also for heterogeneity in the errors across 
cross sectional units.  The panel regression model can be written  
           𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡+ ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑖𝑋𝑚𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1 +   𝜇𝑖𝑡                        Equation 5.3 
Seven different cointegration statistics are proposed to capture the within and between effects in 
his panel and his tests can be classified into two categories. The first category includes four tests 
based on pooling the ‗within‘ dimension. The within estimator shows the variation from 
observation to observation within a single individual. 
The null hypothesis associated with the first four statistics is that ρi = 1 against the alternative 
that ρi ≤1 for all cross-sectional units of the homogeneous panel. Specifically, the four statistics 
test the null hypothesis of no-cointegration for all cross-sectional units versus the alternative of 
the existence of cointegration for all cross sectional units.  
The second category includes test based on pooling the ‗between‘ dimension in which averaging 
the AR coefficients for each member of the panel for the unit root test on the residuals. The 
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between or group statistic indicate the variation in observation between individuals or samples.  
The null hypothesis tested is the same as in the previous case while the alternative is equal to ρi 
<1 for all cross section so it permits distinct slope values or heterogeneity in the panel. 
Specifically, Pedroni base his test on the average of the numerator and denominator terms rather 
than the whole average of the statistic .Pedroni (1999) derived asymptotic distributions and 
critical values for several residual based tests of the null of no cointegration in panels where 
there are multiple regressors.  
5.2.3.2 Johansen-Jesulius (JJ) Cointegration Method 
JJ procedure commands several advantages over Eagle-Granger cointegration mainly i) unlike 
Eagle-Granger cointegration, JJ will  test to discover several cointegrating relationship rather 
than constraining to only one (ii) JJ assumes that every variables is endogenous , unlike Eagle-
Granger procedure that is sensitive to the choice of variable selected to become the dependant 
variable.  JJ provides proper statistics to test hypothesis for the number of cointegrating vectors 
and tests of restrictions upon the coefficients of the vectors. 
 For a single time series with multiple variables, the JJ method is an ideal test to determine the 
number of cointegration involved prior to using vector error correction (VECM) model to 
determine the direction of the long run causality. The error correction model implies that changes 
in the dependent variable as a deviation from the long run equilibrium depend on the 
cointegration relationship. The Johansen method estimates the number of cointegrating as shown 
in the following vector autoregressive model which involves the identification of rank of n by n 
matrix . 
Δ𝑋𝑡 = Γ1Δ𝑋𝑡−1 + ⋯ + Πn−1ΔXt−n+1 + Πxt−n + μt + βzt + ϵt                     Equation 5.4 
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Where Xt is a column vector of the m variables, Γ and Π represent coefficient matrices, and  △ is 
difference operator.  Two methods to determining the number of cointegration relations, which 
involves estimating the matrix Π, with n x n  matrix with r rank.  One method is test the null 
hypothesis that Rank (Π)= r against the hypothesis that rank is r+1.  
The test is based on the characteristic roots (called eigenvalues) obtained from the estimation 
procedure. Where r is the number of cointegrating vectors under the null hypothesis and λ is the 
estimated value for the ith ordered eigenvalue from Π matrix. The eigenvalues , λ, are arranged 
in ascending order λ1≥ λ2≥.... ≥λg. . The real test to calculate the number of cointegration or the 
rank of the Π matrix is to examine the number of eigenvalues or the characteristic roots. The 
rank of matrix is based on the number of eigenvalues that are different from one. The 
eigenvalues, λ, will be largest when it is close to one while λ, will be smallest when it is closer to 
zero. 
 If Π has rank of zero, no stationary relationship is established or no cointegration. All the 
characteristic roots will equal zero, therefore (1 − 𝜆𝑛 ) will equal to 1 and since ln(1) =0 , there 
will no cointegration.  If the variables are not cointegrated, the rank of Π will not be significantly 
different from zero.  Intuitively the larger is λ, the larger and negative will be ln(1-λ) and hence 
the larger will be the test statistic. Each eigenvalue will associate with different cointegrating 
vector, which will be eigenvectors.  A significantly non-zero eigenvalue indicates a significant 
cointegrating vector. 
The following test statistic named, maximum eigenvalue or λmx is used to test the number of 
characteristic roots are significantly different from zero.: 
  𝜆𝑚𝑎𝑥  𝑟, 𝑟 + 1 = −𝑇 ln⁡(1 − 𝜆𝑟+1 )     Equation 5.5 
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The second method is the trace statistic. Λtrace is a joint test where the null is that the number of 
cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r against an unspecified or general alternative that 
there are more than r.  
When 𝜆 𝑛 = 0, then the trace statistic  is equal to zero. The nearer is the characteristic roots to 
unity, the more negative is the ln (1 − 𝜆𝑛 )and the greater is the trace statistic. The trace statistic 
can be shown as below: 
𝜆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒   𝑟 = −𝑇 ∑ ln⁡(1 −
𝑔
𝑖=𝑟+1 𝜆𝑖)                                                           Equation 5.6 
If the test statics is greater than the critical value from Johansen‘s table, reject the null hypothesis 
that there are r+1 (for 𝜆trace) or more than r(for 𝜆max).  If  Π has zero rank, then by analogy to the 
univariate case, ∆Xt depended only on ∆Xt-n, so that there is no long run relationship between 
elements of Xt-n. Hence there is no cointegration. For 1<rank(Π)<n, there are r cointegrating 
vectors 
5.2.4 Error Correction Method (ECM) 
 If the rank of Π is greater than zero, than Π may decomposed into two matrices α and β in such  
that Π = αβ
‘,
 with the  dimension (n x m) and (m x n) , respectively, i.e. 
Π = 𝛼𝛽′     Equation 5.7 
As noted Π=αβ
‘
, where α represents the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium. It represents the 
feedback effect and how much of the disequilibrium is corrected, i.e. in which the extent to 
which any disequilibrium in the previous period effects and adjustment in ΔYt..  β is a matrix of 
long run coefficients. Long run that is employed in econometrics implies that the variables have 
converged upon some long-term values and are no longer changing, thus yt=yt-1=y; xt=xt-1=x. 
Hence all the difference terms will be zero , i.e. ∆yt=0, ∆xt=0, and thus everything in the 
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equation cancels.  The error correction model has the ability to converge the x and other 
variables towards equilibrium relationships, as shown below: 
△ 𝑌𝑡 =∝0+ 𝛾0𝑋𝑡 + 𝜋 𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡                               𝐄𝐪𝐮𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝟓. 𝟖 
Where: π<0, If 𝑦𝑡−1 > 𝛽𝑥𝑡−1, then y in the previous period has overshot the equilibrium; because 
π<0, the error correction term works to push y back toward the equilibrium. 
If there is r≤(n-1) cointegration vectors, then this means that the last (n-r) column of α are zero,. 
In order to determine how many r≤(n-1) exist in β, is similar to testing which column of α is 
zero. 
The effect of error correction can also be illustrated from the re-parameterization of the 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL).  
Let: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛾0𝑥𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡           Equation 5.9 
In which the residual 𝜇𝑡 = 𝑖𝑖𝑑 0, 𝜍
2  and γ0 denotes the short run change of Yt due to changes in 
Xt. The long run model at its equilibrium is when  
𝑋𝑡
∗ = 𝑋𝑡 = 𝑋𝑡−1 = ⋯ = 𝑋𝑡−𝑝  .            Equation 5.10 
Let equation 5.9 be transformed based on assumptions of Equation 5.10 
𝑌𝑡
∗ = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑌𝑡
∗ + 𝛾0𝑋𝑡
∗ + 𝛾1𝑋𝑡
∗ + 𝜇𝑡  
𝑌𝑡
∗ 1 − 𝑎1 = 𝑎0 +  𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑋𝑡









∗ + 𝜇𝑡  
𝑌𝑡
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑡
∗ + 𝜇𝑡         Equation 5.11 
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Therefore, the elasticity of the long term equilibrium state is represented by  β1 or 
𝛾0 + 𝛾1
1 − 𝑎1
 . However, the assumption was that a1 is less than 1 in order for the short-run to 
converge towards long run trend. 
Similarly, error correction model can be derived from same ARDL equation 5.9. Let:  
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛾0𝑥𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡        
𝑌𝑡 − 𝑌𝑡−1 = 𝛾0𝑋𝑡 − 𝛾0𝑋𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑎1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑎0 + 𝛾0𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑇−1 + 𝜇𝑡   ( By adding 𝑌𝑡−1 
and 𝛾0𝑋𝑡−1 into the equation) 
△ 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛾0 △ 𝑋𝑡 −  1 − 𝑎 𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑎0 + (𝛾0 + 𝛾1) 𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡   






𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡  













 and 𝜋 = (1 − 𝑎1); hence 
△ 𝑌𝑡 = 𝛾0𝑋𝑡 − 𝜋 𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡          Equation 5.13 
The ECM captures both short-run as well as the long run effect. The short run effect is captured 




contains all the long term relationship. All the figures are assumed to be stationary in ECM, 
therefore the standard OLS can also be applied to the equation. On the other hand, as long as Yt 










When the terms are not at equilibrium, the coefficient 𝜋 𝑜𝑟(1 − 𝑎1) will act to revert back to its 
equilibrium. 𝜋 𝑜𝑟(1 − 𝑎1).The model is at its equilibrium state when  (𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑋𝑡−1)~0. 
However, during period of disequilibrium this term will no longer be zero and the difference 
measures the distance from equilibrium. Suppose that there was a negative shock to the economy 
and is captured by the error term, ut. Assume that Yt began to rise lesser than normal in the 
model. It then resulted  𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝛽0 − 𝛽1𝑋𝑡−1  to turn negative as Yt-1 moved below its long-run 
steady state growth path. However, since 𝜋 = (1 − 𝑎1) is positive due to the minus sign in front 
of  π,  it pushes back  ∆Yt  towards equilibrium path via Xt  in the equation. Hence, the speed of 
this adjustment to equilibrium is dependent upon the magnitude of (1 − 𝑎1).  
Essentially π represents the adjustment coefficient, which provides the degree of adjustment to 
equilibrium in each period. In other words, it informs how much of the equilibrium error is 
subjected for corrections. Therefore, if: 
i.) If π is equal to 1, then 100 percent of the adjustment occur within one period or in full 
ii.) If π is equal to 50 percent, then only 50 percent of the adjustment took place in that period. 
iii.) If π=0, then there no readjustment back to the equilibrium state. 
5.3 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
5.3.1 Short-run Causality  
The result of the panel unit root testing shows that both credit to private sector and GDP income 
per capita has unit root. We then proceed to determine the order of the unit root. The result 
indicate that only after both variables are being differenced , both transformed into  stationary 
and this indicate both of them are I(1) variable. Log GDP per capita and credit to private sector 
requires 2 and 4 lags of differencing, respectively,  using Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) 
for both to become stationary variable. (Refer to Figure 5.1 in the next page)                     
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UNIT ROOT TEST 
FIGURE 5.1 
Variable: Credit to Private Sector      Variable: GDP Per Capita   
Panel unit root test: Summary  
    Series:  D(_2LGDP_CAP) 
    Date: 03/12/10   Time: 11:20 
    Sample: 1 760 
    Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
   Automatic selection of maximum lags 
   Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2 
  Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
 
     
   
Cross- 
 Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
 Levin, Lin & Chu t* -16.8 0 20 699 
     Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
 Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -16.3 0 20 699 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 301.3 0 20 699 
PP - Fisher Chi-square 305.7 0 20 702 
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
      
Panel unit root test: Summary  
    Series:  D(_3CRD_PRV) 
     Date: 03/11/10   Time: 13:38 
     Sample: 1 760 
     Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
   Automatic selection of maximum lags 
    Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 4 
   Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
  
      
   
Cross- 
  Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
 Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
  Levin, Lin & Chu t* -14.91 0 20 666 
 
      Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
  Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -16.20 0 20 666 
 ADF - Fisher Chi-square 312.94 0 20 666 
 PP - Fisher Chi-square 359.62 0 20 681 
 
      ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 




According to Sim (1980), if a variable not only act as an explanatory variable for a given 
dependent variable but it also explained by other variables, then all the variables should be 
treated the same way. Therefore there should be no classification whether a variable should be 
exogenous or endogenous. All these variables should be treated endogenous. One of the 
advantages of VAR model is that it allows testing for direction of causality. In order to proceed 
with VAR testing on these 20 countries, we decided to use unrestricted equation  with lag 
variables based on panel method either lagged Fixed Effect Model (FEM) and/or Random effects 
model (REM).  Restrictions would be imposed and the model re-estimated to obtain the 
restricted Residual Sum of Square (RSS). F-test would then being applied to determine the short 
term Granger causality. 
First, in order to determine the suitable model for the equation, we apply Hausman test, which is 
a Chi-square test. If the hypothesis is rejected, then we will use FEM estimation.  Our method of 
estimation is similar to Hansen and Rand (2006) and Chowdhury and Mavrotas (2006). Dummy 
variables are also being tested on certain years where economic events may have significant 
impact towards these countries‘ economies, for e.g. 1973 due to world oil shortage, 1981 global 
recession and declined in commodity prices, 1998 East Asia economic meltdown and 2001 
recession. The VAR can be illustrated by the following matrix in Equation 5.14, which 
composed of two equations with Lgdp_cap, i.e. log GDP per capita, as endogenous variable in 
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𝛽26










indicate to reject null 
hypothesis at 5 
percent.  




Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
5.360 1 0.021
Variable Fixed  Random Var(Diff.) Prob. 
_3D_CRD 0.000 0.000 0 0.021
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.024 0.001611 15.16114 0
_3D_CRD -1.09E-05 0.000192 -0.056778 0.9547
R-squared 0.115 0.024418
Adjusted R-squared 0.089 0.044491
S.E. of regression 0.042 -3.4511
Sum squared resid 1.228 -3.31487




Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary
Cross-section random
Cross-section random effects test comparisons:
Cross-section random effects test equation:
Dependent Variable: _2DIF_LGDPCAP
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 03/05/10   Time: 22:16
Sample: 1 760
    Akaike info criterion
    Schwarz criterion
    Hannan-Quinn criter.
    Durbin-Watson stat
Cross-sections included: 20
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 702
Effects Specification
    Mean dependent var




The result from the Hausman test suggest using fixed effect model for the first equation as it was 
rejected at five percent significance level indicated in Figure  5.2.   
Random effects model will be applied for the second equation as the Hausman test result does 
not reject at five percent significance level in Figure 5.3. Based on SIC and Hanan-Quinn 
Information Criterion  (HIC) automatic selection to determine the  number of lags, lag of two 
was chosen to ensure Gaussian error term to avoid autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the 
data.  
In order to test for Granger causality on both equations, we would use the block exogeneity test 
by applying F-test restrictions on the exogenous lag variable , i.e. lag 1 and 2 of credit to private 
sector variable , equals to zero. In first equation in Equation 5.14 using fixed models with lags,  
restrictions was imposed on credit to private sector lag variables . The result shows that the null 
hypothesis, i.e. credit to private sector does not Granger cause GDP per capita income, was not 
rejected as indicated in Figure 5.4.  It can thus be concluded that credit to private sector does not 
Granger cause GDP per capita income. The result also shows the dummy variable for 1998 and 
2001 shows significance, i.e. indicating that the year 1998 and 2001 has significant impact on 
GDP per capita of the emerging economies. 
The second equation of Equation 5.14, using  random effect model with lags of 2, restriction was 
applied to log GDP per capita income variable. As indicated in Figure 5.4, the F-test result 
produces critical value of 7.6 or within one percent level of significance. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis that log GDP per capita do not Granger cause credit to private sector was rejected. In 
conclusion, the result indicates that there is Granger causality from GDP per capita income to 
credit to private sector variable. The  dummy variable for 1981 shows significance which 




 FIGURE 5.3 
Hausman test 
indicate do not reject 
null hypothesis at 5 
percent.  
Result shows to use 




Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
2.269499 1 0.1319
Variable Fixed  Random Var(Diff.) Prob. 
_2DIF_LGDPCAP -0.433 3.468156 6.706402 0.1319
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.878 0.36943 2.376641 0.0177
_2DIF_LGDPCAP -0.433 7.628733 -0.056778 0.9547
R-squared 0.015 0.867425
Adjusted R-squared -0.014 8.395369
S.E. of regression 8.453 7.136315
Sum squared resid   48,656.56 7.272543
Log likelihood -2,483.85 7.188968
F-statistic 0.526 1.913587
Prob(F-statistic) 0.957
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary
Cross-section random
    Mean dependent var
Cross-section random effects test comparisons:
Cross-section random effects test equation:
Dependent Variable: _3D_CRD
Method: Panel Least Squares




Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 702
Effects Specification
    S.D. dependent var
    Akaike info criterion
    Schwarz criterion
    Hannan-Quinn criter.




                  
 FIGURE 5.4 
 
 
                  
Panel Data Granger causality test 1970-2007
Model Vector autoregressions: use the fir-difference series of panel data Causality
Direction
Dep Constant dLgdpcap(-1) dLgdpcap(-2) Dcrd_prv(-1) Dcrd_prv(-2) D1973 D1981 D1998 D2001 Test
var (b1) (b2) (b3) (b4) (b5) (b6) (b7) (b8 (b9) Ho F-test
1. FEM  * dLgdpcap 0.02 (0.00) 0.22 (0.00) 0.04 (0.28) -0.00 (0.63) -0.00 (0.48) 0.01 (0.28) -0.01 (0.16) -0.04 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00) 0.38 (0.68)
2. REM ** dcrd_prv 0.33 (0.37) 25.55 (0.00) 2 (0.78) 0.12 (0.00) -0.15*(0) -0.91 (0.62) 3.03 (0.09) -1.72 (0.33) -0.54 (0.76) 7.6 (0.00)
Hausman has been used to determine the type panel model to be used. 
*   In equation 1, the null for F-test is b(4)=b(5)=0.




The VAR result indicates a one way Granger causality effect in the short term. The countries 
level of financial development does not Granger cause the level of per capita income, however, 
level of per capita income does Granger cause financial development. 
5.3.2 Long Run Causality: Cointegration and ECM 
5.3.2.1 Unit Root Test 
The first step leading to cointegration is to identify the order of integration of the variables 
involved. It is important that the variables are of the same order of integration to ensure that the 
test for cointegration can be clearly established without being too complicated. If the variables 
are to be found I(0), then the VAR model is sufficient to establish long-term association. Several 
types of unit root tests are being used as discussed in the previous section, e.g. Levin, Lin and 
Chu; Im, Pesaran and Shin; Augmented Dickey Fuller based on Fischer Chi-Square ;and Phillip 
Perron based on Fischer Chi-Square. The results presented in Figures 5.5a and 5.5b below 
indicate that Credit to Private Sector variable and GDP per Capita Income are not stationary or 
I(0) using Schwarz (SIC)  and Akaike (AIC) Information Criterion.  However, for GDP per 
capita Income variable, only Levin, Lin & Chu test indicates that credit to private sector variable 
is I(0), even though three other test shows this variable is I(1).  
After both variables were subjected to differencing, the variables were then transformed into 
stationary variable. Based on the previous unit root test, it took 4 and 2 lags based on  Schwartz 
Information Criteria (SIC) procedure to transform Credit to Privates Sector and Log GDP per 





Panel unit root test: Summary 
Series:  _3CRD_PRV
Date: 02/26/10   Time: 00:07
Sample: 1 760
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 5
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel
Cross-
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -0.80438 0.21 20 681
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -0.70791 0.24 20 681
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 55.9799 0.05 20 681
PP - Fisher Chi-square 38.0396 0.56 20 705
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.  
FIGURE 5.5a
Panel unit root test: Summary 
Series:  _2LGDP_CAP
Date: 02/22/10   Time: 12:38
Sample: 1 760
Exogenous variables: Individual effects
Automatic selection of maximum lags
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 1
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel
Cross-
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process) 
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.62451 0.0043 20 715
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process) 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat 1.47349 0.9297 20 715
ADF - Fisher Chi-square 39.6185 0.4873 20 715
PP - Fisher Chi-square 39.91 0.4743 20 722
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality.  
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As both variables are determined to have the same order of integration, we proceed with the 


















5.3.2.2  Pedroni Cointegration 
The first cointegration test is to use the Pedroni method.   The result of Pedroni Eagle-
Granger test of cointegration is shown in Figure 5.6. The Pedroni cointegration test shows 
that both variables are cointegrated after the intercept and deterministic trend terms are 
included in the model. The first four statistics or the pooling within dimension shows both 
FIGURE 5.6 
    
      Pedroni Residual Cointegration Test 
  Series: _2LGDP_CAP _3CRD_PRV  
  Date: 02/22/10   Time: 13:37 
   Sample: 1 760 
    Included observations: 760 
   Cross-sections included: 20 
   Null Hypothesis: No cointegration 
  Trend assumption: Deterministic intercept and trend 
Lag selection: Automatic SIC with max lag of 5 to 8 
 Newey-West bandwidth selection with Bartlett kernel 
      Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. (within-dimension) 
    
Weighted 
  
Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Panel v-Statistic 11.29847 0 8.669783 0 
Panel rho-Statistic 1.755875 0.09 2.262432 0.0309 
Panel PP-Statistic -2.51667 0.02 -0.40223 0.3679 
Panel ADF-Statistic -2.56529 0.01 -1.15552 0.2046 
      Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs. (between-dimension) 
      
  
Statistic Prob. 
  Group rho-Statistic 3.126555 0.00 
  Group PP-Statistic -0.56379 0.34 
  Group ADF-Statistic -2.29358 0.03 
  
      




variables are cointegrated as the probability shows significance at least at 10 percent level. 
In fact, three or four within statistic, i.e. V-statistic, Phillip Perron and ADF statistic shows 
significance at lesser than five percent.  
On the other hand, the Group or pooling along the between-dimension estimator shows that 
2 out of 3 tests, i.e. rho and ADF statistic, show level of significance at five percent. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that both variables, financial development and GDP income 
per capita, are cointegrated. However, to confirm the result we proceed for the second test 
by using the Johansen cointegration which involves several measures. 
5.3.2.3 Johansen Cointegration and Error Correction Method (ECM) 
The next step after determining the unit root is choosing the optimal lag length of both 
variables before undertaking the cointegration test. The most common way of testing the 
optimal length is to estimate using VAR model at the level form. VAR model is run first 
starting with several lags and then being reduced down (Harris, 1995). At each lag, Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC) and Hanan-Quinn (HIC) values are checked to determine the 
optimal lag based on the lowest SIC and HIC value.  The VAR test also included a few 
dummy variables to account for significant shift in the economic events such as 1981 world 
recession, 1998 Asian economic crisis, and 2001 world economic downturn. The results in 
Figure 5.6a below indicates that the lowest HQ and SIC is when VAR is at lag 2 Therefore, 
the lag 2 is used  to test the cointegration and restrictions using ECM.  
 It is also important to find the appropriate lag length in order to achieve a  Gaussian error 
term, i.e. standard error terms that do not  have autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity and non-
normality.  Autocorrelation using LM test does not reject the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation at lag 2. White heteroskedasticity test does not reject of null hypothesis of 
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homoskedasticity in the equation . The normality test shows that the residual are multivariate 











The next step is choosing the appropriate model, whether intercept and/or a trend should 
enter the short run or the long run model or both models. The model using the VECM  can 
be used to include various options (Harris,  1995).  




  𝑍𝑡−1 1 𝑡 +  𝜇2 + 𝛿2𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡  
Equation 5.15 
FIGURE 5.6a Lag determination for Cointegration Test
Endogenous variables: _2LGDP_CAP _3CRD_PRV 
Exogenous variables: C Y1981 Y1998 Y2001 
Date: 03/09/10   Time: 00:48
Sample: 1 760
Included observations: 494
 Lag LogL SC HQ
0 -3,167.81 12.93 12.88
1 -862.62 3.64 3.58
2 -813.75   3.50*   3.42*
3 -810.58 3.53 3.43
4 -799.25 3.54 3.41
5 -798.27 3.58 3.44
6 -795.48 3.62 3.46
7 -793.36 3.66 3.48
8 -789.76 3.70 3.49
9 -787.79 3.74 3.51
10 -786.47 3.79 3.54
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion
 SC: Schwarz information criterion




The above model includes μ1 as the constant and δ1 as the trend in the long run model or the 
cointegrating (CE) term. Also, intercept μ2  and the trend δ2 are included in the short run 
model (the VAR model).  
 The above set-up suggests that there can be 5 types of cointegrating models The first model 
is when there is not intercept or deterministic trend in either CE or VAR (δ1= δ2= μ1= μ2=0). 
The second model is when there is not intercept or trend in VAR, however, there is intercept 
but no trend in CE (δ1= δ2= μ2=0). The intercept is only applied for the long run on 
cointegration equation which would affect the unit of measurement of the following 
variables  𝑍𝑡−1 1 𝑡 . The third model is when there is intercept in CE and VAR, but no 
trends in CE or VAR (δ1= δ2 =0). In this model, intercept in CE is effectively cancelled out 
by the intercept in the VAR, leaving just one intercept in the model. The fourth model is 
when there is intercept in CE and VAR, linear trend in CE but no trend in VAR (δ2=0). The 
fifth model is the unrestricted one as above when there is intercept and quadratic trend in the 
CE as well as intercept and linear trend in VAR.  
According to Johansen (Harris, 1995), the first and the fifth models are unlikely to happen 
and impossible to explain in economic theory. The first model where (δ1= δ2= μ1= μ2=0) is 
considered too restrictive as at least one constant needs to be included in β. The fifth model 
to test the quadratic trend data in the model is infrequently used as it only occurs very rarely.   
The Pantula principle revolves around estimating three models , i.e. options 2,3 and 4 from the 
above, going from the most restrictive hypothesis through to the least restrictive hypothesis, i.e. 
when r=1 and model 2 to the least restrictive model or hypothesis when r=n-1 and model 4. It 
involves moving from the most restrictive model while at each stage comparing the trace test 
statistic to determine its critical value. It only stops when we reached for the first time that the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration is not rejected. According to the results shown in Figure 5.7 
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for lag two, we would move to the right until we stop at model 2 when trace test shows that r=2 
and the null hypothesis of no cointegration is  first not rejected (Refer to Figure 5.7).  Therefore, 






Since there are only two variables, the most number of cointegration for nonstationary 
variables to register is one.  Suppose that r=1 and zt=[yit,y2t]; then α=[α11,α21]. The first 
variable indicate the speed at which ∆y1t, adjust towards the single long-run cointegration 
relationships (𝛽11𝑦1𝑡−1 + 𝛽21𝑦2𝑡−1), while ∝21 represents the speed at which ∆y2t response 
to the disequilibrium changes represented by the cointegration vector. The Johansen 
estimation procedure is a maximum likehood approach in which all the unknown parameters 
in these two equations are estimated simultaneously.  
The next stage is to test for weak exogeneity by imposing restrictions on the Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM).  A test of zero restrictions on α is the test of weak exogeneity. A 
variable  is considered  weakly exogenous if it is only a function of lagged variables and the 
parameter of the equation generating Z are independent of the parameters generating the other 
variables on the system (Johansen and Jeselius, 1992). We can use either α or β as the 
restrictions. The α coefficient is the error correction or the short term adjustment that reverts 
back to its former state of equilibrium. If we place restrictions by normalizing α to zero, all 
the β coefficients (long run parameters) in the same row would also be zero. Since there are 
Figure 5.7
Pantula  test results-Using Trace Values Pantula test results-Using Maximum Eigen Values)
rank n-r model 2 model 3 model 4 rank n-r model 2 model 3 model 4
0 2 126 80 62 0 2 123 69 52
1 1 43* 58 36 1 1 43* 58 36
n = number of variables




only 2 variables, there are only two error correction variables, i.e. ∝11 and ∝21. The system 























 + 𝜇𝑡  
Equation 5.16 
Log GDP per capita and Credit to Private Sectors are the endogenous variables in the above 
VECM model. 
Granger representation theorem implies that at least one of the adjustment coefficient α11 or α21 
must be non-zero if a long run relationship between the variable have to hold (Engel and 
Granger, 1987). If the first row of the α matrix were all zeros then the βs would drop out of the 
Y equation and then it would be weakly exogenous. Therefore, by normalizing α in same row 
equals to zero would test the weak exogeneity of the corresponding variable. If the variable 
found to be weakly exogenous then the endogenous part of the variable can cancel out.  
The first step to examine which of the two variables is weakly exogenous is by normalizing the 
error correction for the first equation, i.e. ∝11=0 (refer to Figure 5.8) or using chi square test 
(Johansen, 1995). The result from the restriction on the short run error correction, ∝11=0, is chi 
square at 58.11 or ρ value close to zero. This shows that the null hypothesis is rejected, i.e. per 
capita income variable is not considered weakly exogenous. A variable is not considered a 
weakly exogenous variable if it can explain not only by its own lag variable, but by other 
parameters on the RHS of the equation (Kennedy, 2008). 
We also compared using the other ratios in the restricted equation 1 (Figure 5.8), with 





the restricted version is lower than the unrestricted version. The equation 1 in Figure 5.8 
recorded adjusted R
2
 at 0.051, which is lower than 0.127, which is found in the unrestricted 
equation 1 in Figure 5.9. Hence, the sum of squared residuals of the restricted equation 
would be higher than the unrestricted ceteris paribus. This is also implied when we compare 
the sum of square residuals for equation 1, i.e. the restricted equation (Figure 5.8), which 
1.20 is marginally higher than 1.105 shown in the unrestricted equation 1 (Figure 5.9). The 
F-statistic for equation 1 (Figure 5.9) show the F-test as 9.868 after imposing restriction of 
one, i.e. ∝11=0, with number of observation of 655. Since the highest critical value of F-test 
with one restriction with infinity number of observations at 1 percent significant is only 
6.63, we conclude that the F-test is significant at 1 percent since (9.868 > 6.63). Therefore, 
we cannot exclude the impact of short-run coefficient, ∝11=0, in affecting GDP per capita 
growth.  
The second test of error correction model is when we impose restriction to the equation 2, 
i.e. by imposing error correction or ∝21=0 (Equation 5.16). The result is chi square of 0.29 
with ρ value =0.59 (Figure 5.9), which means that the null hypothesis is not rejected. We, 
therefore, conclude that credit to private sector variable is weakly exogenous. Since short 
run coefficient (∝21)  becomes zero, it would then zero out the long run coefficients (βs) 
and all of them would be dropped from the equation. If the variable is weakly exogenous, 
then the endogenous part can be dropped from the system and so is the equation.  However, 
when F-test is performed on the restricted equation 2, ∝21 is 10.505 which is above 6.63. 
This shows that the error correction or short run adjustment have significant impact at 1 
percent level.  According to Grigorian et al (2004) a variable is considered a weakly 
exogenous if it does not react to long run equilibrium, however, may still react to changes in   
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  FIGURE 5.8
 Vector Error Correction Estimates
 Date: 03/13/10   Time: 02:18
 Sample: 1 760
 Included observations: 655
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
Cointegration Restrictions: 
      A(1,1)=0
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations.
Not all cointegrating vectors are identified







Error Correction: D(_2LGDP_CAP) D(_3CRD_PRV)
CointEq1 0 0.318
0 -0.127
[ NA] [ 2.51502]
D(_2LGDP_CAP(-1)) 0.359 25.139
-0.038 -6.799
[ 9.41405] [ 3.69725]
D(_2LGDP_CAP(-2)) 0.179 2.211
-0.038 -6.835
[ 4.66449] [ 0.32350]
D(_3CRD_PRV(-1)) 0.000 0.124
0.000 -0.036




 R-squared 0.057 0.068
 Adj. R-squared 0.051 0.062
 Sum sq. resids 1.200 38,259.450
 S.E. equation 0.043 7.672
 F-statistic 9.868 11.865
 Log likelihood 1,134.494 -2,261.514
 Akaike AIC -3.449 6.921
 Schwarz SC -3.415 6.955
 Mean dependent 0.024 0.961
 S.D. dependent 0.044 7.923
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 0.108
 Determinant resid covariance 0.107
 Log likelihood -1,130.237
 Akaike information criterion 3.491






















 Vector Error Correction Estimates
 Date: 03/13/10   Time: 02:20
 Sample: 1 760
 Included observations: 655
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
Cointegration Restrictions: 
      A(2,1)=0
Convergence achieved after 2 iterations.
Not all cointegrating vectors are identified







Error Correction: D(_2LGDP_CAP) D(_3CRD_PRV)
CointEq1 0.013 0
-0.002 0
[ 8.17563] [ NA]
D(_2LGDP_CAP(-1)) 0.279 26.341
-0.038 -7.106
[ 7.33626] [ 3.70701]
D(_2LGDP_CAP(-2)) 0.105 3.284
-0.038 -7.104







 R-squared 0.132 0.061
 Adj. R-squared 0.127 0.055
 Sum sq. resids 1.105 38,560.210
 S.E. equation 0.041 7.702
 F-statistic 24.774 10.505
 Log likelihood 1,161.656 -2,264.079
 Akaike AIC -3.532 6.928
 Schwarz SC -3.498 6.963
 Mean dependent 0.024 0.961
 S.D. dependent 0.044 7.923
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 0.100
 Determinant resid covariance 0.099
 Log likelihood -1,101.321
 Akaike information criterion 3.403
 Schwarz criterion 3.492  
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the same variables in the short run basis. Hence, even though the equation 2 and credit 
development variable is considered weakly exogenous and there is no long run effect 
(β’s=0), there still exist temporary short run impact from ∝21.  
 From these two results of the weak exogeneity test, we can conclude that there exists only 
one cointegration vector.  Since equation 2 in equation 5.16, i.e. credit development as a 
endogenous variable is dropped off due to weak exogeneity, it leaves only one equation and 
cointegration, i.e. equation 1. Based on equation 1, there exists long run causality running 
from credit to private sector variable towards log GDP per capita income.  In another words, 
financial development has long run causality impact on income (GDP) growth in these 
countries.  However, based on F-test calculation, there is bidirectional short term causality 
between credit to private sector with log GDP per capita and therefore, we can conclude that 
there is bidirectional effect between financial development and income growth. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has tested the short and long run causality effect between financial 
development and income (GDP) growth using vector autoregression (VAR) and vector error 
correction (VECM) method.  Attention is focused on two specific variables, GDP per capita 
and credit to private sector as a proxy for economic growth and financial development.  
Using the F-test on VAR model, the results show Granger causality from GDP growth to 
financial development in the short term. However, based on the F-test result of Johansen 
VEC model, it shows a bi-directional  effect between financial development and growth in 
the short term. Hence, both models resulted in different F-test outcome for short term 
causality effect. However, since both results indicate the importance of growth towards 
financial development in the short term, it is vital for the economy to generate enough 
growth in order to spur financial development. 
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 In the long-term, by applying a weak  exogeneity test on the Johansen VECM model, the 
result indeed shows that there is clear long term causality effect from financial development 
to growth. In long term it is imperative that these emerging economies rely on developing 
their financial sectors by allowing the establishment of more financial institutions and 
offering more and better services that would engender greater financial transactions in the 
economy, which would translate into long term and sustainable growth. With the increased 
depth and efficiency of the financial intermediaries, the funds would be effectively 
channeled to the needed households for loans and private sectors to fund their investments, 








CHAPTER 6  
PRIVATE SAVINGS AND NON-MARKET INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS  
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is a widespread believes among economists that the quality of institutions is very 
important for the economic growth of the countries (Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al 
(2001); Rodrik et al (2002); Easterly and Levine (2002)).  Countries, whose investors feel 
secured to uphold property rights and respect the rule of law, would be able to establish a better 
and stronger economy. Similarly, poor countries that are able to embark on institutional reforms 
by strengthening property rights and enforcing the rule of law are able to enhance their economic 
productivity. 
While institutions have emerged as a key determinant of economic growth, there is the key 
question of what defines the quality of institutions.  North (1990) defines institutions more 
generally as rules of the game, the enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of 
behaviour that structure repeated human interactions. 
Rodrik (2000) defines institutions as public organizations or non-market institutions that 
serve to protect property rights and rule of law in the country. A market economy relies on 
a wide array of non-market institutions that perform regulatory, stabilizing, and legitimizing 
functions.  Rodrik (2004) argues that sound non-market institutions are present when there 
exist security of property rights, the rule of law prevails, private incentives are aligned with 
social objectives, monetary and fiscal policies are grounded in solid microeconomic 
institutions, and citizens have the recourse to civil liberties and political representation. 
Dixit (2004) has termed non-market institutions as formal institutions, which are 
institutions under government jurisdiction that protects property rights, responsible for the 
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legislation, policing and judiciary matters. These formal institutions rely on formal 
contracts and enforcement by the courts, or the police to ensure the property rights are 
respected and upheld. 
For this study, following Rodrik (2000) and Dixit (2004), we refer to non-market institutions as 
third party institutions, i.e. the institutions under the jurisdiction of municipality, state, or federal 
government that are able to maintain the security of property rights, governing, regulating, 
maintaining stability, and enforcing the rule of law. In our empirical study, using the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) database, we have identified several institutional 
factors to proxy for the non-market institutions, i.e. levels of corruption, bureaucracy efficiency, 
law and order, accountability and political stability. 
6.2 METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
6.2.1 Data Description 
The exogenous variables used are the demographic and macroeconomic variables from the 
previous chapter 4.  In addition, a new variable of financial openness measure based on the four 
main categories of openness used by Chin and Ito (2008) is introduced beside the current trade 
openness variable obtained from the Penn World database.   
The estimated equation is to examine the impact of the institutional factors on private savings. 
Demographic and macroeconomic factors are used as controlling factors. Institutional variables, 
such as corruption, law and order, bureaucracy, government stability and accountability are used 
in the equation and these variables are obtained from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
database generated by the PRS group. The data collected for the demographic, macroeconomic 
and institutional are from 1984 until 2006. .  
The specification for the model can be framed as follows: 
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S_GDP07 =F(GDPcap_gth, lgdp_cons, old_dep, yth_dep, open,  remit, urb_gth, crd_prv, 
stk_trn, open, kaopen,  corr, law_ord, bureau, stability, accountability)  where 
i. S_GDP07 refers to the savings of household and corporate sector over GDP. The data is 
taken from Penn World Database. 
ii. Lgdp_cons is for log of real GDP per capita, denominated in US dollar based on 2000 
constant prices. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. 
The source is from World Development Indicators (WDI). 
iii. Gdpcap_gth is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita is based on constant 
local currency.  
iv. Old_dep and Yth_dep refer to the old and young dependency over the total population and 
the variable is extracted from WDI.  
v. Open or Trade Openness is the ratio of total trade divided by the GDP and it measures the 
trade openness of a country. The data is taken Penn World database.  
Kaopen or financial openness variable is an index formulated by Chinn and Ito (2008) from 
IMF‘s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). The 
higher the index, the more open is the country for capital transaction across borders. The data is 
based on four major categories mainly: 
a. variable indicating the presence of multiple exchange rates (k1); 
b. variable indicating restrictions on current account transactions(k2); 
c.  variable indicating restrictions on capital account transactions (k3); and  
d. variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds (k4). 
vi. Urb_gth is the share of urban population over total population and obtained from WDI. 
vii. Crd_Prv is the domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP and derived from 
WDI. It is used to measure the extent of financial deepening in the financial institutions. 
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viii. STVALTRADED is defined as stock value traded over stock market. It is used as a proxy to 
measure the extent of the development of equity or share market in these countries.  Since 
stock prices appear in both denominator and numerator, the erratic fluctuation would 
neutralise each other, therefore the measurement would remain rather steady and less 
susceptible to measurement error. The increase in value of share market would indicate also 
the increase in value of equity held by the private sectors. The increase in general wealth 
meant that certain fractions would be allocated for savings. The data is from WDI. 
Indicators from ICRG database are used as proxies to measure the extent of institutional 
developments in these countries. Each category has its own range of scale, however, all of them 
have been normalised to a scale between 0 and 1. 
I. Corr or corruption is a measure of the perception of corruption in the political system.  
Corruption has major impact on the foreign investment and business activities on the 
affected countries. The business activities encompass activities such as i) excessive 
patronage, ii) nepotism and cronyism in awarding contract, , and iii) suspicious ties between 
politicians and businessmen. The source is from ICRG with scale ranges from 0 to 6, 
however, has been normalised to the scale of 0 to 1.   
II. Law_ord or Law and Order variable refers to 2 separate subcomponents that is law and 
order. Each subcomponent is measured from 0 to 3 scales with both totals to 6 points. Law 
refers to the fairness of the judicial system while order refers to the adherence to the law.  
III. Bureau refers to bureaucracy with original scale runs from 0 to 4. Higher points are given to 
the government administration that can operate independently detached from the political 
pressure and transparent in running the government. Lesser points are given to countries 
with questionable process of running government and lack of transparency. The actual scale 
ranges from 0 to 4.  
216 
 
IV. Acct_ty or democratic accountability refers to how responsive is the government towards 
the people‘s needs.  A government which is autocratic and unresponsive towards the 
people‘s social needs will receive the least point. The original score ranges from 0 to 6 
points. 
V. Stability or political stability measures the government capability in executing promised 
programmes and their ability to remain in power. There are 3 subcomponents in the 
assessments: government unity, legislative strength and popular support. Higher scores 
relates to more stable government. 
6.2.2 Methodology 
There are 20 developing countries that are being examined in this study. Since it involves cross 
countries studies, panel estimation is used to test the impact of institutional factors. Panel 
estimation is also used as it can reduce the omitted variable bias and time-invariant heterogeneity 
(Asteriou and Hall, 2007). Panel data can be used to deal with heterogeneity in the individual 
units. In any cross-sections analysis, there are numerous unmeasured explanatory variables, e.g. 
firms, countries etc, that affected the individual units being analysed. Heterogeneity meant that 
these individual units are all different from one another. Omitting these variables causes biasness 
in estimation. Panel estimation method enables to correct the biasness problem.  
However, it is important firstly to determine the types of panel estimation to be used, either 
common pool method or heterogeneous panel estimations. In order to determine the preferred 
and appropriate estimation method, i.e. either pool or panel estimation, a redundant fixed effect 
testing is applied to determine whether the intercept are homogenous, or heterogeneous among 
invariant time characteristic across the sample countries. Figure 6.1 (refer to next page) shows   
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DETERMINING POOL OR PANEL DATA
FIGURE 6.1
Statistic  d.f. Prob. 
43.955 -17,236.000 0.000
378.160 17.000 0.000
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 2.962 8.214 0.361 0.719
_2GDPCAP_GTH 0.422 0.113 3.735 0.000
_2LGDP_CAP 4.773 0.716 6.666 0.000
_2YTH_DEP -0.975 0.129 -7.555 0.000
_2OLD_DEP -0.575 0.371 -1.551 0.122
_3CRD_PRV 0.005 0.012 0.430 0.667
_3STVALTRADED 3.503 0.828 4.231 0.000
_3LR_DEPINT 0.247 0.328 0.752 0.453
_4L_INF 0.309 0.344 0.900 0.369
_4UBN_GTH 3.169 0.432 7.334 0.000
_5OPEN07 0.046 0.009 5.209 0.000




S.E. of regression 6.403 6.596
Sum squared 
resid 10,372.160 6.758
Log likelihood -861.916 6.661
F-statistic 78.514 0.219
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000
    Hannan-Quinn criter.
    Durbin-Watson stat
    Schwarz criterion
Cross-section fixed effects test equation:
Dependent Variable: _1S_GDP
Method: Panel Least Squares




Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 265
    Mean dependent var
    S.D. dependent var
    Akaike info criterion
Cross-section Chi-square
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Equation: Untitled






that the F-test is 43.9 and significant, therefore, we reject the null hypothesis of no fixed effect 
differences between these countries. It shows that the intercepts are heterogeneous and therefore, 
panel estimation, instead of pooled estimation method should be used. Therefore if there is an 
increase in an exogenous variable in a given country, the effect over time would not be 
quantitatively the same across different countries. There are two types of panel data models to 
choose, either fixed or random effect models. The random effects model assumes that each 
country differs in its error term, whereas in fixed effect model, each country differences are 
captured in intercept parameter.  
6.2.2.1 Fixed Effect Method 
In fixed effect models, the intercepts are allowed to be varied, but the steepness of the slope 
remains the same. The error terms remain zero with constant variance for the individuals and 
periods. In another words, all the variations among individuals are captured by the intercept. The 
intercept is also used to control the individual specific differences. There are two methods to 
applying the fixed effect model, i.e. by including intercept dummy for each individual, country 
or firms; or by averaging data across time. By averaging data across time, it involves a within 
transformation, which essentially involves subtracting the time-mean of each entity from the 
values of the variables as illustrated below: 
Assume a panel data equation as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡𝑥3𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡        t=1,2,..T          Equation 6-1 
Firstly , it involves average the data across time by aggregating the left and right hand side of 
equation and divided by T (time). 
1
𝑇
∑ (𝑇𝑡=1 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡𝑥3𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡)                    Equation 6-2 





















𝑡=1 )        Equation 6-3 
And simplified into:  𝑦 𝑡 = 𝛽 1 + 𝛽2𝑥 2𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑥 3𝑖 + 𝑒 𝑖 , in which ―bar‖ notation 𝑦 𝑡 indicates the 
values of 𝑦𝑖𝑡  has been averaged over time.            Equation 6-4
  
Then we subtract equation 6-4 from  6-1and will have the following results. 
  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡𝑥3𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡         
Minus  𝑦 𝑡 = 𝛽 1 + 𝛽2𝑥 2𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑥 3𝑖 + 𝑒 𝑖   
-------------------------------------------------------- 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽2 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥 2𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑥3𝑖𝑡 − 𝑥 3𝑖 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑒 𝑖  
From there the β1i has been cancelled out and if it was to repeat with other individuals, it would 
be transformed into regression containing demean variables only. The regression does not have 
any intercept and the dependent variable have zero mean. The above equation can be simplified 
as below: 
𝑦 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽2𝑥 2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑥 3𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒 𝑖𝑡       
The tildes indicates the variables deviates from the means form. 
  6.2.2.2  Hausman Method 
The next step is to determine between the two types of panel estimation, fixed or random,  is to 
be used by applying the Hausman test( Hausman and Taylor, 1981). Hausman test is used to 
check for any correlation between the error component ui and the regressors in a random effects 
model. The test compares the coefficient estimates from the random effects model to those from 
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the fixed effects model.  By economising on the degrees of freedom, the random effect model 
produced a more efficient estimator of the slope of coefficient than fixed effect model. 
The idea underlying Hausman test is that both the random and fixed effects estimators are 
consistent if there is no correlation between ui and the explanatory variables. If both estimators 
are consistent, then they should converge to the true parameter values B
k
 in large samples. That 
is, in large samples, the random effects and fixed effects estimates should be identical or similar. 
On the other hand, if ui is correlated with any xkit the random effects estimator is inconsistent 
while the fixed effects estimator remains consistent. Thus in large samples, the fixed effects 
estimator converges to the true parameter values, but the random effects estimator converges to 
some other value that is not the value of the true parameters. Then we can see the differences 
between the fixed and random effect estimators.  
In another words, the biasness in the random effect is due to the correlation between error term 
and its intercept. Biasness would not occur in the fixed effect model as the different intercepts 
are explicitly recognised due to dummies assigned to them. In contrast to the random effect, 
different intercepts are not explicitly recognised, in which these intercepts are incorporated 
within the error term. Whenever x value increases, y value tend to increase more due to 
simultaneous increase in the composite or error term. The biasness would become more 
prominent as the samples grew larger as a result of high correlation between x value and the error 
term in random effect.  
The Hausman test‘s null hypothesis is that ui is uncorrelated with any of the explanatory 
variables, i.e.  the random effects estimator will have smaller variance than the fixed effects 
estimator, at least in large sample. Therefore, if there is no correlation between the exogenous 
and error term, then random effect estimator is more efficient and has lesser margin of standard 
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error. However, if there is an endogeneity problem, or where there is correlation between the 
explanatory variables and error term, then the fixed effect model is more appropriate. 
6.3 CORRELATION 
The cross correlations presented in Table 6.2 below  are obtained from the time period of 
estimation from 1984 until 2006 suggest that there are few variables that are highly correlated 
that is at 50 percent or over.  Private saving is highly correlated with several determinants at one 
percent significance level: i) GDP per capita growth at 56 percent, ii) youth dependency at minus 
64 percent and iii) trade openness at 64 percent.  These high correlations meant that per capita 
growth and trade openness are highly associated with private savings although such association 
does not imply causation one way or another. In contrast, private savings ratio would also be 
highly associated but negatively with youth dependency ratio, which is consistent with the Life 
Cycle Hypothesis.  
GDP per capita is also highly correlated with several variables: i) youth dependency at minus 63 
percent, ii) urban growth at minus 49 percent, and iii) law and order at 51 percent at significance 
level of one percent.   
Youth dependency and urban growth are highly negative correlated with GDP per capita which 
is indicative that high GDP per income group is associated with low youth dependency and 
urban growth population. 
Meanwhile, old dependency is highly negatively correlated with young dependency.  
Correspondingly, the higher is the share of youth age dependency group, the lower is the old age 
dependency group. Old dependency is also negatively correlated with urban growth, which 





Correlation S_GDP GDPCAP_GTH LGDP_CAP OLD_DEP YTH_DEP CRD_PRV LR_DEPINT STVALTRADED LG_INF UBN_GTH KAOPENESS OPEN CORR LAW_ORD STABILTIY ACC_TY BUREU 
S_GDP 1
GDPCAP_GTH 0.32*** 1
LGDP_CAP 0.56*** 0.01 1
OLD_DEP 0.22*** -0.02 0.6*** 1
YTH_DEP -0.64*** -0.22*** -0.63*** -0.64*** 1
CRD_PRV 0.44*** 0.08 0.31*** -0.09 -0.23*** 1
LR_DEPINT -0.31*** -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.05 0.23*** -0.18*** 1
STVALTRADED 0.46*** 0.22*** 0.37*** 0.1* -0.46*** 0.13** -0.05 1
LG_INF -0.35*** -0.21*** -0.25*** 0 0.19*** -0.28*** 0.58*** -0.11* 1
UBN_GTH 0.12** 0.1 -0.49*** -0.6*** 0.35p*** 0.19*** 0.03 -0.12** -0.06 1
KAOPENESS 0.33*** 0.09 0.14** 0.04 -0.03 0.07 -0.3*** -0.05 -0.47*** 0.2*** 1
OPEN 0.63*** 0.15** 0.39*** 0.04 -0.33*** 0.53*** -0.51*** 0.05 -0.44*** 0.17*** 0.44*** 1
CORR 0.24*** -0.02 0.41*** 0.22*** -0.18*** 0.37*** 0.02 -0.05 0.1 -0.21*** -0.11* 0.24*** 1
LAW_ORD 0.45*** 0.09 0.51*** 0.32*** -0.38*** 0.39*** -0.15** 0.19*** -0.33*** -0.15*** 0.3*** 0.4*** 0.38*** 1
STABILTIY 0.08 -0.09 0.2*** -0.1 -0.11* 0.24*** -0.23*** 0.19*** -0.43*** -0.03 0.23*** 0.32*** -0.12** 0.18*** 1
ACC_TY -0.1 -0.08 0.14** 0.43*** -0.2*** 0.03 0 0.08** 0.07 -0.14** -0.13** -0.14** 0.26*** 0.01 -0.09 1




*** Significant at 1percent level 
**   Significant at 5 percent level 




Credit to private sector, which is proxy for financial deepening in financial institutions sector, 
shows that it is highly associated with trade openness variable at 52 percent level. This indicates 
that the increased financial deepening is associated with greater trading openness carry out by 
the  countries. Real deposit interest rate, which is part of financial variable, is significantly 
positively correlated with inflation rate and negatively correlated with trade openness. It 
indicates that a high deposit rate is more likely associated with a high inflationary environment, 
but is associated with countries with lesser trade openness. Inflation rate is also correlated at 
minus 47 percent with financial openness, possibly suggesting that countries with restrictive 
financial policy would tend to experience high inflation than those with more open financial 
policy. 
Corruption and bureaucracy variables also show positive high correlation at 57 percent , which 
indicates that countries that have  administrations that are perceived highly bureaucratic, i.e. 
independent and detached from political interferences, tend to be more corrupted than those that 
are less bureaucratic. 
6.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
6.4.1 Main Findings 
The results of the Hausman test shown in figure 6.2 for data collected from period 1984 until 
2006 indicate that the chi-square statistic is at 38.8 and the null hypothesis is therefore rejected at 
1% significance. Since it is rejected, the fixed effect model is preferable over the random effect 
model. Fixed effect model allows the intercept for each individual to vary, but restricts the slope 
parameters to be constant across all individuals and time periods. This model of parameter 
variation specifies that only the intercept parameter varies, not the slope parameters and the 





FIGURE 6.2 DETERMINING RANDOM OR FIXED EFFECT 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
38.824 11.000 0.000
Variable Fixed  Random Var(Diff.) Prob. 
_2GDPCAP_GTH 0.101 0.114 0.000 0.489
_2LGDP_CAP 2.540 2.663 0.185 0.774
_2YTH_DEP -0.287 -0.301 0.002 0.767
_2OLD_DEP -1.122 -1.063 0.110 0.859
_3CRD_PRV 0.023 0.014 0.000 0.017
_3STVALTRADED 1.812 1.855 0.028 0.798
_3LR_DEPINT 0.148 0.255 0.001 0.003
_4L_INF 0.189 0.231 0.002 0.364
_4UBN_GTH 0.296 0.640 0.014 0.003
_5OPEN07 0.007 0.035 0.000 0.005
_5KAOPENESS -0.153 -0.001 0.005 0.035
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 14.459 10.644 1.358 0.176
_2GDPCAP_GTH 0.101 0.068 1.479 0.141
_2LGDP_CAP 2.540 0.975 2.604 0.010
_2YTH_DEP -0.287 0.142 -2.016 0.045
_2OLD_DEP -1.122 0.599 -1.874 0.062
_3CRD_PRV 0.023 0.013 1.830 0.068
_3STVALTRADED 1.812 0.621 2.918 0.004
_3LR_DEPINT 0.148 0.198 0.746 0.456
_4L_INF 0.189 0.216 0.879 0.381
_4UBN_GTH 0.296 0.395 0.749 0.455
_5OPEN07 0.007 0.017 0.429 0.668
_5KAOPENESS -0.153 0.263 -0.580 0.562
R-squared 0.946 24.789
Adjusted R-squared 0.939 13.168
S.E. of regression 3.248 5.297
Sum squared resid 2,489.562 5.689
Log likelihood -672.836 5.454
F-statistic 146.560 0.402
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000




Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 265
Effects Specification
    Mean dependent var
    S.D. dependent var
    Akaike info criterion
    Schwarz criterion
    Hannan-Quinn criter.
Date: 02/06/10   Time: 01:40
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Test cross-section random effects
Test Summary
Cross-section random
Cross-section random effects test comparisons:
Cross-section random effects test equation:
Dependent Variable: _1S_GDP




are independent, with mean zero and constant variance 𝜍𝑒
2, for all individuals and all time 
periods. Given this assumptions, it follows that all behaviour differences between the individual 
countries and over time are captured by the intercept. Individual intercepts are included to 
―control‖ for these individual specific differences.  
In the fixed panel, we used the option of cross country weighted and White test. We use the 
weighted least square option to correct heteroskedasticity for GLS estimator. It has the effect of 
minimizing the weighted sum of squared residuals, where each squared residual is with 1/hi. Less 
weight is given to observation with higher error variance. The WLS estimator is bj values that 
make it as small as possible from the following variance (Wooldridge, 2008). 
The fixed effect panel data model is therefore estimated for a combined sample of 20 selected 
emerging economies and the results are shown in Table 6.4. The results for fixed effect 
regression shown in Table 6.4 are separated in 3 main groups: 
a) Column 0 to 6. Each institutional variable is being introduced individually with the 
demographic, financial and macroeconomic variables act as the control variables. 
b) Column 7 to 10. Institutional variables are grouped together to measure the institutional 
accumulative effects on private savings. 
c) Column 11 to 15. Each institutional variable interact with credit to private sector, i.e. 
proxy to finance development, to measure the indirect financial deepening effect of each 
institutional factor towards private savings.  
Column 1 is the result from regressing using the basic stripped down Life Cycle Model without 
any institutional factors added to it. The result indicates that GDP per capita growth and per  
capita income is positively related at one percent significance with private savings.  Even if 
institutional variable is added to right hand side (RHS) of the equation, we found that 
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TABLE 6.4 FIXED EFFECT WITH ICRG NON-MARKET INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
C 16.88*** 18.02*** 14.6*** 19.45*** 22.11*** 13.49*** 17.64*** 19.09*** 23.96
23.36**
* 39.14*** 19.67*** 21.63*** 8.3*** 22.13***
GDPCAP_GTH 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.10** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.12***
LGDP_CAP 2.62*** 2.48*** 3*** 2.1*** 2.68*** 2.88*** 2.68*** 2.34*** 2.62*** 2.58*** 1.26*** 3.08*** 2.4*** 2.63*** 2.87***
YTH_DEP -0.32*** -0.33*** -0.29*** -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.29*** -0.33*** -0.40*** -0.46*** -0.47*** -0.54*** -0.3*** -0.37*** -0.28*** -0.35***
OLD_DEP -1.14*** -1.13*** -1.17*** -0.87*** -1.4*** -1.01*** -1.16*** -0.88*** -1.21***
-
0.92*** -1.29*** -1.5*** -1.07*** -0.5*** -1.32***
CRD_PRV 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02*** 0.024** 0.03*** -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.02 0.08*** -0.03
STVALTRADED 0.42 0.45* 0.44 0.47* 0.30 0.23 0.55 0.59 0.49 0.34 0.72 0.67 0.33 0.83*** 0.17
LR_DEPINT 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.41*** 0.33*** 0.39*** 0.32*** 0.38*** 0.42*** 0.48*** 0.42*** 0.24*** 0.45*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.36***
LG_INF 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.28 0.04 0.28 0.22 0.18 -0.11 -0.07 0.26 0.31*** 0.3*** 0.42*** 0.10
UBN_GTH -0.21 -0.20 -0.36 0.05 -0.33 -0.13 -0.35 -0.09 -0.25 -0.07 -0.02 -0.61*** -0.16 0.01 -0.33
OPEN 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02
KAOPENESS -0.34 -0.33 -0.35 -0.35 -0.45*** -0.38*** -0.31 -0.33 -0.42** -0.42** -0.34 -0.26 -0.4*** -0.23 -0.26
Corruption 0.07 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.14 -0.39
Law & Order -0.19 -0.29** -0.38*** -0.42*** -0.40*** -0.77***
Bureaucracy 0.31 0.36*** 0.34*** 0.39*** -0.65***
 Stabl i l i ty -0.44*** -0.47*** -0.47*** -0.84***
 Accountabi l i ty  -0.04 -0.11 0.72***
Corruption & 
Prv Credit 0.01***
Law & Order &  
Prv Credit 0.01***
Bureaucracy &  
Prv Credit 0.01***
Stabi l i ty &  Prv 
Credit 0.01**
Accountabi l i ty 
&  Prv Credit -0.01***
Adjusted R2 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
***  significant at 1 percent level 
**     significant at 5 percent level 
*  significant at 10 percent level 
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GDP per capita growth and GDP per capita is still positively related at one percent significance 
with private savings. This connotes that the higher is per capita growth and per capita income 
level, the greater is the private savings ratio. The youth and old dependent variables result 
shows that both of them are significantly related to private savings, even though negatively. 
This signifies that the lower is the youth and dependency share of population, the higher will 
be the private savings. Looking across the column when the institutional variables are added to 
the equation, the youth and old dependency variables remain negatively related at one percent 
significance with private savings. 
The elasticity coefficient for youth dependency ratio ranges from minus 0.28 to minus 0.54.  In 
another words, one percent increase in youth dependency age group over total population, 
would decrease private savings ratio over GDP by minus 0.28 to minus 0.54 percent. The old 
dependency variable shows negative relationship with one percent increase in old dependency 
youth population resulting in decrease of savings between 1 to 1.5 percent of savings. The 
results confirm with previous studies (e.g. Leff, 1969; Fry, 1973; Fry and Mason, 1982; Shultz, 
2004; Hondroyiannis et al, 2005) that have found an inverse relationship between old and 
dependency population with savings.  
 The deposit interest rate shows a positive significant effect at one percent on private savings 
across the column even with institutional variables added in. The coefficient ranges from 0.24 
percent to 0. 45 percent, which indicate that one percent increase in real deposit interest rate 
would increase private savings by 0.24 to 0.45 percent. The positive coefficient indicates that 
the substitution effect is more dominant than the income effect.  The result is consistent with 
the hypothesis by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) and the empirical studies by Gupta 
(1984), Balsa (1992), and Hondroyiannis et al (2005), all of which find the positive 
relationship between real interest rates and savings.  
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GDP growth variable is also significant and the coefficient does not change substantially even 
after institutional variables are added in. A one percent increase in GDP growth contributed to 
0.10 to 0.13 percent increase in private savings. The result is consistent with the rest of the other 
finding from previous literatures, e.g. Carroll and Weil (1994); Masson et al, (1998); Chowdry, 
(2004); and Schrooten and Stephan, (2005), which argue that economic growth has a significant 
impact on aggregate savings. 
The effect of credit to private sector as a proxy for financial development provides a mixed 
signal. When all the macroeconomic and demographic variables, i.e. column 1 of Table 6.4, are 
regressed together, the variables show insignificant relationship with private savings. Similarly, 
when each of the ICRG variables, i.e. corruption, law & order, bureaucracy, stability, and 
accountability were inserted one at a time, as shown in columns 2 to 5 of Table 6.4, credit to 
private sector does not reflect significant relationship with private savings. This indicates that in 
an environment when only each of the institutional variable exist, credit to private sector or 
financial development may not play a significant role in affecting savings. However, when the 
institutional variables are grouped together, as shown from column 7 to 10, credit to private 
sector variable becomes significant. This connotes that when the all the institutional factors 
coexist, financial development proxy by credit to private sectors, becomes a significant factor 
affecting private savings. Based on this coefficient, a one percent increase in credit would result 
increase in private savings by 0.02 percent. Even when we decided to interact financial 
development variable with other institutional variables to measure the indirect significance of 
financial deepening, we find that financial development played a significant impact on private 
savings. We postulate that credit to private sector play a significant and positive role in 
influencing private savings in an environment where institutional factors prevail. 
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The result using share value traded over stock exchange to measure the impact of financial 
market on private savings (as shown in row 6 in Table 6.4)  shows insignificance with or without 
institutional variables being introduced into the equation. This signifies that the deepening of 
financial markets seems not to have any significant impact on the aggregate private savings. 
Other control variables that we used in the equation are inflation, urbanisation, financial 
openness and trade openness. The urbanization variable does not have any significant impact 
across all equations with and without institutional variables together.  Similarly inflation does 
not reflect any significant impact on savings with or without institutional variables, except for 
columns 12 to 14, when we include the interaction of financial development variables with law 
and order, corruption and accountability variables. It can be interpreted that inflation has a 
significant positive impact on private savings in a country where there is deepening in financial 
sector is caused by prevalence of law and order, accountability or corruption.  
Trade openness shows an insignificant impact on savings in all the equations with or without the 
institutional variables, except in column 5. Apparently, trade openness has a negative effect on  
private savings in a country experiencing political stability,. 
Financial openness variable, which is synonymous with financial liberalisation, shows very 
mixed results. Financial openness shows negative significance effect in column 5 and 6 in Table 
6.4, when stability and accountability institutional variable are added separately into the 
equation. This indicates in an environment of stability and accountability, financial openness has 
a significant negative impact on private savings. Also, in columns 9 and 10, the financial 
openness variable shows a negative significant impact on savings when all institutional variables 
regressed together. This could only meant that when all the institutional factors were present 
contemporaneously, instituting financial openness would negatively impact private savings, due 
to the population tendency to spend more. 
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The next stage it to understand the impact of these institutional variables by regressing them 
against private savings. Each institutional factor are being added  one at a time into the equation 
as shown from column 2 to 6 in Table 6.4,  while keeping the demographic, financial and 
macroeconomic variables as the controlling variables. The result indicates that only the political 
stability variable (Column 5) has a significant effect on private savings. The sign shows that 
political stability has significant negative impact on the private saving ratio, suggesting that 
when political stability deteriorates, the population will save more for precautionary measures in 
the event the condition becomes worse. The results agree with the findings by Gyimah-
Brempong and Traynor (1996) on sub-Saharan countries who find that unstable politics have a 
detrimental effect on aggregate savings.  
With the institutional variables being regressed simultaneously, in others words all the 
institutional factors coexist contemporaneously, we find that most of these, such as law and 
order, bureaucracy and political stability, show significant impact on private savings , as 
depicted in column 7 until 10 of Table 6.4. Law and order from column 7 to 10 shows negative 
relationship, which is indicative that a country with less law respecting and abiding population, 
the aggregate savings will increase. Bureaucracy variable from column 8 to 10 shows positive 
impacts against private savings, which meant that more effective is the government bureaucracy, 
the higher is the aggregate private savings. Political stability from column 9 and 10 shows 
significant negative impact against private savings. It can be inferred that a country that is less 
politically stable will experience increased in aggregate savings. Only two institutional factors, 
i.e. corruption and accountability, do not show any significant effect on private savings.  
In contrast to the negative relationship in our findings between law and order against private 
savings, Dollar and Kraay (2000) and Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2006) studies find the positive 
relationship between rule of law and a country‘s growth. Our findings on the positive impact  of 
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effective bureaucracy on private saving is similar to the result by Ali (2003) and Mauro (1995), 
who found that effective bureaucracy is important to spur the country‘s economic growth.  
The next step is to analyse specifically the effect of institutional factors towards financial 
deepening by interacting both variables together. Do the institutional factors magnify the effect 
of financial development towards private savings? Columns 11 to 14 not only examine the 
impact of each institutional factor individually, but also the interactivity with financial 
development, in affecting private savings. The results show significant positive coefficient on 
private savings when financial development interacts with each institutional factor such as 
bureaucracy, law and order, corruption and stability, as depicted in column 11, 12, 13 and 15 of 
Table 6.4. This show that the increase in the level of bureaucracy, law and order, corruption and 
political stability have deepening effects towards financial sectors to positively affect private 
savings. Studies by Wiggler et al (2000), Beck et al(2003), and Himmelberg et al. (2000) shows 
the importance effective legal institutions and investor protection in ensuring improved and 
effective development in financial sectors. Beck et al (2003) show that improved legal and 
regulatory environment would have a positive impact in financial development of a country. 
 On other results, the interaction between accountability with credit to private sector variable 
resulted in negative effect on private saving as depicted in column 14 of Table 6.4. This shows 
that when accountability or transparency measures were instituted to deepen the  financial 
sectors, the effect is negative on aggregate private savings. This result is supported by Chin and 
Ito (2007) , who found that the deepening of financial system as a result of better legal, less 
corruption and open financial market did not have a significant effect on improving the country‘s 
aggregate savings.  
When the three institutional factors, i.e. bureaucracy, law and order and political stability, are 
regressed individually against private savings, the result shows insignificant relationship with 
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private savings. However, when the three variables are regressed together, they show significant 
effect as depicted from column 7 to 10. Furthermore, when these three institutional factors 
interact with credit to private sectors as shown in column 11 until 15, the result shows significant 
relationship with private savings. 
 We can conclude that from consistency and significance of the results, the three institutional 
factors - bureaucracy, law and order and political stability - have significant effects on private 
saving either directly or indirectly via deepening effects on financial sector towards private 
savings. 
6.4.2 Robustness Test  
Another source for institutional data is the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) based on a 
research project covering 212 countries, which stretches from 1996 to 2007.  The World Bank 
project headed by Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008) collect data for 1996, 1998, 2000, and  
yearly from 2002 until 2007. The indicators are based on several hundred individual variables 
measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 35 separate data sources constructed by 32 
different organizations from around the world. The areas are similar to the ones covered by 
ICRG database. The areas covered and the explanations are as below: 
i. Voice and Accountability. It measures the level of participation of the public in selecting the 
government elected officials. It also measures the freedom of expression, association and 
media. Essentially the ―voice and accountability‖ underlies the extent to which the 
government is perceived to be democratic, transparent and accountable. The higher the index, 
the more democratic and transparent is the government as perceived by the public. 
ii. Political Stability and Absence of Violence. It measures the perception of whether the 
government can easily be overthrown through illegal or unconstitutional means. 
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iii. Government effectiveness measures the perception indicating the ability of the civil servants 
to run the government administration, independent from political pressures. It also measures 
the quality of formulating policies and government‘s ability to implement the policies. 
iv. Rule of Law measures the public‘s perceived level of confidence towards the law and orders. 
It also includes the elements of contract enforcements, property rights, the current 
effectiveness of police and courts. 
v. Control of Corruption: Measures the public‘s perception towards the politicians, elites and 
special interest in gaining unfair advantages by means of bribe and unfair patronage. 
vi. Regulatory Quality: Measure the perception of the government effectiveness to formulate 
rules, policies and procedures in order to promote private sector development. It measures the 
government‘s regulatory bodies effectiveness to carry out the duties entrusted. 
All the units in which governance is measured follow a normal distribution with a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of one in each period. All the scores lies between -2.5 and 2.5, with 
higher scores corresponding to better outcomes and all have been normalised to the scale of 0 to 
1.  
Similar to Table 6.4, the results for fixed effect regression in Table 6.5 are separated in 3 main 
groupings: 
i. Column 0 to 6. Each institutional variable is being introduced individually with the 
demographic, financial and macroeconomic variables act as the control variables. 
ii. Column 7 to 10. Institutional variables are grouped together to measure the institutional 
accumulative effects on private savings. 
iii. Column 11 to 15. Each institutional variable interact with credit to private sector, i.e. proxy 
to finance development, to measure the indirect financial deepening effect of each 
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FIXED EFFECT WITH KAUFMAN NON-MARKET INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
TABLE 6.5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
C 64.1** 58.43** 61.73** 64.54** 57.57** 57.43** 55.29** 61.94** 67.05** 67.09** 68.7** 60.8** 52.83** 65.01** 65.4** 75.35** 56.29** 56.62**
GDPCAP_GTH 0.15 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.17*** 0.10 0.06
LGDP_CAP 1.81 2.35 2.07 2.62* 2.56 1.24 1.83 1.99 2.29 2.28 0.79 1.23 2.59 2.43 2.28 1.21 1.34 1.87
YTH_DEP -1.64** -1.67** -1.73** -1.75** -1.68** -1.54** -1.7** -1.73** -1.78** -1.78** -1.67**
-
1.67** -1.63** -1.74** -1.77** -1.91** -1.53** -1.72**
OLD_DEP -1.93** -1.96** -1.93** -2.34** -1.97** -1.35 -0.78 -1.93** -2.31** -2.31** -1.64* -0.77 -1.82*** -2.34** -2.38** -1.63 -1.35 -0.83
CRD_PRV 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04* -0.04 0.06 -0.04 0.03 0.00
STVALTRADED 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.55 0.52 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.66 0.93 0.14 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.58 0.50
LR_DEPINT 0.56** 0.53*** 0.54*** 0.58** 0.56*** 0.5***
0.48**
* 0.54*** 0.58** 0.58** 0.53*** 0.54** 0.53***
0.52**
* 0.59** 0.92** 0.50
0.48**
*
LG_INF 1.35** 1.78** 1.77** 1.63** 1.73** 1.63** 1.55** 1.77** 1.62** 1.63** 1.53***
1.24**
* 1.81** 1.71** 1.63** 1.01 1.66** 1.53**
UBN_GTH 0.52 0.93* 0.89 0.84 0.91 1.35 0.9* 0.89 0.82 0.82 1.23***
1.15**
* 0.92* 0.88 0.81 0.69 1.33** 0.89*
OPEN -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02
KAOPENESS 0.41 0.74 0.71 0.74 0.75 0.33 0.65 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.26 0.30 0.76 0.65 0.70 0.74 0.34 0.62
corruption 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.13
Rule of Law 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.11 0.00 -0.18
Gov. Eff'ness -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.18-0.19*** -0.07
stabi l i ty 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.06**
accountabi l i ty 0.12** 0.12** 0.11** 0.15
Reg. Qlty 0.4** 0.36** 0.34***
Corr & Prv Cred 0.00
L&O &  Prv Cred 0.00
Govt Efft &  
PrvCredit 0.00
Stab &  PrvCredit 0.00**
Acc't &  PrvCredit 0.00
Reg Qty &  
PrvCredit 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97   
***   significant at 1 percent level 
**     significant at 5 percent level 
*  significant at 10 percent level 
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institutional factor towards private savings.  
On the robustness test, we regress using institutional factors constructed by Kaufman, Kraay and 
Mastraazi from 1996 until 2007 (Kaufman et al, 2008).  Likewise, all control variables, i.e. 
demography, financial and macroeconomics, are to be regressed in the same period as Kaufman 
institutional variable. Similar methodology, i.e. fixed effect model is to be used with Kaufman 
institutional factors. The result of the test can be referred to Table 6.5.   
Firstly, based on the control variables, GDP per capita growth and credit to private sectors results 
show mix signal as most of the regression do not show any significant relationships against private 
savings with and without augmented  institutional variables, except only in equation 15 for GDP per 
capita growth and equation 12 for credit to private sectors. Therefore, we can conclude that growth 
and financial development do not have any significant impact on private savings for all the selected 
emerging economies.  
Both youth and old dependency population show significant effect across all the equations, therefore 
it reconfirms the finding of previous literature (e.g., Soyoung and Jong-Wha, 2008; Schrooten and 
Stephan, 2005; Hondroyiannis et al, 2005; Higgins and Williamson, 1996; Kelly and Schmidt, 1996; 
Maxwell Fry and Mason; 1982, 1988), indicating there is negative relationship between old and 
young dependency with private savings.  
Share value traded as proxy for financial market does not show any significant effect on private 
savings across all equations.  Real deposit interest rates and inflation rates show significant positive 
effect on private savings across all the equations with and without augmented institutions variables. 
One percent increase in real deposit rates results in increase of approximately of 0.5 percent in 
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aggregate private savings across all equations. The positive relationship in real interest rates indicates 
the substitution effect is more dominant than income affect when all the institutional factors are being 
considered.   
Similarly, one percent increase in inflation will result increase of 1 to 1.8 percent of aggregate 
savings. Similarly, the positive effect that the inflation rate has on private savings indicates the 
precautionary effect causing the population to save more in the face of increasing uncertainties. 
Urbanization factor provides mixed results as several equations, i.e. equation 1, 6, 10, 11, 12 16 and 
17, show significant effect while others do not indicate any relationships. In equation 6, the 
urbanisation variable shows positive effect when regulation quality, i.e. the only one institutional 
variable, shows significant affect on savings . Similarly, in  equation 10 and 11 when all the 
institutional variables are being factored collectively, urban growth variable shows significant impact 
on savings. In equation, 12, 16 and 17, urbanisation factor also becomes significant when corruption, 
accountability and regulation quality interact with financial development to measure institutional 
deepening impact on financial sectors. Based on the consistency of significance, it can be interpreted 
that urbanization becomes significant at only certain conditions, mainly when quality of regulation 
become significant in affecting saving as indicated in equation 6, 11 and 17.  Therefore, it can be 
interpreted that urbanization has a positive impact on savings when the government is able to 
formulate and implement effectively the regulations to promote private sector development.   
The use of financial and trade openness as the control variables do not indicate any significant effect 
in any equations in Table 6.5. Hence, it can be assumed that financial and trade openness do not have 
any impact on private savings in the presence of the institutional factors.  
237 
 
The next step is to examine the impact of institutional variables from equation 1 to 17. From column 
1 until 6, each institutional variable is introduced individually into the equation. Only voice 
accountability and regulation quality have a significant positive effect towards aggregate savings.  
Voice accountability refers to ability of oneself to express and elect the preferred government to 
govern the country. In a more democratic government, the population tend to save more as they feel 
more safe and secured. Regulation quality refers to the ability of the government to promote the 
development of private sectors.  The higher is the index, the greater is the effectiveness of the 
government in fostering the growth of private sectors. This meant that a government  that encourages 
business friendly environment would encourage more savings.  
The next section of robustness test is to test the effect of the institutional variables as a group as they 
are being introduced one at a time into the equation as illustrated from column 7 to 11. We find that 
in column 10, only voice and accountability shows positive significant effect after assembling 
together all five institutional variables into the equation. It illustrates that in an environment where 
the five institutional factors prevalent - corruption, rule of law, government effectiveness, political 
stability, and voice accountability - only voice accountability factor has significant positive impact in 
increasing the private savings of households and private sectors. 
In column 11, when all six of the institutional variables are regressed together, three of them show 
significant results against private savings ratio, albeit one is negatively related. Government 
effectiveness shows it is inversely related to private savings. The negative relationship indicates that 
the less effective is the government in governing the country, the higher is the level of private 
savings.  However, the result is considered unreliable as in the previous equation, i.e. equation 8 until 




 Regulatory quality as well as voice and accountability variables show positive effect towards 
aggregate private savings when they are regressed individually and group together. Studies that 
reflect the significance of voice and accountability can be traced from studies on democracy by the 
following researchers.  Drury et al (2006) shows that democracy has a significant impact on political 
stability that indirectly affect economic growth. Sandholtz, and Koetzle (2004) and Hellman (1998) 
discover that ex communist economies that have embraced democracy were able to make significant 
impact on economic growth. Barro (1996) and Helliwell (1994) also results shows that democracy 
has an indirect positive effect on growth through education and investment factors. In conclusion, a 
country with quality regulation as well as accountable and democratic government will encourage 
more savings.  
Similar to the test conducted on the ICRG institutional index, the next stage involved estimating the 
interaction effect between institutional factors with financial development, as shown in column 11 to 
17 of Table 6.5. The results indicate that equation 15 is the only equation where the institutional 
variable, i.e. political  stability variable, has the deepening impact on financial development.  Based 
on the equation, there are two inferences can be made, i.e. i) political stability has a significant 
positive effect on private savings, and ii) the interactivity affect between stability and credit to private 
sectors  indicates that political stability has a deepening effect on the financial sector, however the 
effect is negative on aggregate private savings.  Apparently, in a country experiencing political 
stability and deepening in financial sector, the population tend to spend more than savings.  
Based on the consistency and significance of the results using Kaufman institutional factors, we can 
make two inferences. Firstly, in an environment when there are several institutional factors present, a 
government that is accountable and democratic as well as possessing quality regulatory institution 
would experience increase in aggregate private savings.  Secondly, even though political stability 
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would have deepening effect on the financial sector of the economy, it would have a negative effect 
on aggregate private savings; similar to results using ICRG database. 
6.6 CONCLUSION 
The basic premise of the hypothesis proposed in this chapter is that a sound institutional framework, 
associated with good governance and policies would encourage more private savings in these 
countries. Specifically, in our empirical studies we examine the impact non-market institutions such 
as the level of corruption, adherence to law and order, political stability, effectiveness of bureaucracy 
and accountability.  Three stages of panel data regressions were conducted to examine the impact of 
non-market institution variable. The first stage involves testing each institutional variable separately 
in the equations. The second stage is to group them together in order to examine the grouping 
dynamics. The third stage is to interact each of the institutional variables with financial development 
proxy by credit to private sector to measure their partial impact on savings though financial 
development.  
In summary, the three stages of empirical analysis using the ICRG database indicators shows that 
political stability has shown a consistently negative effect on private saving.   When all the 
institutional variables were regressed together, law and order variable which shows that it has 
negative impact on savings, in contrast to bureaucracy variable showing positive impact on savings. 
On the effect of financial development, all the five non-market institutional variables have a 
deepening affect onto financial sector that positively affected savings.  
On the whole, our results support the hypothesis that non-market institutional variables do have a 
significant positive impact on private savings, except for two variables. Effective bureaucracy in the 
government seems to encourage increase in overall household and private savings. However, an 
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environment of sound political stability and adherence to the law and order seem to negatively affect 
the overall aggregate savings. The deepening effect on financial development by the non-market 
institutional variables is positively significant but the overall impact is considered minor. Based on 
the robustness test using Kaufman database, the result also indicates that government accountability 
and regulatory quality have shown consistent significant positive effect, either these variables being 








This thesis has investigated the role of institutional as well as traditional economic factors on savings 
and growth in light of the experience of 20 emerging economies over the past thirty years. The 
determinants of savings, financial development-growth nexus and non-market institutional-savings 
nexus were examine in detail to shed some light on these linkages which ultimately affect savings 
and investment behaviour at the aggregate level. The thesis has employed descriptive investigation, 
covered related theories and performed empirical analysis using pooling, time-series and panel 
estimation techniques to understand the dynamics and significance between savings and its 
determinants. The findings were carefully analysed and compared with previous findings and major 
events to understand these relationships. This final chapter presents an overview of the main theories 
and hypotheses, summarizes the key findings and draws relevant conclusions. 
7.2 RELEVANT THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES 
In summary, the major theories of savings and asset accumulation (LCH, PIH and Consumer 
Optimization Hypothesis) focus on the role of lifetime income and individual preferences. Studies by 
LCH primarily focus on the impact of demographic and macroeconomic factors in explaining their 
impact towards savings. PIH and consumer optimization models aim to rationalise the household 
decision over time based on the opportunity cost and prevailing interest rate in deciding the 
magnitude between savings and consumptions.  
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In studying savings, it is essential to take account of the role of financial development and growth in 
a country. Without financial development, aggregate savings would be undermined as there won‘t be 
a place where savers can keep their money safe and earn modest returns. Growth is also important as 
it relates to economic well being of the economic agents, i.e. the income of the households and 
private sectors. Most theories on financial intermediation have pointed out the importance of 
developing the finance sector as a prerequisite for the country‘s economic growth (Diamond and 
Dybvig, 1983, Becievenga and Smith, 1991; Greenwood and Johnson; 1990).  
Several differences among previous findings have developed regarding prioritization of  the 
importance among these two variables, financial development and income (GDP) growth, and 
Chapter 5 examine the issue in more depth. Theories of financial liberalisation led by McKinnon and 
Shaw shows the indispensability of liberating the financial system from the government interference 
so that the countries are able to grow faster.  It is important for the financial institutions to be able to 
function effectively and efficiently by distributing the financial resources accordingly and perform 
their role as effective intermediaries linking those surplus units with those who are rightfully in need.  
Ultimately, the financial system should perform its role in transforming the economy‘s savings into 
productive investment opportunities, directly through the financial markets or indirectly through 
financial intermediaries, by minimizing the transaction cost and provide modest return to its 
customers and investors. 
 On the other hand, La Porta et al (1997, 2003), and Acemoglu et al (2001, 2004) among others have 
emphasised the importance of property rights and the role of contracts in affecting the country‘s 
financial development and economic growth. However, they differ on the origination or causation 
that prompted the development of property rights and contracts in trading. La Porta et al highlighted 
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the importance of the institutional system based on legal origins; in contrast, Acemoglu et al (2001) 
proposed the endowment hypothesis based primarily on settlers‘ mortality rate, while Acemoglu 
(2004) proposed the political institutional hypothesis hinging on de jure and de facto political 
institution. 
Several studies conducted by Beck et al, (2003a and 2003b) also investigate the link between 
property rights, financial development and growth. The enforceability of property rights reflects the 
extent of the market forces in shaping the overall distribution of resources effectively. However, none 
of the studies have examined in detail the impact of these non-market institutional factors, e.g. 
corruption, bureaucracy, stability as well as law and order on aggregate private savings in these 
emerging economies.  
The dispute on property rights mainly concern between the government and private sectors, which 
includes the public in general. The extent of property rights provided by the government to private 
sectors determine the freedom the free market enjoys without the interference from the higher up 
political power. The extent of non-interference by the political power also determines the extent of 
effectiveness of the role of financial sectors. Financial institutions that are subjected to needless 
interference from the political hierarchy are coerced to provide financial resources to preferential 
economic sectors rather than leaving to the market discretion to decide.  
As for the general public, the lack of proper and effective bureaucracy will cause them becoming 
frustrated due to needless red tapes that impede or slow down the delivery of services. Even simple 
procedures requiring government official endorsement become too complicated and cumbersome as 
numerous red tapes causing difficulties obtaining licenses and approvals. Corruption becomes 
rampant and becomes the norm to speed up government approvals as the public realises that the only 
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way to beat these red tape is by giving kickbacks. There is less transparency and accountability by 
the government as they feared there will be more public outcry as the public would soon realise the 
scale of corruption. The public would not respect and abide the rule of law as they felt the 
government and the politician were practicing double standards as they do not adhere to the laws in 
the first place. Laws were made to be flouted or used as a repressive tool designed for their own 
political interest. The adverse effect to the economy is considered ―economic rent‖ and renders costly 
to the long-term economic growth. This costly economic rent has a grave negative consequence to 
the growth of the economic as well as financial sectors as the population mistrust the government 
rule of law and perceived acceptable to be flouted. Foreign and local investors would be wary of the 
unsettling economic environment and uncertainty in recovering their investment. 
 In view of the above circumstances, depositors and private savers would be less inclined to deposit 
their savings in the country‘s financial institutions. The greater the uncertainties that are prevalent, 
the lesser will the amount of savings and the lesser will be the degree of financial development and 
economic growth.  The purpose of this thesis has been to highlight the importance of both economic 
and institutional factors in the determination of savings behaviour focussing on the emerging market 
economies. 
7.3 TRENDS AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Prior to the empirical analysis, descriptive analysis of the economic trends and patterns of 20 
emerging economies was undertaken as discussed in Chapter 3.  This section summarises the main 
finding of these trends and patterns of the 20 emerging economies, located mainly in three separate 
regions, i.e. Latin America, MENA and Asia Pacific, that stretches for more than thirty years. Saving 
and its likely determinants were analysed based on trends and underlying social, political and 
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economic factors that have affected them. In general savings shows a steady decline in Latin America 
and MENA region from average of 21 percent in 1970 to 16 percent in 2000-2004. However, savings 
in Asia Pacific region has experienced steady increase from 21 percent in 1970 to 29 percent in 2000-
2004. Based on previous theories and findings, the primary determinants of savings are the economic, 
financial and demographics factors such as growth, inflation, interest rates and dependent aged 
population. 
On average, the aggregate private savings in Latin America regions was steadily declining, except 
Chile whose savings has increased since the government decided to institute private pension system 
in 1981. Columbia has seen its savings remained constant until mid 1990s, when it started to decline 
due to declining price of its agriculture products.  In Latin America, during the early 1970s until 
middle of 1990s, the region was undergoing political and economic turmoil. The oil crisis, regime 
turnover and inability of the governments to manage their economy have caused growth in Latin 
America to decline, similar to the decline in the saving rates (refer to chapter 3 - Table 3.6.2.1). On 
average most of the growth is less than 3 percent, except Chile has enjoyed better growth since mid 
1980‘s from open economy policy and competent economic management.   
Inflation and interest rates were at high levels and showing volatile fluctuations that has caused great 
uncertainties in 1980s until the end of 1990s that has adversely affected savings.   Credit to private 
sectors proxy for financial development has shown a steady increase until 1990, before showing 
steady decline due to monetary policy tightening to mitigate the uncontrollable inflation and 
escalating debt. Based on the analysis of trends, credit to private sectors does not seem to be highly 
correlated and affected savings. This is due to the credit provided were mostly spent by households 
and private sectors on the escalating cost rather than for savings.   
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Youth dependency was showing a declining trend, except in Argentina where the rate remained 
relatively unchanged. Old dependency, in contrast, is showing an increasing trend.  In other words, 
youth dependency has positive correlation with savings, whilst old dependency is showing negative 
correlation, contrary to the findings by other scholars. Urban growth shows similar declining trend 
since 1970s, which reflects positive correlations to savings. This indicates that increased in urban 
migration is correlated with improved aggregate savings. 
Private savings in MENA region shows a mild U-shape trend declining in 1980‘s before resurging in 
1990s. Yet, the savings level in 2000 is lower compared to 1970s. In 1970s and 1980s, oil crisis and 
Arab-Israel conflict have shaped the regional economic climate. The average high savings in the 
1970s in MENA was mainly attributed to Saudi Arabia‘s high savings from income earned from 
increases in oil prices and non-oil producing countries reaping spill over effect from investment by 
other oil producing countries. Overall, GDP per capita growth in the region over 30 years is 
considered low and reflects mild U-shaped trend with lows in 1980s (refer to Chapter 3: Table 
3.6.2.2). The trend similarities indicate that it has positive correlation with savings.   
In early 1970s, the GDP per capita growth was extremely high due to unprecedented growth 
experienced in Saudi Arabia that has affected the average of the region. In 1980s, MENA has 
recorded negative growth due to severe growth decline in Saudi Arabia from oil price decline. Credit 
to private sector has been increasing steadily and the trend reflected inverse correlations with savings. 
Except in Egypt and Turkey between1990 to 1994, their credit supplied dropped as both countries 
had to reduce it due to experiencing mounting debt.  
Inflation also reflected a mild hump shaped trend in 1980s as most countries were experiencing peak 
inflation, especially Turkey, Israel and Egypt before declining.  Inflation is perceived to be negatively 
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correlated with savings due to its inverse trend in relations to savings during that period . 
Demographically, youth population in the region has been declining which reflects positive 
correlations with savings, somewhat contrary to theory. Old dependency has been increasing steadily, 
which reflects negative correlations with savings, consistent with the previous theories. Urban growth 
has remained relatively constant from 1970 until end of 1990 before it began to decline until 2006, 
which indicates it does not have similar trend as savings, therefore the relationship seems to be mixed 
and insignificant. Terms of trade for MENA shows mixed and inconsistent trend through the years 
and certain countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel have missing data in certain years. 
Unlike the other two regions, Asia Pacific private savings has shown a steady increase from 1970 to 
2004, except Philippines and Indonesia from 1995 to 1999 when their savings temporarily declined 
due to financial crisis. High savings in Malaysia and Singapore was due to compulsory savings by 
both governments with the establishment of Employee Provident Fund (EPF) in Malaysia and Central 
Provident Fund (CPF) in Singapore.  
Growth in Asia Pacific region is better compared to other regions with recorded growth average more 
than 4 percent except from 1980 to 1984 due to recession from declined in price of agriculture 
products and in 1995 to 1999, and due to financial crisis from mounting debt. Only Philippines has 
average growth lower than 4 percent due to incessant political turmoil and natural catastrophe that 
has adversely affected the economy. Growth trend line show it remained constant and does not 
follow similar trajectory to savings, therefore we can postulate both variables are not significantly 
correlated.  
Credit to private sectors shows an overall increasing trend until 2000, which reflects positive 
correlation with savings. However, in 2001 until 2004, there was a decline in credit to private sectors 
248 
 
as most Asia Pacific countries, i.e. Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand,  were undergoing financial 
restructuring, and pursuing cautious monetary policy. Inflation overall was undergoing steady decline 
even though inflation in this region was already considered very low compared with the other two 
regions. Only Indonesia, Philippines and South Korea experienced double digit inflation from 1970 
to 1985, but yet the inflation was less than 20 percent. Due to its declining effect, inflation is 
considered to be negatively correlated with aggregate savings, which was steadily increasing.  
Youth dependency similar to other regions shows declining trend from 42 percent in 1970 to 26 
percent in 2006, which indicates a negative effect on private savings. Meanwhile, old dependency 
population was showing steady increasing trend line from average 3.5 percent to 6.6 percent from 
1970 to 2006, which indicates its positive relationship with savings. Urban growth shows steady 
declining trend. The decline in urban growth indicates lesser migration to urban areas as compared to 
previous years. When urban migration declines, but saving rate increases, it therefore implies that 
urban migration is negatively correlated with aggregate savings.  
7.4 PRIVATE SAVINGS AND DETERMINANTS 
The first formal empirical analysis undertaken in Chapter 4 was divided into two parts: the main 
analysis, which includes all the 20 emerging economies, and the robustness analysis, which 
subdivided the sample into three main regions, i.e. Asia Pacific, MENA and Latin American. We 
chose the methodology of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) on both main and robustness 
analyses for our empirical methodology to find the relationships between savings and its 
determinants. Several differences and similarities on the findings appeared from the main and sub-
sample regressions.  
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Per capita growth in general and in particular growth in the Asia Pacific region shows a significant 
positive relationship in affecting private savings. However, in the MENA region, the result shows an 
insignificant relationship between growth and private savings. This may signify there are factors 
other than growth in affecting private savings. In Latin America region, the results are quite mixed 
when more control variables are added into the equation, per capita growth becomes insignificant. In 
crux, growth in Asia Pacific region affects savings more than other region. 
All the results in the main part of the analysis show that youth dependent population has a significant 
negative effect on private savings. The Asia Pacific and MENA regions show similar findings, 
however, Latin America shows mixed results as findings in some equations are similar while others 
are insignificant. The results show that youth dependent population in Latin America does not 
contribute towards aggregate dissaving compared to the other two regions. 
 Old dependency population also shows negative significant effect on private savings in the main test. 
Regional-wise, the MENA region shows similar results, however, Asia Pacific and Latin American 
regions show mixed result. These results signify that retirees spending habit in Asia Pacific and Latin 
American region do not cause aggregate dissaving as postulated by LCH and most previous 
literatures.  
The results of the main part of the analysis, which includes all emerging economies, shows that 
financial development impacts positively on private savings, albeit that the coefficient diminishes as 
more variables added. Asia Pacific and Latin American region also show similar result, however, 
MENA shows negative relationship. The negative relationship means that greater financial 
development causes savings to decline, the underlying reason being that as more credit becomes 
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available, households need to save less in order to buy high ticket items, such as houses, cars and 
others. 
Based on the main results, real interest rate has a significant but negative impact on savings, which is 
similar to MENA and Latin American regions that shows significant yet negative effect on savings. 
In other words, the income effect is more dominant than the substitution effect on savings. In 
contrast, Asia Pacific region shows a positive significant effect indicating substitution effect is more 
dominant in this region. It can be interpreted that there is propensity to save in Asia Pacific region, in 
contrast to dissaving in MENA and Latin American region when the real interest rate rises. 
All the regions, excluding Asia Pacific, display the inverse effect of Ricardian Equivalence, in which 
government savings has positive effect on private savings. On the other hand, Asia Pacific region 
shows non-Ricardian Equivalent effect as government savings do not indicate any significant effect 
on savings.  
Latin American and Asia Pacific region inflation results were rather mixed. When we run the 
regression for the entire emerging economies, the result was also mixed. Only MENA region shows 
that inflation has a negative impact. It seems inflation does not have a substantial significant impact 
on saving in Latin American and Asia Pacific. Since inflation is normally used as proxy for time of 
uncertainties, it can be assumed that during period of uncertainties, it does not affect significantly the 
population to save or spend more.  
Trade openness in Asia Pacific and Latin America show positive significant relationship with 
increased savings as the regions become more open. The result is also similar when all the regions 
are pooled together.  Even though the openness effect in Asia Pacific region is significant the impact 
may be considered to be relatively minor given the small magnitude of the coefficient estimates. In 
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MENA region the result was mixed. The first few equations indicate significant positive effect, but as 
additional variables added the openness effect on savings becomes insignificant. 
Terms of trade shows significant positive effect on savings when data for the 20 economies are 
pooled together. Similar results also reflected in all the sub-regions. Hence, the result shows that a 
favourable terms of trade has a significant impact in increasing saving in all emerging economies. A 
favourable terms of trade implies that in the long term the population income will grow, which will 
increase aggregate savings.  
All the regions show urban growth has a significant effect on savings but the nature and orientation 
of the effect varies. Asia Pacific and MENA region urban growth has a negative impact, while Latin 
American region shows a positive impact. When we pool the data for all the countries together, all 
the emerging economies shows a negative impact. The negative impact shows that increase in urban 
growth causes the urban population to save lesser than when they reside in rural area; hence 
contributed to lesser aggregate savings. Several reasons can be given for the increased dissaving: 
mainly the availability of insurance and pension fund scheme would discourage the urban dwellers to 
increase savings. Secondly, it could be attributed to the high cost of living that has consumed most of 
their income for them to save. 
The remittance impact on savings for all the emerging economies shows a significant but negative 
effect on savings. Similar results were also found in Asia Pacific region, where remittance shows a 
negative effect on savings. The negative results indicate that the more remittance flows into the host 
countries, the more dissaving occurs. The dissaving effect would indicate more spending by the 




7.5 FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH 
Chapter 5 investigated the causality between financial development and economic growth within a 
panel cointegration framework. Firstly, using panel VAR analysis to test the short term relationship 
and causality among the selected emerging economies, the result shows that there is short run 
causality running from economic growth to financial development. We decided to extend the analysis 
by using Pedroni and Johansen cointegration methods to confirm whether there is a long term 
relationship. Both methodologies confirm that there is indeed a strong long term relationship.  
After applying error correction terms within Johansen cointegration methodology, the result indicates 
that there is only univariate direction running from growth towards financial development.  This is in 
agreement with the results by the majority of other studies which found that there is causality 
originating from financial development towards growth. (Levine and Zervos,1998; Rajan and 
Zingales,1998; Beck et al, 2000 and 2003; Wachtel, 2001; Christopoulos, 2004; Levine and Thorsten, 
2004; and Ghirmay, 2005). The finding is in agreement with the endogenous growth hypothesis and 
the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis, which in essence postulate that deepening and liberalizing the 
financial sector is prerequisite to improving the growth of the country.  
Most economies in emerging economies began to open up during the middle 1980s after the 
resolution from the Washington Consensus. Evidently, most emerging governments began to pursue 
the course of economic restructuring and liberalizing the financial sector by allowing interest rates 
float and allowing more foreign equity holdings in the financial sector.  
Import substitution industry has deemed failure and most countries are vying to attract foreign 
investors to invest and bring their expertise into their countries. Substantial loans were being 
253 
 
provided to the private sectors to allow them to start up or expand their existing business as reflected 
in figure 3.6.3.1 until 3.6.3.3.   
As a result, during the early 1990s until mid 1990s, most emerging economies in all the regions are 
experiencing positive growth and a few of them are experiencing robust growth.  Emerging 
economies in Asia Pacific have witness substantial growth with South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Singapore registered growth of more than 6 percent average (Figure 3.6.2.3). India 
took a longer period to realise growth as they have more challenging and pressing economic and 
structural issues, such as dismantling complicated tariffs and allowing foreign investment to stake 
equity in various economic sectors. However, from 1995 until 2004, the country recorded more than 
4 percent growth, which greater than period pre-1995. However, in 1997, due to lower investment 
yield and growing deficit, the foreign investors suddenly withdrew their funds from the region 
causing extreme cash flow shortages, which resulted most Asia Pacific economies contracted 
severely to near depression
1 
until 1999. However, by 2002 most of these countries managed to 
recover, albeit not to the pre-financial crisis level.  
In Latin America, most of the economies in 1980s and 1990s were grappling with high inflations and 
unstable political climate with frequent changes in regime. The 1994 Mexico financial crisis caused 
contagious adverse effect on the investment climate in other Latin American economies that caused 
investors to avoid from further investing there. There was less robustness on the effect of financial 
development compared to Asia Pacific region as far as providing more credit to spur economic 
growth.  
                                                          
1 Refer to Chapter 3 section 3.5, in which each of the Asia emerging economies are being described since 1970‘s. 
During the 1997, all of these countries are adversely affected, however, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and 




There is restriction in increasing more credit by the government to the private sectors as the region 
was already mired in debt. Most of the credit supplied by international lenders was used to retire the 
mounting outstanding debt and only a small portion of the credit was used for new capital 
investment. Furthermore, by increasing money supply into the economy it would trigger further 
uncontrollable inflation that has been plaguing most of the Latin American economies since early 
1980s. 
MENA growth economies especially the oil producing countries, the economies was driven by the 
price of petroleum. North African countries which are non-oil producers, their economies were also 
undergoing financial transformation and liberalisation. Countries like Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia 
agreed to undergo financial liberalisation and opening of their economy as a precondition to 
receiving financial assistance from IMF to spur their economic growth. Israel and South Africa were 
undergoing major upheaval as South Africa went through economic and political adaptation from 
apartheid and isolated sanctioned economy into a newly open economy with new political regime. 
Similarly, Israel‘s economy was rocked endlessly by Jewish-Palestinian conflict that has severely 
affected its economy. However, the economic growth was helped with migration of highly skilled 
immigrants from previous Soviet Union satellite countries that enable the economy to migrate into 
high tech industry that has spurred the growth. The role of financial development did not contribute 
as much as other factors in contributing towards the region‘s economic growth.  
The results from the ―financial development and growth‖ empirical analysis were only able to 
confirm one of the two proposed hypotheses. Based on the second hypothesis - financial development 
has a short run Granger causality effect on economic growth of the emerging economies - our 
empirical result using VAR method shows the opposite, i.e. growth has short run Granger causality 
on financial development. However, the result from using the VEC Johansen F-test shows short term 
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bivariate effect, in which financial development and growth has short-term effect running from both 
directions. Due to two different results produced by both methods, the hypothesis, i.e. financial 
development has a short run Granger causality effect on economic growth of the emerging 
economies, has not been able to be rejected or confirmed. 
However, on the third hypothesis - financial development has a long term causality effect on 
economic growth of the emerging economics - our empirical results indicate that indeed financial 
development has a long term causality effect on growth using Vector Error Correction Method 
(VECM). We hypothesise that financial development would be the driving factor to keep on 
sustainable growth as clearly shown in the growth of emerging economies since 1990s, except during 
1997 financial crisis perceived as overdue correction in the financial market. Rapid growth spurned 
by rapid expansion of credits and development of financial markets has caused unsustainable growth 
such as 1994 Mexico and 1997 Asia financial crisis (Springer and Molina, 1995 and Mishkin, F., 
1999). Only prudent monetary and fiscal policy would ensure sustainable growth for the long-term 
(Borio and Shim, 2007). 
7.6 PRIVATE SAVINGS AND NON-MARKET INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
Earlier study by North (1990) has emphasised the need to have institutional framework based on 
protection of property rights and respecting law and order for the countries‘ economy to move 
forward. La Porta et al (1999) and Acemoglu et al (2001) have come out with their own hypothesis, 
i.e. legal origin and endowment respectively, to explain the source and origin of the current state of 
institutions prevalent in most countries. Rodrik (2000) has argued the importance of combining the 
―non-market institutions‖ that acts as regulatory, stabilizing and legitimising functions with laissez 
faire economy to ensure that free market is sustainable. The role of non-market institutions is to be 
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treated as complementary, instead of adversarial, so that free market ideals such as protection of 
property rights are able to flourish, especially in newly emerging economies.  
Based on these set of reasoning, in Chapter 6 we tested on several ―non-market institutional 
variables‖, a term coined by Rodrik. All the indexes were obtained from the database compiled by 
ICRG group and Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi under auspices from World Bank. The institutional 
factors were then tested along with other control variables, including demography, financial and   
macroeconomic variables, to determine the impact on private savings based on our hypothesis that 
non-market institutions have a significant positive impact in determining the level of aggregate 
savings.  
The main empirical analysis in Chapter 6 examines the institutional factors based on the ICRG 
compilation. The institutional factors include, adherence to the i) rule of law, ii) effectiveness of 
bureaucracy, iii) level of political stability, iv) level of accountability or transparency and finally, v) 
level of corruption. Based on all 14 equations using Fixed Effect panel regression as shown in Table 
6-4, our findings have revealed a few important facts. 
One of the main results show that political stability has significant negative effect on private saving 
when each of the institutional variables tested separately. The negative relationship implies that the 
more politically unstable the country is, the greater risk-averse the public becomes and the more they 
will save.  
The next step involved all the institutional variables being tested simultaneously, resulting in 
institutional variables such as stability, law and order as well as bureaucracy becoming significant. 
However, the coefficient for law and order and political stability variables is negative, while the 
bureaucracy coefficient is positive. The negative impact of law and order imply that in an 
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environment devoid of equality and enforcement of law as well as politically instability, the economy 
will experience an increase in private savings. As a result, the population becomes less confident of 
the way the government is being run that they decided to save more for precautionary purposes.  
The other result indicates that the increased effectiveness of bureaucracy has a positive impact on the 
level of aggregate savings.  Bureaucracy, which connotes efficient methods of organization, means 
that the more effective the government bureaucracy is in performing and dispensing its tasks, the 
more confident the public of the country‘s governance, which translates into increased savings by the 
public 
The third test involved measuring the effect of non-market institutions have on financial development 
in affecting private savings, or in other words, the deepening effect that institutional factors may have 
on financial system that could affect private savings. This involved all the non-market institutional 
variables interacting with credit to private sector in the regressions. However, in each respective 
equation, there is also autonomous non-market institutional variable, which is not subjected to 
interactive effect (Chapter 6: column 11 to 15 in Table 6.4).  
The results show after each non-market institutions variable - i.e. corruption, law and order, 
bureaucracy, stability and accountability - interact with credit to private sector, each combined 
variable shows positive significant effect on private savings, except accountability which show 
negative significance. However, except for accountability showing positive significance, the other 
autonomous non-market institutions have significant negative effect on private savings.  The results 
indicate that even though non-market institutional variables have a deepening effect on financial 
institutions which positively affected private savings, the autonomous institutional variables have a 
negative effect on private savings that mitigates the positive impact of financial deepening. In other 
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words, since the negative coefficient of the autonomous non-market institutions is larger than the 
positive coefficient from the combined interactive variables, the overall deepening impact of the 
institutional variables becomes inconsequential.  
The analysis is complemented by a robustness test using Kaufman et al index over a shorter period, 
which generated slightly different results. Instead of five institutional variables used by ICRG index, 
Kaufman index used six. Both indexes have variables that matched to each other except Kaufman has 
an additional variable, i.e. quality of regulation. After undergoing the first two empirical exercises, 
where non-market institutional variables are being regressed separately and later jointly together, the 
results reveal that regulatory quality and voice and accountability variable shows consistent positive 
significant affect on aggregate private savings. It connotes that a country with a government that is 
well endowed with effective regulatory bodies, able to effectively and efficiently perform the 
mandated responsibilities, will experience increased aggregate private savings. In addition, countries 
with government perceived to be democratic, transparent and accountable will also experience 
increase in private savings.   
The final result on the interactions between institutional variables with financial development reveals 
that political stability has a significant deepening effect on the financial sector, but has negative 
effect on private savings. In other words, the climate of political stability has managed to assist the 
financial sector to thrive, however, has decreasing effect on the country‘s aggregate private savings.  
In summary, the result in general supports the first hypothesis, i.e. sound institutional factors based 
on respect on property rights have positive effect in increasing aggregate private savings in the 
emerging economies as shown by the effect of bureaucracy, accountability and regulation quality. 
Effective bureaucracy in a government seems to provide the incentive to save further. It also meant 
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that the government is properly managed and resulted improvements in the public‘s confidence by 
investing their money into savings.   
However, increased political stability and respect towards law and order seems to affect savings 
negatively by virtue of households and private sectors spending more than savings. In this respect, in 
an environment of political instability with less law abiding powers and respect for orders, the 
population will tend to save more as a precautionary measure. However, the deepening impact of the 
institutional factors on financial development has shown inconsequential effect despite showing 
certain significance. The robustness test instead shows two other institutional variables, i.e. 
regulatory quality and accountability, have shown consistent significant positive effect on savings. 
 Overall, the empirical analysis of Chapter 6 shows that government that have – i) effective 
bureaucracy in managing the country‘s administration ii) regulatory bodies that are able to formulate 
effective policies and procedures and iii) transparent and accountable in their governance – are able 
to create an environment for increased aggregate private savings conducive for further investment. 
These results support our overall hypothesis that non-market institutional environment has a positive 
effect on increasing aggregate private savings.  
7.6 RECOMMENDED FUTURE RESEARCH 
Previous studies have not explored the impact of non-market institutional factors on private savings 
in emerging market countries.  While this study takes a step further to formally investigate this 
hypothesis at the aggregate level, building up on the law, finance and institutions literatures, there are 
several areas that could be explored further as an extension of existing research. One possibility 
would be to investigate at the micro-level changes in the level of households‘ savings at country, 
state or city level and the effect of detailed composition of institutional factors affecting them. Due to 
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the rapid development of comprehensive regulation, improved governance and the fight against 
corruption in these countries, these enhancements may have a direct effect on the savings behaviour 
which would have an impact on level of overall household savings.  It would also be interesting to 
explore the underlying and dynamic changes that these detailed institutional factors may have effect 
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